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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the role of urban planning in the reconstruction of war-tom 
cities, particularly under the aegis of international transitional administrations, and 
the impact of the approaches adopted on long-term development, sustainability and 
reconciliation between communities. Post-war reconstruction initiatives at the city 
level have been examined previously in only a handful of cases, and mostly from an 
architectural and urban conservation point of view. Mostar, which is the main case 
study for this research, has also been studied in the past from these perspectives. 
This thesis, however, attempts to shed light on the role urban planning has played 
in Mostar over the past fifteen years, and how it has been understood and used by 
local interest groups and various international actors, especially the international 
administration - the European Union Administration of Mostar. 
This research straddles the worlds of urban planning, state-building, governance, 
post-war reconstruction and peace building. Based on an in-depth review of 
literature in these areas, and an extensi\:,e qualitative field study, it concludes that 
although urban planning has his'torically played an important role in urban (and 
indeed, national) recovery after conflicts, it has been marginalised in more recent 
post-war reconstruction efforts due to the overarching emphasis on building a 
liberal peace, in particular, the efforts of the international community on less state-
and more market-oriented approaches; and the unwillingness to acknowledge that 
post-war reconstruction is a long-term effort which requires thinking beyond one's 
own mandate. 
Busting the myth that Mostar was the ideal multi-ethnic Yugoslav city prior to 
1992, this study demonstrates that a thorough understanding of the context is vital 
in order to establish (and achieve) realistic post-war reconstruction goals. It suggests 
that in post-war environments, incremental efforts at reforming institutions, from 
the bottom-up, can have a greater impact than radical, one-size fits all prescriptions 
for reform. In this process, urban planning can playa significant role, both as a lens 
to understand the historical socio-economic, institutional and political context, 
fissures and fault-lines, and as an instrument to effect change and begin to 're-
envision' a more positive future for war-ravaged cities and countries. Yet, so often, 
it remains 'the road not taken', as 'short-termist', humanitarian approaches continue 
drive reconstruction processes all over the world. 
This research contributes to the literature on post-war reconstruction, transitional 
administrations as well as urban planning. It also provides food for thought for 
policy-makers and practitioners undertaking the reconstruction of war-tom cities in 
the future. Finally, it is also hoped that this work will in some way contribute to 
post-war recovery, development and reconciliation, if not perfect reunification, in 
the city of Mostar. 
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SEC T ION I: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES 
CHAPTER 1 
Research introduction and 
methodology 
5 
Chapter 1: Research introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This research study is set in the context of renewed interest in the mutuality of 
cities and conflict, growing awareness of issues of post-war reconstruction, closer 
scrutiny of the role of international administrations in post-war situations, and 
the revival of urban planning, both in literature and practice. This opening 
chapter provides a summary of the research context, the justification for this 
work, the main research question and the hypotheses being proposed. It then 
goes on to elaborate the methodological approach and techniques adopted, before 
summarising the thesis structure. 
1.1 Research context 
1.1.1 Cities, ~ destruction and reconstruction 
Conflict, cities and planning have had an intimate relationship throughout 
history, one that has been explored by many authors. For instance, in his seminal 
work "The City in History" (1961), Lewis Mumford argues that war has played a 
major role in shaping both the physical form and institutional structure of the 
city. Graham (2004) also suggests that throughout history, capture of strategic 
and politically important cities, as well as their deliberate destruction, has 
remained the ultimate symbol of conquest. Other literature on the history of 
urban development and urban planning also reinforces the argument that cities 
have always provided more than just a backdrop for war, and have in fact 
significantly influenced, and been influenced by, the nature of warfare. As cities 
developed, the strategies and tactics to conquer them also evolved. The 
advancements in the technology of warfare, in tum, led to further development 
in the art of fortification - stronger, higher walls, deeper and wider moats, 
ramparts and other such features emerged, changed and evolved in order to 
better protect cities from outside aggression. 
6 
Chapter J: Research introduction 
At the same time, it has also been argued that the city - ever since it came into 
existence - is characterised by as many struggles within as outside. Cities of the 
developing as well as developed world today bear witness to a 'thousand litde 
wars' (Mumford 1961: 66). The slums and informal settlements rubbing 
shoulders with the posh residential districts in cities such as Mumbai and Rio, 
the run down inner-city areas abutting rich business districts in American and 
European cities, the black neighbourhoods of New Orleans and the banlieus in 
France, signify important socio-economic divisions within cities. The growing 
social polarisation, due to various factors, combined with the end of the Cold 
War and transition to a unipolar world, have clearly had an important bearing 
on cities, and have all served to exacerbate violent urban conflict (Graham 2004). 
The Serb-Albanian divide in Mitrovica, the political and national divisions in 
Nicosia, the Shia-Sunni enclaves in Iraq, the Muslim-Christian divide in East and 
West Beirut, all illustrate the most obvious ethnic/nationalist/religious fault lines 
along which cities are divided. Disasters - whether natural or man-made - often 
serve as a magnifying glass, bringing a variety of urban fault lines to the surface 
and into the open. 
Harbom and Wallensteen (2007) report that there has been a steady decline in 
the occurrence of conflict since the end of the Cold War, with 32 armed conflicts 
in 23 locations reported in 2006. However, many countries are affected by more 
than one conflict, and the range of countries affected has expanded to touch 
virtually every continent, in recent years. Some authors refer to more recent 
conflicts as 'new wars' - wars that are caused by different factors, have different 
goals, different methods, and are financed in different ways, than the 'old wars', 
defined by Clausewitz as being between states and for a definite political end -
protection of state interest (Kaldor 1999; Miinkler 2005). Other authors, 
however, choose to emphasise the differences rather than the similarities 
between these 'new wars', arguing that each is a product of different 
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circumstances and thus needs to be treated differently (Barakat 1998; Luckham 
2004). 
An important common feature of the recent wars, however, is that distinction 
between a conflict and post-conflict situation is increasingly blurred. The formal 
end of conflict is usually anything but, and many of the conflicts that are said to 
be terminated never actually achieve complete closure (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 
1998; Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Barakat 2005a; Junne and Verkoren 
2005b). Still, as the number of conflicts goes down, more and more 'post-conflict' 
situations emerge - this has led to a renewed focus on the importance of post-
conflict reconstruction. Indeed, the emergence of post-conflict reconstruction as 
a specialised area of study and application is the result of a growing recognition 
that reconstruction of war-tom societies is an extremely complex process, which 
needs to address not only issues of physical destruction but also an 
institutional/governance fragility and ..... the destruction of relationships, 
including the loss of trust, dignity, confidence and faith in others ... " (Barakat 
200Sa: 10). A number of different approaches have been applied towards 
reconstruction of cities, destroyed either by wars or natural disasters. In post-war 
reconstruction, particularly, there are many lessons to be learnt from the 
nationally-directed reconstruction of European cities following the Second 
World War. Reconstruction in the aftermath of the Vietnam war comprised 
small-scale, individual efforts. Solidere in Beirut provides an example of private-
sector led reconstruction. Other recent examples of reconstruction, whether in 
Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan, have brought to the fore the role of external 
actors - the UN, EU, occupying powers and others - in the absence of state 
sovereignty. 
1.1.2 The role of urban plllIllling in post-war reconstruction 
The modem urban planning profession was founded in order to address the 
deteriorating physical, environmental and public health condition of newly 
industrialised cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
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utopian visions of Ebenezer Howard and Daniel Burnham, the integration of 
social and physical planning by Patrick Geddes, and the explanations of Master 
Planning by Edward Bassett were all significant milestones in the development 
of the planning profession. It received its biggest boost, however, only in the 
aftermath of the world wars, particularly the Second World War, thanks to the 
widespread destruction of cities across Europe. In fact, in most European 
countries, reconstruction planning began in the early 1940s, before the war was 
over, and the mood was decidedly pro-planning. Ideas such as zoning and 
pedestrianisation of city centres gained currency. The balance between 
conservation and modernisation generated widespread debate and discussion. 
Indeed, the decades following the Second World War witnessed what is termed 
by Ward as <: .. the widespread political triumphs of the planning idea" (Ward 
2002: 81). 
The last two decades of the 20th century, however, witnessed a decline in urban 
planning as it failed to address the new and varied problems faced by cities. 
Comprehensive, expensive and un-implementable masterplans, prepared by 
planners in their 'ivory towers', particularly contributed to the disenchantment 
with planning. Planning was unable to respond to new challenges of increased 
urbanisation of poverty and exclusion, deterioration of the environment and 
natural resources, and natural and man-made disasters. Sectoral programmes and 
projects became more popular, and land use was left as the most important 
(sometimes the sole) instrument in the hands of planners. Urban management, 
and subsequently, urban governance, soon became the new catch-phrases, 
virtually supplanting urban planning in the dictionary of local governments. The 
decline of planning was also undoubtedly accelerated by the end of communism 
and the centralised planning (economic and physical) which it had encouraged. 
The role of planners and planning in post-war reconstruction efforts also 
followed a similar course. While planners played a prominent and indeed 
visionary role in the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, in 
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many post-Cold War conflicts they have been marginalised as the emphasis on 
relief and recovery, and a short-termist approach (advocated by many 
international agencies), gained currency. Traditional planning requires a strong 
body of baseline information - in the aftermath of conflict, such information and 
data is hard to obtain, and takes time to generate afresh. Therefore, planning is 
labelled as being too 'time-consuming', and piecemeal interventions are 
undertaken in the short-term, often with little consideration for their long-term 
impact. The emphasis on building a 'liberal peace' (Paris 2004; Richmond 2006) 
in the aftermath of war, comprising standard prescriptions of democratisation, 
free markets and neo-liberal development - less state and more market - has 
also contributed to the neglect of planning, traditionally associated with a strong 
state, in post-conflict interventions. 
Meanwhile, there has been a revival of interest in planning more generally over 
the last decade, led largely by Western European cities where innovative 
strategic planning approaches have come to the fore, integrating the spatial and 
the sectoral. Among developing countries, South Africa has shown the way with 
the introduction of Integrated Development Plans (IDPln) which aim to 
transform the divided cities that were a legacy of apartheid, by focusing on 
service backlogs and inequalities (Boraine 2004). Many argue that the new 
planning is a tool for good governance, with its focus increasingly on citizen 
participation in decision-making, transparency and accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness of development and investments. 
There is also a slow but growing realisation in the international development 
community that planning can be a tool for sustainable recovery and development 
after disasters, both natural and man-made, as it can facilitate a smooth transition 
from relief to development stages. Even so, the emphasis continues to be on ad 
hoc interventions - shelter delivery, reconstruction of symbolic buildings, and 
patching up of physical infrastructure, rather than on planned city-scale 
initiatives. This is seen particularly in cases where post-war reconstruction is led 
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by external actors, such as international transitional administrations). The key 
questions being asked in this study relate to whether planning can in fact help In 
furthering the agendas of inclusive governance, sustainable development, 
community empowerment and ethnic reconciliation in cities affected by conflict; 
whether international transitional administrations should deploy urban planning 
as an essential instrument in their post-conflict reconstruction efforts; and what, 
if any, are the negative impacts of the neglect of urban planning in post-conflict 
environments. 
1.2 Objectives and contribution of the present study 
This is not a research study on conflicts, peacebuilding or even state-building, 
subjects that are best left to scholars who focus on those areas. This is a study that 
focuses on the role of urban planning in post-reconstruction efforts, and in 
particular, the approach adopted by international transitional administrations 
and other external actors in this regard. It will explore the case of Mostar in 
depth, with the aim of making a contribution to: 
• the literature on the reconstruction of conflict-affected cities and societies, 
particularly focusing on the use (or not) of urban planning 
• the approaches and interventions of the international community, especially 
transitional administrations, towards reconstruction in other post-war cities 
• the ongoing process of reunification of Mostar. 
The main purpose of this research is to formulate and test the hypotheses listed 
in Section 1.5 below, in the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that 
some lessons can be drawn and guidelines proposed for future reconstruction 
efforts in war-affected cities. The specific objectives, which would help in testing 
the hypotheses, are: 
) Transitional administrations are defined in Section 1.6 on Preliminary Conceptualisation. 
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a. To explore how political, economic and social changes over the pre-war 
decades have left their imprint on urban development, spatial 
organisation and built form in Mostar; 
b. To explore the significance accorded to urban planning in pre-war Bosnia 
and HerzegoviIia, and the degree to which it shaped the urban spatial and 
social patterns; 
c. To examine the reconstruction approach that was adopted in Mostar 
immediately after the conflict, including: 
• the stage at which urban planning was introduced in the 
reconstruction process, 
• the main characteristics of the planning process, 
• the entities responsible and the stakeholders involved in 
reconstruction and planning, 
• the content of the plans developed; 
d. To assess how the reconstruction and planning approaches influenced the 
settlement pattern, economy, local governance and ethnic polarisation in 
the city; 
e. To review the impact of statutory reunification of Mostar municipality in 
terms of planning, socio-economic development and ethnic 
reconciliation; and 
f. To draw lessons that could be useful in using urban planning as a 
instrument for post-conflict recovery and ethnic reconciliation in other 
cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in South Eastern Europe, as well as 
other post-conflict situations in general. 
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1.3 Why urban planning under transitional administrations? 
In any given context, whether in the developed or the developing world, 
whether in situations of conflict or peace, urban planning is a key tool in the 
hands of local politicians and policymakers. As briefly discussed in the beginning 
of this chapter, its significance has waxed and waned in the past fifty or so years, 
but it is now increasingly being seen as an instrument to promote sustainable and 
equitable development. Rapid urbanisation, urban poverty, the growth of slums 
and the increasing frequency and intensity of environmental crises have also 
refocused global attention on planning in recent decades (UN-HABITAT in 
press). Yet, in post-conflict reconstruction, it is rarely used to achieve the 
broader goals of equity, sustainability, inclusion and reconciliation, or even 
short- to medium-term objectives such as reconstruction and recovery. In fact, 
the discourse on post-conflict governance and reconstruction approaches is also 
fairly recent and still evolving. The debate on the role and form of urban 
planning in the aftermath of a conflict, if at all it exists, is still in its infancy. 
Post-war reconstruction initiatives in a number of cities have been examined by 
various scholars - from a political and state-building perspective (for example, see 
volumes edited by Barakat (2005a), Junne and Verkoren (2005b», as well as an 
urban design and/or architectural conservation point of view (e.g. Khalaf and 
Khoury (1993), Barakat and Wilson (1997), Makdisi (1997b), Charlesworth 
(2003), Calame (2005), Warren (2008) and many other authors who have 
explored this area in the context of the Second World War). However, not many 
scholars or practitioners have explored the dimension of urban policy and 
planning in detail, especially in the context of the absence of state sovereignty. 
Along with post-war reconstruction, the discussion on Transitional 
Administrations (TAs) is also fairly recent. It is only over the past decade that 
transitional administrations have emerged as a popular theme for research within 
the broad area of international governance. The role of the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
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(UNTAET) are, in particular, much-studied in recent literature. Comparative 
studies are also gaining prominence, for instance by Chesterman (2001; 2004), 
Chopra (2002), Berdal and Caplan (2004), Caplan (2005a; 2005b). The most 
recent addition to the literature on transitional administrations has been made by 
Stahn (2008), who has comprehensively reviewed the evolution of the legal basis, 
mandates, structure and functions of transitional administrations, beginning with 
the administration of the Saar territory (1920-35) and the free city of Danzig 
(1920-39) by the League of Nations, and concluding with the recent war in Iraq. 
However, despite the broad mandates assigned to TAs, which invariably include 
post-war recovery through the rebuilding of the economy, institutions of 
governance and a society fragmented by war, post-war reconstruction under TAs 
is paid very little attention by Stahn and the other authors mentioned earlier. 
Finally, a lot has been written on the Bosnian war, the Dayton Agreement and its 
implications, and the rebuilding of the Bosnian state in the years following 
Dayton, for instance by Kumar (1997), Chandler (1999; 2005; 2006a), Bose 
(2002; 2006), Schuman (2004), and Solioz (2007), among others. Mostar, too, has 
also been the focus of numerous articles, a few books and some research studies, 
focusing predominantly on aspects of urban form, architectural conservation, and 
cultural identity (see, for example, contributions by Adams 1993; Klemencic and 
Schofield 1996; Plunz, Baratloo et al. 1998; Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999; Bublin 
1999; Yarwood 1999; ICG 2000; Bing 2001; Bose 2003; Charlesworth 2003; ICG 
2003; Pasic 2004; Bieber 2005; Pasic 2005; Bollens 2006; Calame and Pasic 2006; 
Makas 2006). 
However, the politics of urban planning in Mostar, its de facto division and the 
impact of post-war reconstruction approaches on ethnic relations, the role of the 
European Union Administration of Mostar, and the impact of the 2004 statute 
aiming to reunify the city - and the elements of planning in all these themes -
have not been examined in great detail. In a recent article, Bollens (2006) 
attempts to explore the relationship between urban policies and peace-building, 
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using Mostar as one the case studies. Urbanism and urban governance, he argues, 
have been manipulated over the past ten years to serve political interests of 
different nationalist groups, and have reinforced nationalist divisions in the 
urban area. He concludes that Mostar was a 'missed opportunity' to introduce 
urban strategies that could bring communities together. He does not, however, 
adequately analyse the role of the international transitional administrations in 
Mostar and in Bosnia, nor does he explore the constraints faced by planners and 
planning after the conflict - the transition from a highly centralised to a highly 
decentralised system, for instance, resulting in new demands being placed on 
local planners, which they might not have been equipped or willing to respond 
to; the environment of deep mistrust between communities; the gaps in the 
national legal and policy framework; and the political and institutional 
breakdown at the city level. He also fails to dig deep enough into the seemingly 
contradictory efforts of the international community - promoting a multi-ethnic, 
unified city on the one hand, while taking steps that reinforced divisions (such as 
permitting the establishment of separate service delivery systems, schools, 
hospitals etc. in the different zones), on the other - and the reasons behind these. 
The fact remains that given the new generation of wars ('new wars') and the 
absence of state sovereignty in the immediate aftermath of these, early post-war 
reconstruction interventions are increasingly being undertaken or coordinated 
by transitional administrations. Exploring the impact of pre-war planning 
systems and post-war planning interventions (or the lack thereof) on long-term 
sustainability and reconciliation between divided communities in the city of 
Mostar, from 1994 till date, and extracting some lessons for the future role of 
international transitional administrations, is the niche that this study aims to 
occupy. 
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1.4 Case Study selection and the potential for generalisation 
I~ •• when case studies are properly undertaken, they should not only 
fit the specific individual, group or event studied but also generally 
provide understanding about similar individuals, groups or events. " 
(Berg 2004: 259) 
The selection of Mostar as a case study for this research has emerged after 
numerous levels of analysis. As the emphasis is on urban planning efforts under 
transitional administrations, the examples of UN transitional administrations in 
Kosovo and East Timor, the EU-Ied Office of the High Representative (OHR) in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq were 
considered as potential cases. Of these, Iraq is still a conflict zone even though 
the transitional authority has handed over power to an elected national 
government. East Timor and Kosovo are relatively recent examples of 
international administration - the UN missions in both territories were 
established in 1999. The former, which gained independence in 2002, has a 
largely Christian population (90%) with approximately 5% Muslims and the rest 
of the population made up other smaller minorities - there are no prominent 
examples of multi-religious, multi-ethnic cities in East Timor. Kosovo, on the 
other hand, only declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, and the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is gradually handing over to a European Rule of 
Law Mission (EULEX). Approximately 88% of the population of Kosovo is 
Kosovar Albanian, with the remainder largely made up of Serbs (6-7%) and 
smaller groups including Bosniacs, Roma etc. The municipalities of Mitrovica, 
Strpce and Novo Brdo are multi-ethnic, while the remainder are largely mono-
ethnic with some minority populations. Of the three, Mitrovica is the most 
urbanised and physically divided as it straddles the border between the Albanian 
and Serb-dominated areas in Kosovo. While Kosovo has been recognised by a 
number of countries as an independent state, the status of Mitrovica and the 
other northern municipalities inhabited by the Serbs remains uncertain. 
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international administration has been active for 
nearly fifteen years (since 1994 in Mostar and since 1995 at the country level 
following the signing of the Dayton Accords), which is a reasonable length of 
time to be able to assess its impact. The Bosnian war of 1992 was triggered by the 
collapse of the formal structures of (Tito's) Yugoslavia. It lasted from 1992 to 
1995 and was formally concluded by the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 
1995. The Dayton Peace Agreement established an international administration 
in the form of the Office of the High Representative, which is, till date, the 
highest decision-making authority on major political issues. 
Mostar is the second most prominent city in the Bosnian-Croat Federation 
(FBiH), after Sarajevo, the national capital. Lying at the heart of one of the two 
mixed cantons in the Federation, straddling the Neretva river, the city was 
battered by the conflict. Pre-1992, while the Croat and Muslim populations did 
live largely separately, Croats and Muslims were found on both sides of the river. 
Over a period of eighteen months, however, the city was clearly and indelibly 
divided into two - Muslims were driven out of the Croat-majority areas and vice 
versa - and the central avenue, the Bulevar, became the frontline. In November 
1993, the destruction of the old bridge of Mostar - the Stari Most - by an artillery 
unit from the Croatian side, marked the complete and (at the time) irreversible 
breakdown of relations between the two communities. By the time the fighting 
ended in 1995, the city was (and continues to be, to a great extent, certainly de 
facto if not de jure) partitioned into Croat and Bosniac enclaves, the former 
occupying the west bank and the latter the east bank of the Neretva river 
(Yarwood 1999; Bose 2002; Grodach 2002; Charlesworth 2003; Ignatieff 2003). 
Mostar first came under international administration in 1994 when the European 
Union Administration of Mostar - EUAM - was established in the city with a 
view to initiate and supervise the reconstruction of the city and the reintegration 
of its communities. Although many rounds of local elections have been held 
subsequently, a measure of control is still exercised by the Office of the High 
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Representative over the city and the entire country. Mostar has been selected as 
the main case study for this research due to its particular multi-ethnic 
characteristics, the spatial reflection of the social divisions in the city, and the 
assumption that fifteen years of international intervention is a reasonable 
duration for its impact to be visible2• 
Some might suggest that the case of Mostar is unique and lessons learnt from it 
(and indeed, anyone case study) cannot be applied elsewhere. On the contrary, 
it is argued here that an in-depth analysis of urban planning and reconstruction 
efforts in Mostar can lead to a number of lessons for other divided cities, as well 
as for transitional administrations and other international actors active in other 
post-conflict situations. Burnham et al (2004) suggest that in order to ensure that 
the case study has a wider impact, there must be a clearly defined hypothesis that 
is put to test in the case study, and generalisations drawn from the result. 
Schnabel (2001) emphasises that to have an impact on policy, the research must 
combine knowledge about the general (Le. in this case the broader context of 
conflict, transitional administrations as an emerging form of post-conflict 
governance, and emerging approaches towards post-war reconstruction), as well 
as the particular (specific to the situation or case study being examined, which in 
this case is Mostar). He asserts that in order to be effective, research must be 
policy-oriented and potentially lead to improved responses to conflict and 
division. Barakat arid Ellis (1996) also suggest that while research on conflict or 
post-conflict situations cannot directly influence the outcome of a conflict, it can 
certainly assist in the process of recovery and reconstruction following war. 
This is also the ultimate goal of the current research project. The ambition is that 
this study is conducted, analysed and written in such a fashion that it can be 
generalised and can eventually be utilised to influence policy. It is hoped that the 
2 Barakat, Chard et al. (2008) assert that there is no such thing as a 'standard length of time' when 
assessing the impact of post-war reconstruction, even though it may clearly be too early to 
undertake such assessments in Kosovo, Mghanistan or Iraq at the present moment. 
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outcomes of this research will assist international administrations as well as 
donors active in other war-affected cities and countries (Iraq, for example) in 
learning from the mistakes made in Mostar, and in ensuring that in future, the 
permanent divisions of cities along ethnic lines, though often a post-war reality, 
are prevented, and sustainable, inclusive development, achieved.3 
1.5 Research {)Jlestions and Hypothesis 
Given the context as discussed briefly in the previous section, the main research 
question that this study seeks to answer, is as follows. 
How is urban planning viewed in the process of reconstruction of war-
tom dties, and to what extent is it used as an instrument by the 
international community, particularly transitional administrations, for 
sodo-economic recovery and development, community empowerment, 
and ethnic reconciliation? 
The hypotheses being proposed are: 
1. The role of urban planning in reconstruction of post-war cities, as a tool to 
support the development or peacebuilding goals of reconstruction, is neither 
well-defined nor clearly understood by the organisations undertaking these 
efforts in the aftermath of war. 
2. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, local actors often use urban planning 
tools to 'continue war by other means', reinforce the results of ethnic 
cleansing, appropriate or mark territory, and establish symbolic and actual 
control over contested and/or profitable areas, institutions and assets. 
3. 'Short-termist' humanitarian and reconstruction interventions undertaken by 
international actors after the war are often based on limited understanding of 
the context and with little involvement oflocal stakeholders. This can further 
3 For example, in Baghdad, where the recently erected wall between Shia and Sunni dominated 
areas is being portrayed as a short-term measure to keep the peace, but can in fact divide the city 
permanently along ethnic lines. 
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polarise ethnic groups and make the eventual reunification of cities and 
reconciliation of communities, more difficult. 
These three hypotheses can be pulled together into one unifying hypothesis, 
which is proposed below. 
Urban plaIl11ing has been neglected by the international community, 
particularly transitional administrationsl as a tool for the analysis ot; and 
as an instrument for the promotion ot; urban social changel despite its use 
and abuse by local political actors as a mechanism to establish control or 
advance particular ethnic interests. This may have had a negative impact 
on both the long-term development of the city as well as ethnic 
reconciliation efforts. 
1.6 Preliminary Conceptualisation 
It is important at this stage to define the main concepts and terms used in this 
research study. To begin with, 'planning' and 'urban planning' are two terms that 
have been used interchangeably in this study. Planning, its evolution and its 
various forms, its theory and practice, have been discussed by a number of 
thinkers and writers, ranging from John Friedmann and Andreas Faludi (since 
the late 1960s), to Peter Hall's classic text on urban and regional planning and his 
subsequent works (since the 1970s), Healey (since the late 1980s), Forester 
(1988), and many others. Yet, it is not easy to find precise definitions of 
planning, or urban planning. In fact, the exact definition of planning has always 
been a contentious issue, and most theorists have advanced its conceptualisation 
by adding qualifiers such as 'rational', 'normative', 'functional', 'comprehensive', 
'strategic' or 'collaborative', among others, to planning. Essentially, the 'planning 
movement', which was born as a response to the social problems of newly 
industrialised Britain just over a century ago, aimed to address issues of 
overcrowding, poor quality housing and the low levels of sanitation which 
accompanied it, and eventually improve, broadly, the quality of life in cities. The 
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activity, and the profession, emerged from engineering, architecture, and urban 
design, but today has its own niche in 'city forming processes' (Friedmann 1998). 
One of the definitions of planning provided by Friedmann (1998) describes it as 
"the conscious intervention of coJJective actors, roughly speaking state, capital 
and organized civil society in the production of urban space, so that outcomes 
may be tumed to one or the other's favour" (p. 251). Hall (2002) describes 
planning today as 'joined-up thinking', although its traditional remit focused 
almost entirely on the development and management of land, and was quite 
distinct from social and economic planning. UN-HABITAT defines urban, city or 
town planning as t~ •• as a self-conscious coJJective (societal) effort to imagine or 
re-imagine a town, city, urban region or wider territory and to translate the 
result into priorities for area investment, conservation measures, new and 
upgraded areas of settlement, strategic infrastructure investments and principles 
of land useregulation"(UN-HABITAT in press: 31). 
In this study, 'urban planning' refers to a set of inter-related activities and 
processes which determine the form, structure and function of a city, that is, 
which deal not only with housing, infrastructure and land use, but also with 
economic and social development, environmental sustain ability, poverty 
alleviation and social inclusion. Urban planning as described here addresses and 
integrates the widest possible range of urban development issues. The term 
'urban planning' is used interchangeably with 'planning' throughout this thesis. 
Post-war or post-conflict reconstruction is also a term used repeatedly in this 
study. Post-war reconstruction has been defined in recent literature as including 
a range of inter-related activities designed to not only end violence, but also 
reactivate economic and social development, and at the same time create a 
peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence (Barakat 2005a; 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse et al. 2005). Defined in this way, it extends beyond 
simply reverting to status quo ante, or 're'creating what existed before the war, to 
include strategic choices which would pave the way for a better future (Kreimer. 
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Eriksson et al. 1998; Barakat 200Sa). This is the formulation which is applied in 
the present study. 
A third key concept used in this research is that of Transitional Administrations 
(TA). Transitional administrations can be defined as administrative systems 
installed in a war-affected territory which act as an interim government for the 
territory. As discussed briefly in preceding sections, the UN administrations in 
Kosovo and East Timor and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq are 
much-touted recent examples. Transitional administrations have become 
increasingly common over the last two decades because of the growing number 
of fragile and failed states, and the complexity of administering these territories, 
mitigating conflict and preparing for the settlement of their eventual territorial 
status. Transitional administrations are " ... disCi'nct in important respects fi-om 
complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding [. . .} International territorial 
administration is in fundamental ways a political ente1pnse"(Caplan 200Sa: 12). 
Figure 1: Conceptualisation of the present study 
A few other concepts or terms that are used throughout this thesis also need brief 
explanation. Key among these are the terms 'ethnic' , 'national', or 'ethno-
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national' (groups/ conflict), which have been used interchangeably in this thesis. 
Kaufman defines ethnic groups as I~ .. a large aggregate of people who have a self-
defined name, believe they share a common descent, have common historical 
memories and elements of a shared culture [ .. .j and have an attachment [ ... J to a 
specific territory" (Kaufman 2001, as cited in Oberschall 2007: 3). According to 
Esman (2004), ethnicity or ethnic identity is an expression of identification of 
oneself within a group, and necessarily in relation to 'other' group(s). It can have 
a 'primordial' basis (rooted in history), an 'instrumentalist' basis (created by 
individuals or elites to achieve their selfish objectives), or it can be a 'social 
construct' (imagined and contingent on changing circumstances) (Esman 2004: 
pp. 30-35). Nationalism is based on the concept of nation-state and the sense of 
belonging, loyalty or duty of citizens to this nation-state. The two concepts -
ethnicity and nationality - overlap (Oberschall 2007). Ethno-nationalism is 
defined as '~ .. the belief that any people that aspires to political self-
determination and self-rule is a nation and as such is entitled to independent 
statehood" (Esman 2004: 41). Based on this conceptualisation, the war in Bosnia 
can be described as an ethno-national conflict, and the warring communities -
ethno-national groups. 
Clearly, the concepts are not necessarily synonymous, but as they form the 
backdrop rather than the focus of this study, and they do overlap, the least 
unwieldy term - "ethnic groups" - will be used consistently to describe the 
different communities in Bosnia - Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. The term Bosniac 
implies a Bosnian Muslim, whereas Bosnian is used to denote all citizens of 
Bosnia, regardless of their ethnicity/ nationality. 
Finally, the Dayton Accords established a multi-layered, confederal system of 
governance in Bosnia. This is discussed in detail elsewhere in the thesis, but it 
might be useful to explain here that the term "State" in this context refers to the 
country level, "Entities" are the Bosnian-Croat Federation (FBiH) and the 
Republika Srpska (RS), and Cantons are the decentralised units of administration 
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within the Federation only. Municipalities are the lowest formal unit of 
government. 
1.7 Research methodology 
Undertaking research on a topic which cuts across a number of disciplines - in 
this case, conflict, reconstruction, urban planning. governance and state-
building, among others - poses a large number of challenges. The most important 
of these, of course, is defining the scope, as the literature and theoretical base can 
be extremely expansive. Integrating the different strands into a coherent analysis 
can also be complicated. In this thesis, therefore, the methodology is discussed in 
detail at the outset of the project. 
This section begins with a brief discussion on the theoretical underpinnings to 
this. research. Subsequently, the appropriate data collection techniques, and the 
relative advantages of the chosen options, are elaborated. The preliminary 
interview questions and selection of respondents are also discussed in this 
section, but the details of these elements are included in the Appendices. The 
framework for analysis, challenges and constraints faced during field research, 
and ethical issues are also addressed in this section. 
1.7.1 Theoretical underpinnings 
The social sciences, including the disciplines of anthropology, psychology, 
political science and sociology, involve the study of people and the interactions 
between them (Berg 2004). Although they are sometimes referred to as the 'soft 
sciences', they are as logical, systematic, rigorous and empirical as the natural 
sciences, and involve both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Thomas 
Kuhn's stance, for instance, that the fundamental unit of scientific achievement 
is not simply new empirical laws and their application but the paradigm - a 
much richer body of accepted principles, models, rules and I~ •• indeed a 
distinctive way of seeing' all the phenomena of its domain" (Cutting 1980: 12)-
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is particularly supportive of, and attractive to, social scientists (Kuhn 1970; 
Cutting 1980). 
Based on their epistemological stance. two broad 'schools' of social science can be 
identified - the positivist, and the interpretive. Positivism, or the positivist 
tradition, follows the style of natural scientists and aims to develop causal 
relationships or predictive models by testing correlations between variables 
(Silverman 1993; Marsh and Stoker 2002). According to this definition. 
positivism clearly relies much more on empiricism (the belief that experience is 
the ultimate basis of knowledge). and on deductive logic, i.e. reasoning from the 
general to the particular. Quantitative data and quantitative approaches to data 
collection and analysis form the mainstay of a positivist approach. 
The interpretive tradition. on the other hand. argues that the world is socially 
constructed, and that It •• • social phenomena do not exist independent of our 
interpretation of them" (Silverman 1993: 26). Interpretivists, therefore, are more 
concerned with observation and description. and inductive reasoning 
(potentially moving from the particular to the general), rather than establishing 
direct and strong causal relationships. Leaning towards rationalism (which 
emphasises that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge 
are gained independently of sensory experience). they rely to a greater extent on 
qualitative data and analysis. 
Social science research can be broadly divided into three types - exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory (Chomsky 1965)4. The first of these - observational 
(or exploratory) research - requires a rich enough database to be able to justify 
the inferences. The second, descriptive research, includes development of models 
which can help describe the observations as well as describe all possible/ 
4 In the field of linguistics. Chomsky (1965) proposed these as three key parameters of adequacy 
against which any 'grammar' may be evaluated. Chomsky's later theories and models. 'principles 
and parameters theory' (1979 and 1993), 'Government and Binding', and 'minimalists approaches/ 
programmes/models' (1995) today form the basis of not only social science research but also that 
in physical sciences and life sciences. 
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potential data. The third, explanatory or evaluative research, suggests that these 
models should be able to establish causality between different variables, provide 
valid explanations for real and potential data, and predict ('generate') as well as 
evaluate potential data. 
A certain measure of each of these three dimensions exists in every research 
effort. While the first and second are more empirical and usually form the 
preliminary stages of a research project, the third explains many things not 
visible to the eye. Theories and models are generated through this third stage of 
explanatory research. 
The current research project leans much more towards an interpretive approach, 
that is, it aims to explore, describe and draw some general conclusions from the 
study of one particular case. It aspires to establish a strong empirical basis for 
such conclusions through the detailed examination of a single case study of a 
post-war city (Mostar). Perfectly predictive models cannot be established, given 
the unpredictable nature of each conflict and its impact on cities. However, 
lessons can be drawn from the case study in order to influence the course of 
future situations of a similar nature. 
1. 7.2 SeJecting appropriate data elicitation techniques 
Given the inductive, interpretive nature of this research project, it became clear 
that a predominantly qualitative approach would be appropriate for this study, 
relying in large measure on field research. 
Field research for this thesis was conducted in two phases. In December 2006, a 
two-week reconnaissance mission was undertaken to Mostar, with the objectives 
of building an understanding of the context, exploring major sources of 
information, identifying challenges and constraints, making preliminary contacts 
and identifying 'gatekeepers's. In addition, this visit provided a valuable 
5 See discussion on gatekeepers in Section 1.7.6. 
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opportunity to observe the ongoing attempts of the OHR to reunify the city, and 
get a flavour of the political ramifications of this process. 
The main body of the field research was undertaken over a period of six weeks 
during August-September 2008. Historical documentation and records which 
describe the growth of Mostar and the evolution of its socio-spatial structure, as 
well as archival information relating to urban plans and planning processes in 
Mostar, including (but not restricted to) land use, zoning and detailed plans, 
provided a significant amount of data and information. The planning legislation 
and systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both past and present, were also 
examined. This necessitated spending some time in Sarajevo, in the University 
library as well as the offices of the Cantonal Planning Institute. Information thus 
collected was supplemented by what Neuman calls 'soft data', i.e., descriptions, 
reflections, impressions, photographs and other such material, elicited through 
observation and interviews (Neuman 2003). 
Silverman (1993) identifies the major techniques used by researchers 
undertaking field research as observation, textual analysis, interviews and 
transcripts, noting that most research efforts combine one or more of these 
methods. Other authors also include focus group interviews or discussions, 
participant observation, photographic techniques (including videotaping), 
historical analysis (historiography), ethnographic research and a number of 
unobtrusive techniques (e.g. archivaV document! textual analysis) in this list 
(Berg 2004; Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004). Most authors suggest that a 
combination of methods be used to examine the problem from different 
perspectives, so that the information collected can be triangulated, that is, its 
various elements cross-checked and verified. 
The main data-gathering techniques considered for this study included (a) 
archival (including mainly document or textual) analysis; (b) historiography; and 
(c) interviews. These were supplemented by observation and photography. 
Participant observation can also be an extremely useful technique for social 
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research, but in a post-conflict setting, where political sensitivities are high and 
there are number of practical constraints such as access and language, it is 
unlikely to be effective or as productive as the other methods enumerated above. 
Thus it was not deployed as a research technique. The main features, strengths 
and weaknesses of the three selected techniques are described below. 
Archiyal analysis 
According to Berg (2004), archival records include (a) public archival records 
(usually prepared for the express purpose of examination by others, and are 
therefore more or less standardised and arranged systematically) and (b) private 
archival records (typically intended for private audiences, so may not be equally 
well-structured or organised as public archival records). 
For the purpose of this study, data was collected predominantly from public 
archives, for instance, libraries of the University of Sarajevo (faculty of 
architecture and planning; the World Bank and UN archives; and the Cantonal 
Planning Institute in Sarajevo), city council records, maps, plans, meeting 
minutes, internal documents of the OHR and the EU Administration, etc. Berg 
(2004) lists three categories of public archives - (a) Commercial media accounts-
anything written, drawn, recorded, intended for mass consumption (e.g. 
newspapers, books, magazines, videotapes, maps, plans etc); (b) Actuarial records 
- produced for a special or limited audience and available to the public under 
certain circumstances (e.g. birth and death records, records of marriages and 
divorces; title, land and deed information (cadastre); demographic records etc.); 
(c) Official documentary records - originally produced for special, limited 
audiences, which mayor may not eventually find their way into public domain 
(e.g. Court transcripts, minutes of meetings, police records, inter-office memos, 
organisational newsletters etc.). These, however, were not as systematically 
organised in Bosnia as hoped for. Private archives such as autobiographies, 
memoirs, diaries and letters etc. were examined only on an ad hoc basis, 
wherever available and offered, as part of this study. 
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Archival analysis, traditionally used by historians more often than social 
scientists, can provide invaluable data and evidence, particularly where societies 
and communities have gone through a major socio-political transformation. It 
can lead to interesting insights not just into what happened and when, but why 
certain events happened the way they did, what were the decision-making 
processes, who were the key actors involved (visible as well as behind the scenes) 
and what roles they played. Lowe (1997) asserts that public records provide 
t~ •• greater contextualisation and balance, enabling the researcher to gain greater 
empathy with the past and therefore make a decisive contribution to 
understanding change over time" (see Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004: 177). In this 
sense, archival analysis is intricately connected with historiography, which is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Historiography or historical analysis 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) define historiography as t~ •• a method for 
discovering, nom records and accounts, what happened dunng some past period" 
(see Berg 2004: 233). Historiography attempts to develop a descriptive account of 
the past and present a story that does not simply report facts, but pieces together 
events, symbols, characters, ideas and meanings in a manner which is 
t~ •• nowing, revealing, vibrant and aBve!" (Berg 2004: 233) 
Historiography is, as stated before, closely linked with archival analysis. It relies 
on primary as well as secondary sources of data. Primary sources are described as 
oral or written testimony of eyewitnesses, or any evidence that was part of the 
event under study (including original artefacts, documents, photographs, 
recordings, journals, diaries, drawings etc). Secondary sources include material 
circulated after the event, including oral or written testimonies of people not 
immediately present at the time of a given event, e.g. oral histories, newspaper 
articles, periodicals, reports, textbooks, encyclopaedias etc. (Berg 2004; Burnham, 
Gilland et al. 2004). Some authors also distinguish between secondary and 
tertiary sources, defining the latter as those materials which offer a 
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reconstruction or interpretation of the events in question, but this is a fine 
distinction which is not applied in the present study. 
Historical analysis emerged as an extremely important data-gathering technique 
in the present study. The growth of the city of Mostar prior to the Yugoslav era 
and then as part of the Yugoslav Federation, the process of urban planning 
adopted under the socialist system, and the developments after the conflict in 
1995, particularly under the transitional administration and other international 
actors, were systematically traced using books, articles, maps, plans, documents 
and photographic evidence (wherever available). Masterplans and other plan-
related documents, town planning laws and regulations, national development 
plans, conservation plans prepared by the authorities as well as by external 
actors, and other such documentation has been used as a key source of 
information for piecing together the history of development and division of the 
city. The role played by international actors since 1994 has been examined using 
official documentation, notes of meetings, press releases, newspaper and other 
articles. The information thus obtained has been triangulated using individual 
interviews, which are described below. The major constraints in this process 
were those of access to government and EU documentation, and language (as all 
government documents are usually available only in Bosnian6). A professional 
translator-interpreter was engaged to overcome the latter handicap. EUAM 
archives remained inaccessible despite several attempts to trace them in Brussels, 
and in their absence, personal interviews with a number of key personalities 
involved with the work of the EUAM were a critical source of information. 
6 The language spoken by the major communities (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is essentially the same (originally known as Serbo-Croat) but is variously labelled as 
Bosnian, Serbo-Croatian or Serbian after the war, depending on who one is speaking to. Since the 
war, the 'Bosnian' language has seen the addition of new terminologies with increased emphasis 
on Islamic expressions. For the purpose of clarity, the term Bosnian will be used to describe the 
local language throughout this research study. 
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Interviews 
An interview is defined by Berg (2004) as I~ •• a conversation with a purpose. 
Specifically, the puzpose is to gather information» (p. 75). Interviews can be of 
three types - standardised, semi-standardised and unstandardised. 
Standardised interviews are rigid and formally structured, with no deviation 
permitted from the set order, content or wording of questions. Very similar to a 
pencil-and-paper survey. they do not permit any additional questions, probes or 
clarifications. 
Unstandardised interviews, on the other hand, are positioned at the other 
extreme. Completely unstructured, they have no set order or wording of 
questions. The level of language may be adjusted according to the respondent's 
needs, the interviewer can make clarifications and may also add or delete 
questions between interviews. 
Semi-standardised interviews lie between these two poles. They are more or less 
structured, with flexibility in wording and order of questions as well as level of 
language used by the interviewer. The interviewer also has freedom to digress, 
answer questions and make clarifications, as well as to add or delete probes 
between successive interviews. 
For the purpose of this study, semi-standardised interviews were used to elicit 
data from key respondents identified through archival and historical analysis as 
well as snowball sampling methods (see section on selection of respondents 
below). This allowed in-depth exploration of issues related to planning processes, 
decision-making structures, extent of political influence and public participation 
in planning, and other such aspects. 
The use of Focus Groups to precede interviews was also considered in the initial 
stages of development of the research methodology. Focus Groups could have 
been used after the historical analysis (which could help generate the major 
questions or topics for group discussions), and before individual interviews 
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(which could then be used to tease out the details of issues raised by key 
respondents in the Focus Group discussions). However. due to constraints of 
language and time. as well as the fact that Focus Groups might be difficult to 
condu~t smoothly when a topic is highly controversial. or if there is fundamental 
disagreement among the participants? this technique was not considered 
appropriate for the present study. 
1.7.3 Preliminary interview questions 
The interview schedule was developed on the basis of the literature review as 
well as the other data-elicitation methods listed above and is included in 
Appendix 1. A few key themes explored through interviews are listed below. 
• How did planning, decision-making and local governance (broadly) function 
in Mostar and Bosnia and Herzegovina. before the war? What was the extent 
of political influence and public participation in planning, under the socialist 
system? 
• Was the city truly 'united' before the war? Did the local communities want a 
unified city after the war? Do they still want a unified city? 
• What was the thinking behind the international community's push for the 
reunification of Mostar, and the strategy and tools adopted by the EUAM 
towards achieving this goal? What were the instruments used by other actors, 
particularly the OHR, in subsequent years? 
• What role did other international actors such as bilateral and multilateral 
donors and lending agencies play in the reconstruction of Mostar (setting of 
priorities, funding, implementation etc.?) How did their activities influence 
the reunification agenda? Were projects selected on the basis of 
reconciliation and reunification goals? 
? This issue is particularly important in the case of Mostar, where the division and reunification 
of the city. and the role of urban planning in furthering ethnic agendas. are sensitive issues that 
lie at the heart of the conflict. 
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• Did the local stakeholders have any role in determining reconstruction 
priorities and projects? To what extent were activities undertaken by. 
transitional administrations and the other international actors responsive to 
the 'real' priorities of the local communities? How was this ensured? 
• Have any reconstruction projects undertaken by the EDAM and other actors 
contributed directly to reconciliation between the communities and 
reunification of the city? 
• How did the transitional administration, and other agencies responsible for 
reconstruction, approach urban planning? Did transitional administrations 
understand the significance of urban planning - its positive implications for 
economic recovery, reunification and reconciliation; or its potential negative 
impact in terms of control of one community over another, lack of an 
economic base, and perpetuation of ethnic divisions, etc.? 
• Why did initial efforts towards urban planning under the EUAM fail? Was 
there a lack on international donor commitment (political or financial) to 
support the planning efforts? 
• What role could a joint strategic vision and framework for development play 
in reunifying the city? Would people from both communities buy into such a 
vision or development strategy? What would be the preconditions for it to 
succeed? 
1.7.4 Selecting respondents 
The respondents for the field research were selected on the basis of the literature 
review and the historical analysis. The respondents for this study can be 
classified into two main groups - those that were targeted, through an analysis of 
the literature, preliminary documentation, archives etc, and those who were 
recommended, by the targeted respondents. In other words, once a few key 
respondents were identified, the snowball sampling method (Berg 2004) was 
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applied, asking them to recommend other subjects who have played similar (or 
indeed, different) roles in the post-war reconstruction of Mostar. 
The main categories of respondents included: 
• Political decision-makers, international (OHR, OSCE, other international 
actors) as well as national (Mayor, councillors etc.) This category also 
included officials (both international and local) involved with the EUAM 
between 1994-96; 
• Urban planners and other municipal staff and officials (for instance those of 
the Spatial Planning Institute) involved in urban planning for Mostar, before 
and during the war, as part of the transitional administration, and at present; 
• NGOs, civil society organisations active in Mostar; 
• Staff at the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Sarajevo, as well as 
other architects, urbanists and planners in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
• Staff of other international agencies involved in reconstruction and 
development efforts, for instance, the World Bank, UNDP and UNHCR; and 
• Urban residents/ returnees (individuals or households) from different 
communities. 
Thirty-seven interviews were conducted during the course of this research, in 
Mostar and Sarajevo in BiH, as well as in the U.K. The full list of respondents is 
provided in Appendix 2. 
The broad framework for data collection, including types and sources of data, is 
presented in Table 1 on the next page. 
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Table 1: Framework for data collection, including types and sources of data 
Purpose Type of data Sources 
To establish the pattern of • Information on land use ownership • Secondary information from 
growth and development of the patterns, residential patterns. books and journal articles on 
city of Mostar during the development of the urban urbanism, architectural history, 
Ottoman era and then as part of structure and motphology social development of Mostar, 
the Yugoslav Federation - as an • Information on rural-urban Bosnia or Yugoslavia 
assimilated. polarised. migration. economic development, • Spatial planning institute 
segmented or divided city (Boal industrial development etc • Urbanism department within 
1999: see discussion in Chapter 4 • Maps and old planning documents the municipality 
andS) • Interviews with urban residents. 
planners. architects. urbanists 
To determine the main elements • Legal and policy documents • Spatial planning institute 
of the urban planning process • Successive master plans, • Urbanism department in the 
under the socialist system. conservation plans municipality 
including the governance • Other planning documents • Interviews with planners 
dimension 
To determine how the city • Secondary information from books • Agency Archives - EUAM. 
changed during the conflict - • EUAM. OHR documents and maps OHR. UNHCR, other 
both in governance and spatial organisations 
terms • Interviews with urban residents. 
mediapersons. planners. NGO 
representatives 
• Interviews with other 
individuals involved with 
EUAM. OHR etc 
To trace the process of • EUAM documents. archives • Agency Archives - EUAM. 
reconstruction and urban • Official documents. reports on OHR. other organisations 
planning under EUAM 1994-96, overall reconstruction progress or • Interviews with planners, NGO 
OHR 1997 onwards specific projects representatives 
• Maps and plans showing areas of • 'Elite interviews' - EUAM. 
reconstruction and investment RRTF, OHR officials, Council 
President 
To assess the process of adoption • Washington agreement • 'Elite interviews' - EUAM, 
and pursuit of reunification as • GenevaMoU RRTF, OHR officials. Council 
an avowed goal (since 1994 till • EUAM documents and statements President 
date) • OHR documents and statements 
• Report of the Commission for 
Reunification 
• Minutes of meetings 
• Other international agency 
documents 
To assess the impact of planning • Testimonies from individuals - • Before/after photographs 
and reconstruction decisions planners. local community. • Interviews with planners. 
taken by transitional international agency community representatives. 
administrations (and other representatives Mayor. international agency 
international agencies). on • Maps representatives 
reunification and reconciliation • Photographs 
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1.7.5 Developing an appropriate framework for analysis 
A key concern in qualitative research is that data takes various shapes and forms 
that are often incomparable, on the surface at least. Data analysis, therefore, 
involves a complex process of sorting, categorising and evaluating data. Neuman 
defines data analysis as l~ .. a search for pattems in data - recurrent behaviours, 
objects, or a body of knowledge" (Neuman 2003: 447), whereas Berg (2004) 
highlights its main components as: 
• Data reduction, which aims to make raw data more accessible and 
understandable. This involves simplifying and transforming raw data into a 
more manageable form. 
• Data display, which aims to present data in an organised and easily 
understandable format from which conclusions can be drawn. 
• Conclusions and verification, which involves drawing of more firm 
conclusions than what the researcher has been leaning towards during the 
data collection stages, and in the end verifying both the path adopted to reach 
those conclusions, as well as ensuring that the processes adopted have been 
clearly articulated. 
It is important to note here that all the steps described above are integral to the 
process of analysing data rather than mechanically reducing it, coding it or 
applying labels. Furthermore, most authors concur that qualitative data analysis, 
unlike quantitative data analysis, begins early in the research process, often while 
the data is still being collected, and usually informs the ongoing process of data 
collection (Neuman 2003; Berg 2004). 
According to Neuman (2003), most qualitative research measures are often ad 
hoc a~d specific to the individual setting. Thus it is not always possible to apply a 
ready-made analytical framework to a body of qualitative data. For the present. 
research project, the analytical framework was derived from the two main 
conceptual pillars of this study, namely, urban planning and its role in post-war 
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reconstruction, and transitional administrations (their role, strengths and 
weaknesses vis-a.-vis reconstruction). These are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3. An additional layer of analysis provided by the Bosnian 
context, which was examined in terms of the opportunities it offered and the 
threats it posed to effective post-war reconstruction and realisation of the TA's 
goals. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
1.7.6 Field research experience, challenges and constraints 
A field researcher is likely to face a number of constraints and challenges in the 
process of data eliCitation. In this case, contacts established in the field through 
my past work with UN-HABITAT in the Balkans (2002-03), as well as through 
the reconnaissance visit (December 2006), were extremely useful in facilitating 
my research. Yet, a number of challenges and constraints remained. These are 
discussed briefly below. 
• Access - In any field-based research, data as well as respondents may not 
always be easily accessible to researchers. Reasons for these can be both 
practical as well as political. In the latter case, one is liable to be confronted 
by gatekeepers, who control access to organizations, information as well as 
potential interviewees. Many authors mention the important role played by 
gatekeepers, including Barakat and Ellis (1996), Neuman (2003), Burnham et 
al. (2004) and Berg (2004). Barakat and Ellis (1996) propose that the 
researcher should try and enter into a partnership with a local counterpart, 
who could facilitate access to organisations, respondents and information. 
Neuman points out that while negotiation and bargaining with gatekeepers 
might be necessary to gain access, the researcher must at the same time It •• • set 
non-negotiable limits to protect research integrity"(Neuman 2003: 372). 
In Bosnia, government documents, especially those containing demographic 
data at the cantonal or municipal level, proved almost impossible to obtain. 
Gaining access to Yugoslav-era planning laws and regulations (especially old 
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laws which are no longer applied), maps and plans, also proved difficult. To 
access some of the older documents, links were forged with the Spatial 
Planning Institutes in Sarajevo and Mostar. My association with UN-
HABITAT during previous visits to Mostar and Sarajevo, and the network of 
contacts established during those visits, was extremely useful in gaining 
access to the limited archives, as well as respondents. 
• Language - All government documentation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in 
Bosnian, with the exception of documents issued by the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) and other international agencies, which is available in 
English as well. Many of the respondents for this research only spoke 
Bosnian. To overcome this key constraint, a translator/interpreter was 
engaged to translate the documentation and provide interpretation during 
interviews. 
• Sensitivity - Planning is not simply a technical or a value-neutral subject, 
especially in a city such as Mostar, tom apart by war, where different 
communities are still struggling to gain control over land and other resources. 
Land is often at the heart of conflict, which makes land governance, and 
planning, extremely important in the post-war period. In Mostar, the 
establishment of the Spatial Planning Institute was at the centre of a 
prolonged and bitter struggle between the main political parties until very 
recently. It was finally resolved, on paper, by an OHR decree, but the issue is 
by no means settled8• Some respondents, therefore, were unwilli~g to provide 
frank opinions on this subject. In some cases, 'off the record' or confidential 
discussions with anonymous reporting of responses was offered, but was not 
always taken up. The ethical issues related to anonymity and confidentiality 
are addressed in the section on ethics below. 
8 This is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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• Bias - There are many dimensions to the problem of bias. In conflict 
situations, issues such as ease of access (to settlements, communities), and 
availability of pre-processed data (for instance, that collected by other 
researchers and for project interventions), might guide the researcher to focus 
on more easily accessible subjects and areas. This would naturally introduce a 
bias in the study. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the subject and the 
politically-charged environment within which planning and development is 
currently taking place in Mostar, respondents might not provide unbiased 
responses to the questions. Different actors might provide starkly different 
accounts of the same processes and events. In some cases, one might end up 
dealing with only the more articulate or vocal members of the community, 
inadvertently ignoring the concerns of the more quiet ones (Barakat and Ellis 
1996). While these issues are more pronounced during conflicts, they can be 
equally important factors while conducting research in post-conflict 
situations. 
Furthermore, the researcher has to guard against becoming a pawn in the 
hands of rival political players seeking to further their own agendas. In such a 
situation, triangulation holds the key to arriving at an accurate description of 
the process or the problem, and producing an objective analysis. 
Finally, the issue of the researcher's own bias(es) is equally important. As a 
practitioner, I worked for nearly ten years with the United Nations, including 
two years in Kosovo, and was also involved in the conceptualisation of a 
potential UN-HABITAT9 project in Mostar. As a researcher, now, it is 
difficult for me to stay objective and to prevent the practical experience of 
my work in the field from creeping into the analysis. In addition, my 
association with UN-HABIT AT also initially generated certain expectations 
9 UN-HABITAT, or the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, is the UN agency that 
addresses human settlements and planning issues. For more information see www.unhabjtat.or". 
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among my respondents, although I attempted to unambiguously declare my 
position as a researcher rather than as an ex-UN staff member. 
• Going in cold' - A final challenge in the context of this particular research 
effort relates to the fact that the researcher is a complete outsider. I am not a 
Bosnian, not even a European. My exposure to the Balkans has been through 
my work with the UN, both within the region as well as at headquarters. This 
was invaluable, but not sufficient to make me an insider. When a researcher 
doesn't belong to the community he or she researches, acquiring an in-depth 
understanding of the context and building trust with the respondents are two 
prerequisites, both of which need time and effort. This was always going to 
be an important challenge to be overcome in the present research, but one 
that I believe has been adequately addressed. 
1.7.7 Ethicalissues 
"Political research cannot be properly conducted in a moral vacuum. It 
has consequences for those who participate in the research and those 
who are influenced by it. " (Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004: 250) 
The issue of ethics and ethical practices in research has gained considerable 
prominence in the past few decades, having originated in the context of 
biomedical research. The problem is that ethical considerations, in any research, 
but particularly in social sciences, are a subjective issue. Concerns of voluntary 
participation, informed consent, avoidance of deception, confidentiality and the 
overarching principle of 'doing no harm', and if possible achieving beneficial 
results for those being studied, are cited by many as the main ethical 
considerations in any research (Smyth and Robinson 2001; Berg 2004; Burnham, 
Gilland et al. 2004). 
• Participation and consent: The foremost ethical issue to be addressed by 
researchers is the participation and consent of those being studied. 
Interviewees and other respondents must be clearly informed about the 
objectives of the research and must voluntarily agree to participate in the 
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process. In this research, consent was taken on tape, as most interviews were 
recorded. 
• A voidance of deception: Unless there is a case for covert research, the 
researcher should attempt to be as honest as possible about his identity, 
research objectives and potential use or impact of the research. As mentioned 
earlier, I played down my association with UN-HABITAT, and consistently 
and consciously emphasised my identity as a researcher, during the field 
research. 
• Anonymity and confidentiality: While anonymity is possible in quantitative 
research, it is hard to maintain in qualitative research where the respondents 
are known to the researcher. The right of respondents to control the use of 
information about themselves must be protected, particularly in conflict or 
post-conflict situations where revelation of identity of the respondents could 
put them in physical danger or otherwise at risk (Berg 2004; Burnham, 
Gilland et al. 2004). Various professional associations such as the Political 
Studies Association (PSA), British International Studies Association (BISA) 
and the British Sociological Association (BSA) provide guidelines in this 
regardlO• 
Anonymity, however, is harder to justify, especially in cases where the 
participants are not particularly vulnerable or 'at risk.' In the case of this 
particular research, only two requests for anonymity were made, and only 
relating to specific information about ongoing planning projects which may have 
been granted permission illegally. Five respondents (of a total of thirty-seven) 
10 The BSA guidelines are most explicit and state that: "Research participants should understand 
how far they will be afforded anonymity and confidentiality and should be able to reject the use 
of data-gathering devices such as tape recorders and video cameras. Sociologists should be careful, 
on the one hand, not to give unrealistic guarantees of confidentiality and, on the other, not to 
permit communication of research films or records to audiences other than those to which the 
research participants have agreed. H(British Sociological Association) 
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refused permission to record the interview, although they consented to being 
cited and quoted by name. 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This study is divided into three substantive sections. The first section comprises, 
first of all, the present introduction including the research methodology. The 
next chapter sets the research questions in context, exploring the mutuality of 
cities and war in history, the nature of recent conflicts and their impact of cities, 
and the rise and fall (and rise again) of urban planning. Chapter Three discusses 
in greater detail the role of urban planning in post-war reconstruction efforts, 
especially under the aegis of transitional administrations. Chapter Four, the final 
chapter in this literature review trilogy, provides a historical overview of urban 
planning traditions and approaches in Bosnia, before as well as during the 
conflict, and the governance, reconstruction and planning scenarios which 
emerged as a result of the war. 
The second section of the thesis presents and discusses the field research and 
fmdings. The discussion in this section is organised in three chapters. Chapter 
Five narrates the story of Mostar, its destruction during the war, the post-war 
reconstruction initiatives, and its situation today. Chapter Six explores the 
strategies adopted by EUAM for post-war reconstruction, examining in particular 
detail, the approach towards urban planning. It also discusses how other actors, . 
local and international, used urban planning to promote their own goals in 
Mostar. Chapter Seven brings together the literature and the field research, 
revisiting the themes of post-war reconstruction, transitional administrations and 
urban planning, and begins to point towards some conclusions. 
The final section, comprising a single chapter (Chapter Eight), presents the 
conclusions of this thesis, including the extent to which the research objectives 
have been met, and suggests some directions for future research. 
42 
CHAPTER 2 
Context (Part I) 
Cities and war, 
governance and planning 
43 
Chapter 2; Cities and J.Y'ar, Governance and Planning 
2.0 Introduction 
While the emphasis of this research effort is on urban planning in post-conflict 
reconstruction, the role of the international community and the effectiveness of 
their interventions in cities, particularly vis-a.-vis reconciliation between divided 
populations and their socio-economic recovery, it is important to understand 
some of these underlying concepts. This chapter explores the mutuality of cities 
and war in history and the nature of recent conflicts and their impact on cities. 
The rise and fall of urban planning over the past century, its replacement by 
concepts such as urban management and urban governance, and its recent 
revival as an effective instrument of public policy, are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
2.1 Conflicts and cities: an intimate relationship through history 
"No matter how many valuable functions the city has furthered, it 
has also served, throughout most of its history, as a container of 
organized violence and a transmitter of war. "(Mumford 1961: 59) 
2.1.1 Shaped by war. The urban response to conflict 
No author has described the evolution of cities as eloquently as Lewis Mumford 
(1895-1990). The relationship between cities and wars is a recurrent theme in 
Mumford's work, as he describes the evolution of a temporary settlement of 
hunter-gatherers into a village, then into a stronghold, a citadel ('little city'), a 
walled city, and eventually into the contemporary city we identify today. He 
argues that urbanisation was less the result of a revolution, or an explosion of 
power as described by V. Gordon Childe, but more an implosion, whereby many 
diverse elements of a community were brought together ': .. under pressure. 
behind the massive walls of the city"(Mumford 1961: 46). Since the beginning of 
the urban implosion, war shaped both the physical form and institutional 
structure of the city. As centres of wealth and power, and symbols of armed 
might, cities became an attractive target for aggressors. At the same time, 
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Mumford argues, the very nature of war also changed once cities came into the 
picture - from aiming to capture a few sacrificial victims from the opposing side, 
aggression now meant '~ .. mass extermination and mass destruction" (Mumford 
1961: 55). This in tum led to further development in the art of fortification, and 
more broadly, in the urban pattern. Medieval towns adopted a radial layout, with 
a series of fortifications in the form of concentric walls. However, cities that 
formed part of the powerful Ottoman empire between the 16th and 18th 
Centuries, such as Cairo, Tunis or Damascus, and which were I~ •• relatively well-
protected from outside aggression" (Raymond 1984: 2) due to the security offered 
by a powerful state, did not construct any major fortifications to protect 
themselves from aggressors. All these phenomena are reflective of the historical 
relationship between cities and conflict (Unwin 1911; Abercrombie 1959). 
Some authors argue that the development of the modem city is equally defined 
by the change in the nature, strategies and tools of warfare, which have, along 
with the advancements in communications, transportation systems and 
construction techniques, significantly influenced settlement patterns as well as 
the shape and form of the city in the last century. A case in point is the 'dispersal 
movement' which emerged in the United States in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War. Even though American cities had not been directly 
affected by the war, Light (2003) describes how the idea of 'defensive dispersal', 
or deliberate dispersal of population and industries to reduce the vulnerability of 
cities to a nuclear attack, gained currency in the 1940s and 1950s. The concept 
was championed by a wide range of professionals, including atomic scientists, 
defence strategists, and prominent urban planners. The latter, in particular, saw 
this as an opportunity to strengthen, consolidate and expand the influence of 
urban planning profession. Light (2003) and Farish (2003) indicate in their 
analyses that while the dispersal movement did not achieve much success in 
terms of actual implementation (due to both resource and enforcement 
constraints), it did establish a collaborative relationship between urban planners 
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and the defence establishment, including scientists and strategists, for many 
years to come. 
Others assert, however, that the suburbanisation that eventually occurred in 
America was actually a product of many other factors, and cannot be attributed 
to the dispersal movement. The increasing motorisation of the American society, 
improvement of highways networks and the policies of the Federal Highways 
Agency, federal housing policies of the time, and private developers who were 
more interested in investing in suburbia as opposed to inner-city redevelopment, 
all played an important role in promoting suburban housing. Middle-class white 
citizens who could afford to do so, moved out from inner-city areas to suburbs, 
and were replaced by poorer, black populations. Industries, too, were already 
decentralising prior to the emergence of the dispersal movement (Ward 2002; 
Farish 2003; Beauregard 2006)11. 
In the United Kingdom, the first wave of New Towns in the aftennath of World 
War-II are also said to be a result not only of spatial planning concerns, but also 
of the strategic objective of dispersal of national industries and the urban 
population. Defence planning against terrorism further became a reality in the 
1990s when a 'ring of steel' was systematically and effectively erected around the 
City of London (or simply, the City) as a response to the IRA bombings. Coaffee 
(2004) provides an interesting and eloquent description of the combination of 
physical changes (initially temporary but subsequently pennanent), traffic 
management measures, security and surveillance measures, and other restrictions 
that fonned the 'ring of steel', which cordoned off the City to protect it from 
terrorist attack. Interestingly, turning the City into a '~ .. medieval-style walled 
enclave [ ... ] a walled city-approach [ ... ] with access through a number of small 
gates'" is said to have been an explicit objective of the policymakers of the time 
11 Beauregard's concept of parasitic urbanisation suggests that post-war urbanisation in America 
was 'parasitic' in the sense that it siphoned households out of older industrial centres, attracted 
urban retailers and manufacturing firms, and absorbed capital which might have been used for 
urban redevelopment (Beauregard 2006). 
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(see Coaffee 2004: 281). Following the September 11 attack in the United States, 
the ring was revived and strengthened, and today aims to serve as not only a 
deterrent for terrorists but also to criminals in general. Thus, the shape and form 
of the City has evolved and changed permanently over the last fifteen years, not 
just because of growth and economic development and changes in city function, 
but also thanks to the changing modes of urban warfare. 
2.1.2 A thousand little wan within: (In)visible urban fault lines 
" ... a thousand little wars were fought in the market-place, in the 
law courts, in the ball game or the arena. " (Mumford 1961: 66) 
It has also been argued that the city - since it came into existence - has been 
characterised by as many struggles within as outside. Segmentation of cities 
according to race, ethnicity or class is nothing new. In industrial societies, the 
working class was clearly segregated from the upper echelons of society, and 
planning was in fact the major tool of public policy used to ameliorate the living 
conditions of the working class. The post-industrial, and in many countries, post-
colonial, society has seen an increase and intensification, not reduction, of the 
'thousand little wars' described by Mumford, with many more cleavages in 
today's cities than ever seen before. 
Beall et a1 (2002) argue that cities can be divided along a range of axes, 
including, among others, class, race, ethnicity, gender and length of residence. In 
most cities of the developing as well as developed world, class fault lines are 
clearer than religious, ethnic or national ones, and are reflected in the spatial 
pattern. Friedrich Engels pointed out in 1845 in the context of industrial 
Manchester that ': .. the worldng-peoples quarters are sharply separated from the 
sections of the city reserved for the middle class" (see LeGates and Stout 2000a: 
49). This remains true even today, in fact, most cities are divided by different 
occupation and income groups, " ... the velJ" rich; the affluent professionals; the 
suburban middle class; the unskilled workers; the informal workers; and the 
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residual or marginalized underclass" (UN-HABITAT 2003a: 2). In 2003, nearly 
one third of the world's urban residents lived in slumsl2, which represent an 
extreme physical and spatial manifestation of intra-city inequalities in many 
developing-country cities (UN-HABITAT 2003a). 
The Chinese city of Nanjing provides an interesting example of income and class 
divisions generated due to the economic transition and rapid growth, in a 
hitherto 'classless' urban spatial structure. Urban poverty has become a 
significant problem in China since the transition to the market in the early 
1990s, and the spatial reflection of urban poverty is now beginning to emerge. 
According to Liu and Wu (2006), neighbourhoods of similar income or status 
have appeared in most Chinese cities. In Nanjing, the urban poor are 
concentrated in specific areas of the city where housing is affordable, though 
usually severely run-down. These include mainly three types of neighbourhoods 
- inner-city dilapidated residences, workers enclaves and rural migrants' 
enclaves. 
In developed country cities, too, similar fault lines exist, though often just 
beneath the surface. A 2007 report on Indices of Deprivation observed that 
despite being one of the richest cities in the world, London is home to 4 out of 
the 8 most deprived local authorities' areas in England (Government Office for 
London 2007)13. BanJieues (suburbs) containing France's most distressed public 
housing projects can be found on the outskirts of most major French cities and 
are said to exemplify the country's most prominent social disparities. Home to 
marginalised communities of first and second generation immigrants, and 
characterised by lifeless architecture, poor accessibility, high unemployment and 
12 The word slum first appeared in the 1820s in London, and was used loosely to define poorest 
quality housing and unsanitary living conditions, a refuge for, and source of, crime, 'vice' and 
disease. Today it simply refers to low-quality or informal housing, often overcrowded and poorly 
served by basic services and infrastructure. (For a more rigorous conceptual discussion on slums, 
see UN-HABITAT 2003) 
13 The Index is based on various indicators combined under seven categories - Income, 
Employment, Health Deprivation and Disability, Education, Skills and Training, Barriers to 
Housing and Services, Crime, Living Environment (Government Office for London 2007). 
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crime rates, these poor urban areas of France made world headlines in November 
2005 when their disenchanted young residents took to the streets in a month-
long orgy of night-time rioting and violence (Simpson 2006). According to Balbo 
and Tuts (2006), as international migrants head to cities, not just in France but in 
many other countries, they prefer to settle among their 'own' people, who can 
provide them with initial support and guidance, something that is not always 
forthcoming from local institutions or authorities. This segregated pattern of 
settlement leads to a fragmentation of the urban fabric, with the implication that 
any urban conflict can lead to a de facto division of the city. 
In their exploration of how the phenomenon of globalisation has affected cities, 
their spatial structure and form, Marcuse and van Kempen (2000) also find that 
although there is no standardised 'new spatial order' resulting from globalisation, 
cities ranging from New York to Calcutta to Brussels and others have witnessed 
growing polarisation, segmentation and exclusion as spatial patterns are brought 
about by policies and developments which are not solely spatial or local. They 
argue, nevertheless, that t: .. Spatial policies can have a dramatic effect on the 
divisions of the city" (p. 273), effect which can be either positive or negative. 
Land use and social housing policies can reduce divisions caused or exacerbated 
by globalisation, for example in Singapore and the Netherlands, or reinforce 
them, as in the United States. In terms of ethnic concentration, land use and 
economic development policies can either encourage or hinder the solidification 
of ethnic enclaves. 
The manner in which a combination of racial segregation and class inequality 
can physically divide a city is exemplified in the case of Johannesburg. 
Johannesburg has been described as the quintessential apartheid city, and has 
been at the centre of the struggle against apartheid, racial segregation and job 
reservations. However, Beall et al. (2002) assert that Johannesburg'S divisions, 
particularly in the post-apartheid era, are a consequence of the changed political 
economy, and the resultant inequalities - of income, of economic opportunity, 
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and of access to housing and services. Even in New York, which is almost 
universally labelled as a "global city", despite the increasing mobility of the 
better-off individuals and families belonging to almost all different raciaVethnic 
groups, '~ .. there remains a hierarchy of racial and ethnic groups such that, for 
example, affluent wh!tes and Asians h've in the most attractive neighbourhoods, 
followed by comparable white Hispam'cs, and with blacks (both Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic) in significantly lower status communities" (Logan 2000: 183). 
Indeed, across North America, urban economic and spatial inequities are far 
more pronounced that other developed regions of the world, with race/ethnicity 
'~ .. an important determinant of socio-economic status [ ... J Non-Whites, 
especially those of African ancestry, tend to live in squalid, dilapidated, 
functionally obsolescent and segregated neighbourhoods" (UN-HABITAT in 
press: 70). 
The existence and significance of ethnic and religious fault lines is one of the 
emerging areas of concern in urban studies, and has been examined in 
considerable detail in many 'obviously' divided cities, such as Jerusalem, Belfast, . 
Mitrovica or Beirut. However, these cracks also exist, often just beneath the 
surface, in many seemingly 'normal' or 'cosmopolitan' cities, for instance in the 
Indian city of Mumbai (Bombay). Mumbai had witnessed occasional sectarian 
violence between Hindus and Muslims prior to 1992-93, but it was in that year 
that the communal tensions in the city reached the scale of a full-fledged 
conflagration. Nearly 1000 people were killed in the riots. The demographics of 
the city of Mumbai have changed significantly since then, as a large number of 
Hindus migrated from Muslim majority areas to Hindu majority areas in the city, 
and vice versa. According to Subramaniam (1999): 
"In the enormous movement of people after the riots, an open and 
subtle coercion worked alongside reactive fears, which resulted in 
Hindus fleeing to largely Hindu neighbourhoods and Muslims 
moving to predominantiy Muslim areas. "(p. 105) 
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Thus while religious, ethnic, racial and socio-economic cleavages in many cities 
may not take the shape of walls and barbed wire, they are often nevertheless 
clearly etched in the minds of the community, and reflected in the spatial 
structure of the city. In these contexts, the role of public policy, and indeed that 
of urban planning as one of its key instruments, can be determined keeping in 
mind the argument below. 
"In principle, there is no reason why public policy should interfere 
with enclave formation, as long as it is truly voluntary, that is, that 
anyone resident in an enclave has the realistic possibility of moving 
out. [ ... J Yet, the dangers of real ghetto formation must also be of 
concern. "(Marcuse and Van Kempen 2000: 274) 
2.1.3 The changing nature (or not?) of conDict 
,,[wars today are} fought not in trenches and fields, but in Jiving 
rooms, schools and supermarkets. "(Barakat 1998: 11) 
The nature of war has undoubtedly changed over the past century. While there 
has been a steady decline in the occurrence of conflict since the end of the Cold 
War I., many countries are affected by more than one conflict, and the range of 
countries affected has expanded to touch virtually every continent, in recent 
years. Moreover, most conflicts are internal: only seven interstate armed 
conflicts have been recorded in the period 1989-2003 (Eriksson and Wallensteen 
2004). 
While Machiavelli and Clausewitz have historically been key contributors to the 
definition of warl conflict, there have also been many attempts in recent years to 
describe the new forms of conflict. The World Bank identifies a "conflict 
country" as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where a 
main preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or 
where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the 
14 According to Harborn and Wallensteen (2007), 122 conflicts in 80 locations have been recorded 
in the post Cold War period. Shortly after the end ofthe Cold War, i.e. in 1989,54 conflicts were 
active. There has been a steep, but not constant, decline in the number since 1992, and in 2006, 
there were 32 armed conflicts in 23 locations. This figure has remained constant for three years. 
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state (see Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998). Peter Wallensteen and the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which he leads at the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden, have defined armed conflict as 
" ... a contested incompatibility that concems government or territory or both, 
where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the 
government ofa state"(Wallensteen 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2007) 15. 
Kaldor (1999) describes the post-Cold War conflicts as 'new wars' - wars that are 
caused by different factors, have different goals, different methods, and are 
financed in different ways, as compared to the 'old wars', defined by Clausewitz 
as being between states and for a definite political end - protection of state 
interest. Andersen refers to these as 'civilian-based civil wars' (Andersen 1999). 
A number of other authors have also touched upon the characteristics of recent! 
contemporary conflicts as part of broader discussions on aid, peace building or 
post-conflict reconstruction. The common features of post-Cold War conflicts 
identified by a number of authors include: 
• Genesis and goals: New wars are not simply conflicts to defend 'state 
interest', nor do they always have justified ends. These wars are often 
driven by a combination of proximate causes and greed, manipulation and 
personal ambitions of a handful of people, who mobilise communities on 
the basis of identity (ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc.), in order to 
achieve their objectives (Andersen 1999; Kaldor 1999). Miinkler (2005) 
lists some of the causes of the new wars as inequality and uneven 
distribution of wealth; ethnic, cultural, nationalist or religious differences; 
historic fault lines, colonial and pre-colonial era disputes; control, 
appropriation and distribution of resources. While none of these factors is 
sufficient in itself to lead to violent conflict or war, they often combine to 
15 The UCDP defines war as a conflict with at least 1.000 battle-related deaths in a year (Harborn 
and Wa11ensteen 2007). 
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create an explosive cocktail. Conflicts generated by these mixed 
motivations are much more difficult to end - there is no single root cause 
which, if dealt with, would bring the conflict to a close. 
• Techniques: Kaldor describes the 'new wars' as a combination of guerrilla 
warfare and counter-insurgency techniques, fought by highly 
decentralised units. According to UN-HABITAT, recent wars have been 
waged by largely amateur militia in cities and villages, t~ •• driven by long-
simmering ethnic and religious ideologies and fuelled by a struggle for 
political and economic control" (UN-HABITAT 2004b). As claiming 
power on basis of identity is their overarching goal, they focus on control 
of populations, and expulsion of those that cannot be controlled (Kaldor 
1999; Munkler 2005). 
• Ferocity: tiThe new wars are, in a sense, a mixture of war. crime and 
human rights violations"(Kaldor 1999: 11). Recent wars have indeed been 
characterised by greater ferocity of the conflict than ever before. Brutal 
and unjust methods are used regularly and widely. and the lawlessness 
and chaos gives rise to oppottunistic criminal gangs. As a result. new 
vulnerable groups have corne to the fore. such as Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs). ex-combatants. women-headed households and children. 
Their return and reintegration into their former homes and communities 
are issues that currently preoccupy most international agencies. including 
the, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA). the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UN-HCHR). 
• Resources: While inter-state conflicts of the past were funded largely 
from within the warring nations. recent conflicts have been financed by a 
variety of sources. many of them external. a phenomenon Miinkler labels 
'shadow globalisation' (Miinkler 2005). Foreign assistance has come from 
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states backing particular nationalist groups or militias (e.g. in the Bosnian 
war, from Serbia and Croatia), or from diaspora, either indirectly 
(remittances sent to individuals and households which are then 
'channelled' into the 'movement', for instance in Kosovo), or directly to 
movements (also in Kosovo, for example, the remittances to Ibrahim 
Rugova's LDK or Democratic League of Kosovo, which were later 
redirected to KLA, or the Kosovo Liberation Army). This is supported by 
the sale of drilling or prospecting rights by militia who control certain 
regions; drugs and human trafficking; local predation, including looting 
and extortion; theft and diversion of humanitarian aid. The diversity of 
resources (and, consequently, interests) fuelling the new wars is yet 
another factor that makes these wars extremely difficult to end. 
• Civilian involvement: As these 'new wars' are mostly fought within state 
borders and often in civic spaces, they are characterised by heavy 
involvement of civilians, both as combatants as and as targets. Civilians 
are no longer 'caught in the crossfire' but deliberate targets. Perpetrators 
are also victims - as illustrated by the case of child soldiers. According to 
UN-OCHA, one of the characteristics of the changing nature of conflict is 
that civilians are actively and deliberately targeted, and the dividing line 
between civilians and combatants is frequently blurred (see OCHA 
website - http://ochaonline.un.org). Combatant and non-combatant, 
soldier, policeman and criminal - it is hard to distinguish one from the 
other. 
One critique of the 'new wars' thesis is based on its inadequate emphasis on the 
role of conventional state military forces, on interstate wars, and on the 
genocidal nature of the new wars. Shaw (2000), states that: 
"Kaldor restricts the significance of new wars by over-emphasising 
their separation from continuing inter-state war, and by 
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understating how tar genocidal tendencies ha,ve come to dominate 
in contemporary war as a whole. "(p. 179) 
Indeed, the dual nature of war is evident throughout history - inter-state and 
intra-state conflicts have always co-existed. In the 1990s, the break-up of former 
Yugoslavia and the conflict in Rwanda were intra-state conflicts that grabbed the 
headlines, but the protracted Iran-Iraq conflict, the first Gulf War, and the 
international interventions in Kosovo and Haiti also occurred around the same 
time. Azerbaijan and Armenia; Ethiopia and Eritrea fought bitter inter-state 
wars. The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are also wars of aggression on 
the part of the United States and a small coalition against these two countries. 
Inter- and intra-state wars can also take place at the same time, in the same 
place, as was illustrated by the Ethiopian attack on Somali Islamist groups at the 
end of 2006. 
A more important perspective on the new conflicts is offered by authors and 
international agencies who suggest that it is less important to distinguish 
between old and new wars. than it is to differentiate between the different types 
of contemporary wars. In 1995, the World Bank acknowledged that not all 
conflict situations are the same, and that different types of conflicts warrant 
different types of post-conflict intervention. It identified five categories of 'socio-
political emergencies' as: 
• Stable states with disorderly transfers of power but with 
bureaucratic/governance continuity 
• Peaceful dissolution into successor states 
• State failure due to predatory or ineffectual governance 
• State erosion or failure due to ethnic/regional conflict 
• State failure due to ideological conflict (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998). 
Many others have also argued that while the 'new wars' certainly share some key 
characteristics, they also differ in significant ways, and that these differences 
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significantly impact the way post-conflict reconstruction needs to be approached. 
According to Luckham (2004), the manner in which states are called into 
question can be: 
• State collapse, where state administrations have effectively ceased, which 
can in fact precede or follow conflict 
• A challenge to authoritarian states by predatory groups wishing to 
control the state and appropriate its resources 
• A challenge to authoritarian states by popular revolts, due to their non-
inclusive policies or marginalisation of certain groups 
• Wars of national identity, which challenge the territorial integrity of the 
state 
• Conflict at the margins of the state, which is not very different from the 
wars of national identity, except in degree, i.e. they don't challenge the 
existence of the state itself but paralyse certain geographical areas within 
it 
• Regionalised conflicts, where the causes as well as consequences of the 
conflicts are regional rather than restricted to national boundaries 
• Collapse caused by external intervention, including military invasion or 
regime change. 
Luckham emphasises that the historical evolution of the conflict and its 
manifestation needs to be well-understood before any post-conflict intervention 
is planned, and that peacebuilding and reconstruction approaches, strategies and 
priorities, as well as the role played by international actors, would necessarily be 
different for each of the categories mentioned above. Berdal (2003), while 
echoing the importance of understanding the conflict from all perspectives, 
emphasises that the political economy of civil wars must be a crucial element of 
such an analysis. He focuses on three sets of issues: (a) the degree and nature of 
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state weakness and fragmentation, and an understanding of historical fault lines; 
(b) the nature and patterns oflocal and regional economic activity, formal as well 
as informal; and (c) mechanisms that support the continuation of war, including 
ease of access to, and integration into, international markets and actors. On the 
other hand, Kaufmann (1996) is of the view that a focus on causes of conflict 
takes away attention from the changes that take place during the conflict, and 
can lead to misguided solutions. He asserts that peace makers must concern 
themselves with the outcome of the conflict, rather than what existed before. 
One of the themes being explored in this research is that the understanding of 
the pre-war context, as well as the changes that take place during the conflict, is 
central to establishing post-war reconstruction objectives, priorities and 
strategies which are realistic and achievable. Vlhether restoration of status quo 
ante is a desirable or achievable objective, is a different issue altogether. Both 
these aspects will be explored further in the context of Bosnia and Mostar. 
Barakat (1998) divides the post-Cold war conflicts into three broad categories: 
• Conflicts of a religious or ethnic nature 
• Conflicts of a civilian character 
• Conflicts between the 'haves' and 'have-nots', including an anti-urban 
discontent among rural and small-town communities 
Prodanovic (2002) and Shaw (2004a) develop the last idea further, the latter 
arguing that all new wars share an anti-urban and anti-civic element. They 
suggest that cities are attacked by ethno-nationalists because of a combination of 
" ... archetypal feelings of hostility on part of the rural society toward the rise of 
cities"(Prodanovic 2002: 141), and the pluralist, multi-ethnic, democratic politics 
that cities have to offer. Educated 'elites' within cities are specifically targeted 
because they represent a cosmopolitan culture alien to those coming from rural 
backgrounds. 
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2.1.4 Killing the urban: The impact of recent conflicts on dties 
Over the last few decades, broader political struggles and conflicts are 
increasingly being articulated through attacks on strategic urban sites and their 
inhabitants. The complexity of the modem urban system, its infrastructure and 
communication networks, its reliance on technology and services, the 
concentration of large populations within its boundaries, and its multi-layered 
governance arrangements, renders it particularly vulnerable to conflict and its 
impact (Luke 2004). This was demonstrated in the not-too-distant history by the 
9/11 strike on the twin towers in the United States, the Madrid train bombings, 
and the 7n bombing of the London underground. Conversely, the urban setting 
also suits the nature of the new wars, which are characterised by the use of light 
weapons, bombs, and which focus on spreading terror. 
Indeed, Mumford's words on cities as targets of war find resonance in many later 
works on urbanism, urban planning, urban sociology, conflict and peace studies. 
Graham (2004) suggests that the capture of strategic and politically important 
cities, as well as their deliberate destruction - 'city annihilation' - in many cases, 
still remains the ultimate symbol of conquest. The targeting of cities appears to 
be one aspect of warfare that has not changed fundamentally through history, 
though its significance has waxed and waned. This is despite the clear injunction 
in international humanitarian law, issued over a hundred years ago as part of the 
Hague Conventions of 1907, that towns, villages, cities (or any areas with 
concentration of civilian population) must not be subject to attack or 
bombardment in any forml6• 
16 International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of war, the laws and customs of 
war or the law of armed conflict, is the legal corpus that comprises the Geneva Conventions and 
the Hague Conventions, as well as subsequent treaties, case law, and customary international law. 
It defines the conduct and responsibilities of all key actors engaged in warfare, including 
'belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare', in relation to each other 
and to protected persons (usually meaning civilians). The fourth Hague Convention (Hague IV) 
of 1907, which entered into force in January 1910, deals with the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, and its Article 25 expressly prohibits "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of 
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended." Article 27 of the same 
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Hills (2004) also states that: 
'~ .. urban war has probably changed less than most other forms of 
war. It remains a brutal and exhausting matter, involving significant 
'collateral damage' and military and civilian casualties, and is the 
closest the West comes to pre-industrial forms of conflict. " (Hills 
2004: 237) 
The bombing of German and Japanese cities and civilians in the second World 
Warl?; the systematic destruction of Warsaw by the Nazi forcesl8; the demolition 
of many historic urban sites during the break-up of former Yugoslavia; the urban 
warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, are all examples of deliberate targeting of cities 
as part of inter- and intra-state conflicts during and after the Second World War. 
Some authors also label the deliberate targeting of cities and what they 
represent, as 'urbicide'. 
The term 'urbicide' first came into circulation in 1992, when a group of 
architects from Mostar documented the destruction of buildings and the urban 
fabric in Mostar in a publication titled Mostar '92 - Urbicid This was an attempt 
to demonstrate that the devastation of the urban environment was a deliberate 
effort to destroy the very identity of the city, and that the destruction of public 
and private buildings and infrastructure was more than simple collateral damage. 
The Mayor of Belgrade is also reported to have used the term to describe '~ .. the 
Convention also insists that historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, art, science 
etc., as well as hospitals and other places where the sick and wounded are collected, be spared. 
17 For example, Dresden, the historic capital of the old kingdom of Saxony and a famous cultural 
centre. It was one of the few German cities which had remained undamaged for most of the war, 
until February 1945, in fact, when it was flattened by an Anglo-American bombing raid. The 
official reason for attacking Dresden was that it was a major communications centre, close behind 
Germany's eastern frontier, which the Red Army was about to cross in its final offensive from 
Poland towards Berlin. The raid was intended to disrupt the German defence and to lend support 
to the Russians, who were about to cross over from Poland into Germany in their final offensive 
(Keegan 2005). However, critics go as far as to say that the bombing of Dresden was a 'war crime' 
- it was essentially a civilian target, and the all-out attack destroyed the city and killed nearly 
35,000 people, mostly civilians. 
18 The destruction of Warsaw by the Nazis during the war clearly demonstrated an attempt to not 
only destroy the city and its citizens, but also wipe out the culture it represented (STOLICA 1954j 
Jankowski 1990j Crowley 1997). 
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intentional, planned destruction and disintegration of an entire way of life in the 
city through the killing of its citizens as well as its culture of civility and 
diversity" (Prodanovic 2002: 139)19. In a more recent publication, Coward (2004) 
proposes the following definition of urbicide: 
tiThe destruction of buildings and urban fabric as elements of 
urbanity. Buildings are destroyed because they are the condition of 
possibility of urbanity. Since urbanity is constituted by 
heterogeneity, urbicide compnses the destruction of the conditions 
of possibility of heterogeneity. "(p.167) 
He argues that the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia was neither 
collateral damage nor military necessity, nor can it be explained away as 
attempts to destroy heritage, or targeting of cultural sites as signs representing 
particular ethnic/religious concepts or values. It was a vicious and deliberate 
assault by the ethno-nationalists on the plural and heterogeneous culture of 
Bosnia, in order to destroy both the symbols of co-existence between various 
ethnic/national groups, as well as the places and spaces where they lived their 
collective lives.· Prodanovic (2002) lists Dubrovnik and Vukovar in Croatia, as 
well as Sarajevo and Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as notable examples of 
urbicide in the Balkans. 
Conflicts also have a significant economic impact on cities, not just in terms of 
the collapse of all major pre-war economic activity, but also in the changed 
nature of the economy. Skilled labour often migrates out of the city during a 
conflict (as is currently being seen in Iraq), along with capital. Trade and 
production are interrupted. At the same time, rural populations make their way 
into the city, driven by fighting in the countryside and drawn by the possibility 
of accessing relief goods as well as employment and shelter, in urban areas 
(Barakat 1998; Kamphuis 2005). At the national level, war generates a 'conflict 
economy', which may need many years of peace to dismantle and transform. 
19 Also see Adams (1993) and Coward (2001). 
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According to Kamphuis, a 'conflict economy' is characterised by the destruction of 
physical capital and the means of production and trade, as well as capital flight, 
along with the breakdown of social and political institutions. This is accompanied 
by the establishment of " ... alternative structures of power and exchange, mostly 
outside the formal economy" (Kamphuis 2005: 185)20. It is often in the interests of 
economic and political elites to maintain a conflict or post-conflict situation in 
order to siphon off national and international resources, or to impose their own 
de facto authority on the ground. 
The impact of conflict on cities thus includes, but extends beyond. physical 
destruction and economic devastation, often resulting in extreme social 
polarisation along lines of religion. ethnicity or nationality, and the de facto re-
drawing of city boundaries, external as well as within. 
2.2 After the conflict 
2.2.1 'Post-conflict' - is there any such thing? 
"Inter-state wars in Europe from the mid-seventeenth to the early 
twentieth century ..... had a precise definition in time. beginning 
with the declaration of war and ending with the peace settlement." 
(Munkler 2005: 11) 
In recent conflicts, this traditional distinction between a conflict and post-
conflict situation has become, to say the least, blurred. Peace accords signed after 
conflicts can either (a) fully resolve a conflict, or (b) regulate or partially resolve 
the conflict, or (c) decide on a process towards achieving a resolution to the 
conflict. The military and political provisions of these accords vary greatly 
(Harbom, Hogbladh et al. 2006). 
According to a number of authors, conflicts may become more or less violent, 
but they seldom achieve complete closure or resolution. Oberschall states that 
there can be several phases in the transition from conflict to peace, ranging from 
" ... conventional politics. mJ1itant politics. armed confrontation. { ... } talk/fight. 
20 See full discussion on pages 64-65. 
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ceasefire, peace agreement (contested to varying degrees), and implementation, 
with a lot of reversing and recycling over these phases untJ1 a stable, self-
sustaining peace or some other outcome is achieved" (Oberschall 2007: 28). 
There could be prolonged periods when a conflict lies dormant, but it can be re-
ignited by events or actions of the adversaries. According to Harbom and 
Wallensteen (2007), out of the 32 armed conflicts reported in 2006, nearly 21 had 
been going on for over ten years, experiencing a lull for a year or two, only to 
restart again. While four of the conflicts which had been reported as 'active' in 
2005 were 'no longer active' in 2006, four others were restarted in 2006, either 
by the same parties that were involved before, or by new actors. 
In their discussion on post-conflict development, Junne and Verkoren (2005c) 
use the term 'post-conflict' as "shorthand for conflict situations, in which open 
warfare has come to an end"(p.l). International organisations such as the United 
Nations and the World Bank, too, find it hard to draw a line between conflict 
and post-conflict. A report on the World Bank's experience in post-conflict 
reconstruction points out that: 
'The apparent closure points to conflict, such as peace agreements 
or elections, rarely signal the clear beginning of a definable post-
conDict reconstruction period. Rathe~ there is a period of transition 
where peace must still be consolidated and ground laid before 
sustainable recovery can begin. "(Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998: 9 -
original emphasis) 
However incongruent it may seem, despite the lack of an accepted definition of 
'post-conflict', there seems to be consensus among academics and researchers 
that the number of post-conflict situations is on the rise. It is this understanding 
that has led to an increasing emphasis on post-conflict recovery, reconstruction 
and development initiatives. 
2.2.2 Peace settlements and ddes: New actors~ new governance systems 
Some authors believe that inadequate attention is paid to cities in high level 
peace settlements, even though territorial claims often lie the heart of the 
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conflict. Bollens (2000; 2006) argues that cities have the potential and capacity to 
transform conflict, yet few peace accords have made full use of this capacity. He 
highlights the case of Sarajevo, where lifting of the siege of Sarajevo was an 
important element of the peace deal, and where initial discussions on the 
agreement included a provision to place Sarajevo under international 
administration. This did not materialise, however, and Sarajevo, though officially 
the capital of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was physically included 
under the Bosnian-Croat Federation. This discouraged the displaced Serbian 
population from returning to Sarajevo, and in fact led to more Serbs moving out 
of Sarajevo in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Accords21 • 
Caplan (200Sa) describes the different governance arrangements that have been 
devised following recent conflicts - in Cambodia; Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sirminium; East Timor; Kosovo; and other war zones. While they vary 
between 'poles of supervision and direct governance' (Caplan 200Sa: 20), 
international administrations in these situations nevertheless take on a wide 
range of responsibilities that go beyond traditional peacekeeping and include 
maintenance of public order and security, protection of refugees and displaced 
persons, civic administration and political institution-building, and economic 
recovery and reconstruction. 
It is the last aspect, in particular, that has a direct bearing on cities. Even if a city 
is not placed under direct international administration in the aftermath of the 
conflict, the influence of the international community, including the multitude 
21 In my view, however, this case illustrates that international mediators are not unaware of the 
role of cities and the significance accorded to control of particular cities by warring parties. 
Whether they get the solution right (if indeed there is any 'right' solution) is open to debate. The 
case of Mostar, which is the main case study for this research, is also another example of the 
attention paid to cities in peace agreements. The destruction and division of Mostar was so 
extreme that the Washington Agreement of 1994 devised an entirely novel arrangement (the EU 
Administration of Mostar) for its administration and reconstruction. An Interim Statute for the 
governance of the city was adopted in 1996, and a final city statute formally reunifying the city, 
in 2004. Even today, the international community sees Mostar as a reflection of the complex 
reality of Bosnian-Croat Federation, and efforts to resolve the impasse in Mostar and reunify the 
city are seen as attempts to find a lasting solution for the Federation as a whole. 
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of UN agencies, international donors and lending organisations, as well as 
international NGOs, is often clearly visible. Reconstruction priorities are usually 
defined by the international community. Even if local elections are held, 
international administrators andlor advisers are placed in municipalities, who 
have the final word on the important issues. This co-administrative or 'dual desk' 
model was applied (albeit with limited success) in Kosovo (Caplan 200Sa). 
One of the important fallouts of peace, thus, is the emergence of new and 
powerful external actors 'governing' cities (and indeed, entire territories or 
countries), and driving reconstruction and development - actors who are not 
accountable to local communities. The vision and priorities for reconstruction of 
cities thus emerge from the ideas and (often) preconceived agendas of these 
actors22. The new forms of participatory planning and governance (see Section 
2.3) that have emerged in the past fifteen years have not yet been adapted 
effectively to post-conflict situations, despite the urgent need to ensure 
engagement, participation and inclusion of minorities and marginalised groups in 
the decision-making process. How participation can be promoted in situations of 
extreme conflict, and whether it is desirable or possible at all in these contexts, 
are also aspects which are yet to be fully explored. 
2.23 New economic structures 
New governance arrangements are also usually accompanied by new economic 
structures, especially in (but not limited to) urban areas. According to Kamphuis 
(2005), four different types of economies, co-existing and closely intertwined, 
can be seen in typical post-conflict situations: 
22 Whether this is the right approach or not, or the merits and demerits of introducing democratic 
governance (and at which stage) in post-conflict societies, is not the issue under discussion here. 
The point being made is that a number of new actors often emerge in post-conflict contexts, and 
have a significant role to play in recovery and reconstruction. These roles need to be 
acknowledged and factored into the analysis of post-conflict reconstruction approaches. This will 
be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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• the international aid economy, led by aid organisations and their 
international staff who need housing, offices and services; 
• the criminal economy, including a broad range of criminal and 
paracriminal activities; 
• the informal economy, where informal systems of cash and goods 
exchange prevail; and 
• the formal economy, which occupies a very small fraction of the total. 
Urban areas, in particular, witness an economic explosion in response to the first 
of the reasons li~ted above - the presence of a large community of international 
organisations and workers, requiring not just housing and office space but also 
services of local professional and administrative staff, the latter including 
translators, drivers, secretaries, telephone operators and various others. 
Pioneering research on local staff of international organisations - the lokalci - by 
Barakat and Kapisazovic (2003) highlights that the presence of the international 
community in Bosnia has led to the emergence of this new social class, and that 
little has been done to ensure their capacity development or reintegration into 
the local economy once the international operations wind down. Outside these 
organisations, cafes and restaurants, numerous supermarkets and car-wash 
facilities, abound - in Kosovo, these can be found even in the smallest of 
settlements. Many local households choose to rent out their homes to expatriates, 
and live in overcrowded conditions themselves. The danger, of course, is the 
excessive reliance of the government as well as the local community on this arm 
of the economy, and the potential for another economic collapse, when the 
international operations are phased out. 
The informal economy also becomes predominant in the aftermath of war 
because of influx of refugees and displaced persons who may not be able to find 
jobs; and the destruction of public assets and production facilities, for example in 
former Yugoslavia, which employed large numbers of people before the conflict. 
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The collapse of the state leads to the collapse of the state-run economy, and high 
unemployment is usually an immediate consequence. 
At the same time, the post-conflict environment also presents an opportunity to 
address systemic problems in the economy, at both micro and macro levels. 
Donors are often not only willing but keen to support the legislative and policy 
reform, public administration reform, restructuring of the public finance system 
and rationalisation of taxes. This is also seen as a time to support strengthening of 
local government structures and introduce modem revenue collection and 
expenditure accounting systems at the local level. 
2.23 New boundaries - Partition. unification. enclaves. extensions 
Another important impact of war, and peace, on cities is the redrawing of their 
borders. Nicosia, for example, was partitioned in 1958 when Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots turned on each other, after Turkish soldiers forced the Greek 
population from one of the mixed suburbs of the city. Although Cyprus gained 
independence from British colonial rule in 1960, neither side was satisfied - the 
Greek Cypriots wanted unification with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots 
demanded division of the island. The island was formally partitioned in 1974 and 
remains so till date, as does the city of Nicosia (Charlesworth 2003). 
The city of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo. too, remains firmly divided between 
Serbs and Albanians, despite many years of international administration and 
many attempts to unify the two parts. Encouraging returns of displaced persons 
of either community to their original dwellings on 'the other side' has been a key 
element of the reunification strategy, but one that has not achieved much 
success. Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, was divided by the war between 
Croat and Bosniac-controlled areas, and the division was even more firmly 
entrenched by the measures undertaken in the name of peace. There have been 
strenuous efforts over the last few years, however, to reunify the city. 
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Heavily-guarded mono-ethnic enclaves - mini-cities within cities - are yet 
another feature of many post-war situations. In Kosovo, for example, UNHCR 
points out that the majority of Serb returns have been to all-Serb communities 
(enclaves) within villages, larger communities and municipalities, which have 
minimal interaction with ethnic Albanians. The Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (IDMC) notes that the patterns of returns and resettlement 
f~ •• do not indicate real progress towards a multi-ethnic Kosovo, since returnees 
live almost separately from the rest of Kosovo's society and institutional 
framework" (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2005). A similar spatial 
segregation is also seen vis-a.-vis the Roma and other minority communities in 
Kosovo. 
In Beirut, the end of the fifteen-year war in 1990 brought with it the possibility 
of reunifying a city that had been divided into two distinct territories, East and 
West Beirut, by the Green Line. However, as the two areas had developed 
independent of each other over the past decades, it was no mean task. War had 
also brought with it many extensions to the city's suburbs, which were used at 
the beginning of the war for the resettlements of refugees from various parts of 
the country. Post-1990, these irregular settlements were officially sanctioned by 
special planning measures, thus allowing their consolidation and inclusion in the 
city boundaries. Boundaries within the city were also redrawn, with the 
development of a new central business district, where the souks once stood, and 
narrow winding streets made their way23 (Davie 1993; Stewart 1996; Verdeil 
2005). 
It might be useful here to briefly discuss the broader theoretical arguments for 
and against partition (usually implying national or regional, rather than local) in 
the aftermath of ethnic conflicts. Between 1996-99, Chaim Kaufmann published 
23 The approach adopted for the reconstruction of Beirut. led by the private sector and supported 
by the political leadership of the country. has its supporters as well as critics. It was undoubtedly 
a novel approach. but not one without flaws. It will be examined in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
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a series of provocative papers suggesting that partition or strict separation of 
warring ethnic groups into defensible territories might be an effective way to 
end civil wars and purchase "lasting security': instead of an unrealistic I~inperfect 
peace" (Kaufmann 1996: 151). He also suggested that unless majority-versus-
minority claims on the same territory are removed, ethnic cleansing would 
either continue, or resume at some point in the future. He proposed, finally, that 
the alternatives to separation are either equally undesirable (e.g. suppression), 
unrealistic (e.g. reconstruction of identities), have proved to be ineffective, or 
have many constraints (as in the case of power-sharing arrangements or state-
building). On the other hand, demographic separation and considerable local 
autonomy could replace the need for (and calls for) secession or sovereignty. 
This argument has been supported by a handful of others, for example Deutscher 
(2001), who uses the case of Switzerland to assert that strong, autonomous 
cantons, established on the basis of linguistic homogeneity, have proved to be an 
effective arrangement to prevent inter-group hostility and conflict. Downes 
(2006) takes up the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo and argues that in both cases, 
partition along (now-)established ethnic lines might be a more effective and 
lasting solution to the conflict than the emphasis on minority returns and state-
building efforts to (re)construct a multi-ethnic state (and in the case of Bosnia, 
the complex power-sharing arrangements instituted by Dayton). 
The "Chaim Kaufmann Argument", as it has been labelled by Licklider and 
Bloom (2006) in a recent volume on the subject, also has its critics. Sambanis 
(2006) uses the Doyle-Sambanis dataset of 145 post-1945 civil wars to assert that 
although partition is likely in ethnic! religious civil wars which have witnessed 
high levels of violence, there is no evidence to support that it makes war less 
likely to resume, or results in lower levels of residual conflict. Laitin (2006) also 
challenges Kaufmann's argument that renewed civil war is less likely to take 
place when warring communities are separated, rather than when they are 
intermingled. 
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Simonsen (2005) has argued that to effectively address divisions in societies 
ravaged by ethnic conflict, it is important to reduce the salience of ethnicity. 
Kaufmann (1996; 1998), Deutscher (2001) and Downes (2006) are of the opinion 
that this can be done by separating the groups into defensible, homogeneous 
enclaves, which would reduce the power of the nationalists and reduce any need 
for military action against the ethnic 'other.' Simonsen, however, suggests that 
the salience of ethnicity can be diminished by (a) sharpening the focus on other 
cross-cutting cleavages in society, and (b) developing flexible institutional 
structures which are responsive to the needs of the various groups. Local political 
autonomy and decision-making power over local issues are seen by many authors 
as central to resolving ethnic conflict. 
Taken to its logical extreme, Kaufmann's argument would mean that all states 
which have ever experienced ethnic conflict are inherently unstable and must be 
made mono-ethnic or clearly segregated at some stage. The present research 
asserts that such a situation is undesirable, unrealistic, and an extreme viewpoint. 
However, what can be usefully extracted from the argument is that the 
international community must establish a realistic set of goals or aspirations for 
different phases in the aftermath of conflict. Segregation or partition is often a 
reality in the aftermath of conflict, especially at the city or regional level, as 
illustrated by the examples of Nicosia, Mitrovica, Serb enclaves in Kosovo, cited 
above, as well as other cities such as Mostar (discussed in later chapters), and 
Belfast (not discussed here). The strategies to deal with ethnic 'un-mixing' should 
be context-specific and flexible, rather than one-size-fits-all, prescriptive 
solutions. The case of Mostar, as we will see later in this thesis, suggests that in 
the early stages, it may be unrealistic to try to impose ethnic re-mixing in places 
where an extremely violent form of un-mixing or cleansing has taken place, and 
a focus on incremental normalisation might stand a better chance of success than 
forced reunification. 
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2.3 The rise, demise and resurrection of urban planning 
To build an understanding of the crisis of identity and relevance faced by urban 
planning today - especially in disaster- and conflict-affected cities where, 
ironically, it is needed the most - the rise and fall of urban planning over the last 
fifty years has been briefly reviewed in this section. From a means of defending 
the city, to a tool of socio-political organisation and an instrument to 
demonstrate power, planning evolved into a mechanism for improving the 
quality of life in cities and towns, especially after the industrial revolution. 
Slowly, however. it became simply another bureaucratic exercise, and lost its 
significance in urban and national governance, except in cases where it was used 
for not-so-positive objectives, which are discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.1 Planning in the ancient world 
The ancient city of Hotep Sesostris (Kahun) in modem-day Egypt, the city of Ur 
located near the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in modem-day Iraq, and Harappa 
and Mohenjodaro in the Indus Valley in modem-day Pakistan are some of the 
earliest known towns based on a definite plan. All were built between the Fourth 
and Third Millennia B.C. Hotep Sesostris, now called Kahun, is one of the better-
preserved urban sites of the ancient world. According to Lampl (1968): 
t~ •• within a rectangular mud-brick enclosure, the city was 
constructed according to a preconceived plan providing maximal 
occupancy on a minimal area and zoned according to its different 
types of buildings. II (p. 26) 
The city of Ur in Mesopotamia, too, was surrounded by a mud-brick rampart, 
with a walled 'temenos' (a sacred site or official precinct) just off the centre of 
the city serving as its administrative centre. In Egypt, a small acropolis was 
situated on higher ground, large and smaller dwellings were separated, which 
was perhaps an ancient form of zoning. Excavated ruins of other ancient cities 
also point towards a grid pattern, with a hierarchy of streets (commercial 
boulevards to small residential alleyways), a separation of uses, and well-
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developed drainage and sanitation systems. Excavated ruins of Megiddo in the 
Levant (now Syria, in broad terms) show signs of an '~ .. ambitious town planning 
scheme"that included a series oflevel terraces with well-planned streets, square 
houses, a sanctuary and a large, probably public, building (Lampl 1968: 35). To a 
limited extent, thus, planning seems to have existed ever since the city itself 
came into existence, has apparently been an exercise undertaken by some form of 
planning authority, and used to reflect the socio-political structure of societies in 
spatial terms. 
The Greek 'planner' Hippodamus, who is said to have designed early Greek cities 
such as Miletus, Piraeus (the new port of Athens), and a Panhellenic colony in 
southern Italy around 443 B.C., is considered the 'father' of city planning. 
Straight, wide and paved streets, often edged with stately colonnades, separate 
groupings of dwellings and public buildings, the rectangular open spaces of the 
forums and agoras, and the monumental public buildings, and the centrality of 
the market reflected the socio-political organization and economic structures of 
the Greek 'polis'. Many new cities built around this time in Italy, Sicily and 
North Africa are also said to have followed similar principles. While the Greek 
'polis' had an important influence on Roman cities, the latter were laid much 
more along a regular grid-iron pattern, with two main roads running at right 
angles (Unwin 1911; Abercrombie 1959; Kennedy 1985). Early Islamic cities 
were said to follow principles such as interdependence and privacy, with clear 
guidelines on requirements for public and private spaces. These principles 
remained valid until much later, with Arab cities of the 17th and 18th centuries 
also demonstrating pronounced distinctions between public and private spaces, 
commercial and residential districts, and a prominent role for the market and the 
Great Mosque (Raymond 1984; Hakim 1986). 
2.3.2 Pl8D.11ing during the Renaissance 
Town planning emerged as an an form during the Renaissance period in Europe, 
with magnificent buildings and beautifully designed open spaces. The city as a 
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whole was considered a fl ••• monument or a work of art" (Abercrombie 1959: 54). 
Large planning schemes were undertaken at this time, and new capitals built as 
symbols of power and pride - the most notable among these being Versailles, 
which was developed on the instruction of Louis XIV in the late 1660s (Borsay 
1989)24. Planning in England, however. lagged much further behind its European 
counterpart during the Renaissance. The turning point came when the Great Fire 
of London destroyed large parts of the city in 1666, and Christopher Wren's 
famous plans for rebuilding London were developed and implemented (though 
only partially)25. Thus the revival of planning in Britain is closely linked to the 
objective of reconstruction rather than the establishment of new settlements. 
2.3.3 Planning as the tool for equitable development 
In the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the industrial revolution 
generated unprecedented growth and densification of cities across Britain. the 
rest of Europe and North America. This in turn led to the emergence of an 
industrial working class and a distinct urban underclass. The contrast between 
the advances in technology and industry and the disorder and squalor in cities 
was striking (LeGates and Stout 2000b). In the late 19th century. Friedrich Engels 
described the state of industrial towns in England. the collapse of urban 
2. This was also the case much later in the capitals of countries governed by, or newly 
independent of, colonial powers. New Delhi, Chandigarh, Islamabad and Harare were all built as 
symbols of power. 
lS London's reconstruction efforts served as one of the models for the rebuilding of Lisbon after 
the earthquake of 1755, which measured 8.5-9.0 on the Richter scale, and triggered a tsunami as 
well as a series of fires across the city. Between 10,000 - 15,000 people are said to have perished, 
and one-third of the city destroyed. It was rebuilt on the basis of completely different principles 
as compared to the old. with a rejection of the former opulent and grand style in favour of a more 
utilitarian and modern plan. While the planners of the new Lisbon drew inspiration from the 
rebuilding of London, in many ways the reconstruction of Lisbon was far more radical and 
comprehensive than that of London. This is attributed mainly to the inability of London's 
planners and politicians, unlike their Portuguese counterparts. to break away from the old street 
patterns. property lines and ownership rights. Another key factor behind the successful 
implementation of Lisbon's reconstruction plan was the role played by Marqu~s de Pombal, a 
powerful figure in the King's cabinet, who took charge of the reconstruction process (Maxwell 
2002). 
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infrastructure and the desperate living conditions of the urban poor. Writing 
about the Old Town of Manchester, for instance, he pointed out: 
I~ •• the filth, ruin, and uninhabitableness, the defiance of all 
considerations and cleanliness, ventl1ation and health which 
emphasizes the construction of this single district, containing at least 
twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants. II (see LeGates and Stout 2000a: 
53) 
He also described how particular planning interventions physically and 
psychologically separate the privileged classes from the poor, going on to observe 
that 
liThe dwellings of the workers are everywhere badly planned, badly 
bU11t, kept in the WOl3't condition, badly ventilated and 
unwholesome. "(see LeGates and Stout 2000a: 54) 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban or town planning 
emerged as the tool to address these physical, environmental and social ills of 
nineteenth-century industrial cities, aiming to restore order and health, address 
overcrowding and ensure safety. Public hygiene goals combined with a focus on 
decongestion, housing reform and developing city 'lungs' or green spaces, and 
I~ •• professional, comprehensive planning practice that we are familiar with today 
began to arise first in Germany, England and the United States; later everywhere 
in the world"(LeGates and Stout 2000b: 299). 
This was a period when planners had a free hand to design and execute utopian 
urban development schemes. Hausmann's replanning of Paris between 1856-70 
brought in wide boulevards and large green spaces, improved circulation and 
connectivity, produced impressive and innovative vistas. In Abercrombie's 
words, it was " ... the best example of clear-headed logic in town modernization" 
. (Abercrombie 1959: 91). Around the same time, the parks movement led by 
landscape architects saw the development of open spaces, squares and gardens in 
London, Paris, New York and many other cities. Planning for public hygiene 
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concerns was highlighted by Benjamin Ward Richardson, a physician, in his 
publication "Hygeia, City of Health", published in 1876. 
Ebenezer Howard's Garden City sought to integrate the rural with the urban and 
provide city-dwellers with a good quality of life along with economic 
opportunity, in one self-sufficient unit. Letchworth, the world's first garden city, 
was built in 1904. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 'City Beautiful' 
movement began to gain ground, exemplified by Daniel Burnham's Chicago Plan 
of 1909, emphasizing urban planning as a comprehensive process. Patrick Geddes 
took the discussion a step further and addressed issues of physical planning and 
social development together. He also introduced what we today assume is a 
prerequisite to plan preparation - a survey of the city, its environment and 
surrounding eco-systems, its history and growth. Geddes' ideas were taken 
forward by Lewis Mumford, who also helped popularise them in America. All 
these were significant milestones in the development of the planning profession, 
and examples of planning for urban renewal. 
The shape and form of the Master Plan, as we know it today, was first articulated 
by Edward Bassett in The Master Plan (1935). He described it as a general, 
flexible document, containing both map and text, having a certain visionary 
quality but emphasising physical land use planning (see LeGates and Stout 
2000b). Patrick Abercrombie's Greater London Plan of 1944 was considered the 
pinnacle of master planning in the aftermath of the Second World War. It laid 
out a comprehensive set of proposals for the reconstruction of London and 
creation of new towns outside London, which was to be ring-fenced by a 
substantial green belt. It also provided the basis for the post-War urban 
development policy in Britain, one that remained intact until the 1980s. Overall, 
the local planning system in Britain changed and evolved throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, with a renewed emphasis on slum clearance and redevelopment for 
public housing, the modernisation of urban centres, and restructuring of urban 
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roads. The New Towns, of course, were a much-admired British planning 
achievement of this era (Cherry 1982; Ward 2002). 
At the same time, the post-War period saw a new system of development in 
America as well, with mixed-use neighbourhoods replaced by a rigorous 
separation of uses. Mter a ': .. brief flirtation with a broad-based. European-style 
subsidized social housing policy" (Ward 2002: 187), private house building 
boomed, federal highway-building was initiated and suburbanisation gained 
momentum. This was resisted by some urban dwellers, who fought to retain the 
lifestyle, vibrancy and vitality offered by inner-city neighbourhoods. Jane Jacobs 
led the charge, with her scathing critique of modernist planning policies that she 
claimed were destroying many existing inner-city communities (Jacobs 1961). As 
a result, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of a number of urban 
renewal and inner-city redevelopment initiatives. The New Urbanism movement 
also developed at this time, aiming to provide an alternative to the urban sprawl 
that was rapidly becoming the defining characteristic of American cities. 
2.3.4 The (f)utility of master plllI1I1ing 
For much of the world, however, both developed and developing, Master Plans 
continued to be the predominant model of planning in the twentieth century, as 
they remain to this day. It is ironic, however, that although Master Plans 
retained most of the characteristics originally ascribed to them by Bassett, they 
failed to remain true what was perhaps the most important of all the features he 
proposed, and one that held the key to their successful implementation -
flexibility. Indeed, comprehensive, inflexible and un-implementable masterplans 
characterised planning in most countries towards the end of the twentieth 
century. Too much attention was paid to plan making and too little to the 
financial implications of planning proposals, and consequently, plan 
implementation. Plans failed to bring together sectoral and spatial strategies for 
development, and planning went from being seen as the " ... embodiment of the 
dream of the brave new world"(Taylor 2004: 4), the means by government could 
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deliver equitable and efficient development, to an expensive. long-drawn. 
unrealistic exercise wound up in red tape. It also proved unable to respond to 
new challenges of increased urbanisation of poverty and exclusion. deterioration 
of the environment and natural resources. and natural and man-made disasters 
(Clarke 1994; Taylor 2004). 
As sectoral programmes and projects became more popular, land use became the 
most important (sometimes the sole) instrument in the hands of planners. In 
North America, even this was lost as policies designed to roll-back the state and 
allow a greater role for the market came to the fore, which considerably 
weakened planning. However, two decades of laissez-/aire and market-led 
development. not only in North America but in many other parts of the world, 
have clearly made cities less sustainable, habitable and equitable. It is argued that 
letting private interests control resources such as land and housing, infrastructure 
and transportation, without adequate guidance, has exacerbated inequity and 
exclusion (Narang and Reutersward 2006). 
While urban planning faded into insignificance, sustainable urban development 
emerged as an important issue in the international development debate. A large 
number of international declarations and agreements have been adopted over the 
last fifteen years, most notably, Agenda 21, an unprecedented global plan of 
action for sustainable development adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio; the 
Habitat Agenda, the main outcome of the Habitat II conference in Istanbul in 
1996; and the more recent Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, adopted at the 
World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. All have 
called upon national and local governments to look for ways to ensure the 
sustainability of rapidly expanding cities and towns. The understanding of 
sustainable development seems to have been especially broadened and 
strengthened as a result of the Johannesburg Summit, particularly in respect of 
the important linkages between poverty, the environment, and the use of natural 
resources. 
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Interestingly, while they focused on issues of social, economic and 
environmental sustainability; shelter and housing; the need for enablement and 
participation; the role of public and private sectors, all these international 
agendas failed to place any emphasis on the role of planning and planners. 
Mechanisms to ensure sustainable development included new environmental 
planning and management approaches, the use of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) and Socio-Economic Impact Assessments (SEIA). Urban 
planning, however, scarcely received a mention as a possible means of ensuring 
sustainable development. Indeed, over the last twenty years, urban planning was 
slowly upstaged by urban management, which in turn gave way to the concept of 
urban governance, these new catch-phrases virtually supplanting urban planning 
in the dictionary of local governments (Narang and Reutersward 2006). 
2.3.5 Planning as an instrument of urban governance 
In the 1980s, the concept of urban management was introduced with a view to 
making cities more productive and efficient. It was in fact a rejection of the 
increasingly physical, land-use orientation of planning, a response to its inability 
to deal with new challenges of increased urbanisation of poverty and exclusion, 
deterioration of the environment and natural resources, and natural and man-
made disasters. Urban management soon came to be seen as a panacea for these 
problems (Biau 2005; Mehta 2005). 
Over the last two decades, however, the term 'urban governance' has slowly 
replaced 'urban management' in the international development lexicon. Kearns 
and Paddison (2000) argue that several changes in the urban context have led to 
this shift, including economic globalisation, which has led to greater inter-urban 
competition as well as a 'loss of control' on urban economies on the part of urban 
governments; changing urban-regional-national relationships; increasing 
political decentralisation and the growing complexity of urban social life. Indeed, 
over the last decade or so, there has been a growing interest in the concept of 
governance in general, and urban governance in particular. Governance is 
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defined in many ways, but all definitions focus on the relationships between the 
State, civil society and private sectors. The key aspects to be noted are that (a) 
governance is not government, a crucial distinction between the two being the 
notion of civil society; and (b) governance emphasises the processes of decision-
making, as much as, or even more than, the decisions themselves or their 
outcomes (see Harpham and Boateng 1997; UN-HABITAT 2002a; ODI 2006). 
UN-HABITAT's Global Campaign on Urban Governance (GCUG) puts forth the 
following definition of urban governance: 
"Urban governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs 
of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or 
diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be 
taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements 
and the social capital of citizens. " (UN-HABITAT 2002a: 9) 
The Campaign also takes a normative stand and proposes seven principles of good 
urban governance. These are also supported by other international actors 
including The Urban Governance Initiative (UNDP-TUGI) and the Oslo 
Governance Centre. The seven principles are: 
• Sustainability - Balancing the social, economic and environmental needs of 
present and future generations 
• Subsidiarity - Assigning responsibilities and resources to the closest 
appropriate level 
• Equity of access to decision-making processes and the basic necessities of 
urban life 
• Efficiency in delivery of public services and in promoting local economic 
development 
• Transparency and Accountability of decision -makers and all stakeholders 
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• Civic Engagement and Citizenship - Recognising that people are the 
principal wealth of cities, and both the object and the means of sustainable 
human development 
• Security of individuals and their living environment (UN-HABITAT 2002b). 
The discussion on governance has evolved and matured over the last fifteen or so 
years, and new tools and techniques to encourage participation, transparency and 
accountability have come to the fore. Examples include participatory budgeting, 
an innovative practice widely applied in Latin America as well as parts of 
Western Europe; City Consultations; Urban Pacts; and other similar approaches 
designed to promote civic engagement. There is a growing focus on issues of 
exclusion and inclusion, and their spatial manifestation in cities across the 
developing as well as developed world. Some attempts have been made to link 
planning and governance through approaches such as participatory planning, 
community development planning, Environmental Planning and Management 
(EPM) and City Development Strategies (CDS), but these are few and far 
between. Some of these approaches are discussed briefly in the following 
sections. 
2.3. 6 New goalsl new approaches (I): Planning for sustamabiJity and inclusion 
The recent revival of planning has been led largely by Western European cities 
where innovative strategic planning approaches have come to the fore, 
integrating the spatial and the sectoral. Strategic Plans, or Strategic Structure 
Plans, have derived from, and in turn revived, Europe's 'strong state' traditions 
(Albrechts, Healey et aI. 2003). The Strategic Structure Plan for the Flanders 
Region, in particular, is an example of a shift from traditional regulatory land use 
planning towards a more strategic framework, emphasising principles such as 
sustainability and participation. Similar strategic structure plans have also been 
adopted for other cities as well as regions in continental Europe. 
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Some of the innovation in this period has also come from developing countries. 
Many Latin American cities have adopted a strategic urban planning approach, 
for instance, Buenos Aires in Argentina, Santiago de Chile in Chile, La Paz in 
Bolivia and Havana in Cuba. In this part of the world, key elements of strategic 
planning include, inter alia, formulation of a long term vision and strategy for 
the city, focusing on critical issues, establishing action-oriented participatory 
processes, and flexible decision-making (UN-HABITAT 2004a). In Africa, South 
Africa has introduced Integrated Development Plans which aim to transform the 
divided cities that were a legacy of apartheid, by focusing on service backlogs and 
inequalities, while at the same time aiming for efficiency and competitiveness 
(Boraine 2004; UN-HABITAT 2004a). City Development Strategies (CDS) are yet 
another tool, though not spatial-focused, which have been used in a number of 
cities to move towards inclusive and well-governed cities, linking development 
priorities with investments, while retaining a pro-poor focus (Mehta 2004). 
The growing realisation that a renewed planning can be a key force for 
addressing the sustainability agenda and balancing the three pillars -
environmental, economic and social sustain ability - which are often competing, 
has provided policymakers, practitioners and thinkers with the opportunity to 
redefine and re-establish the planning agenda (Lovering 2004; Narang 2006). 
Many also argue that the revived planning is (or, has the potential to be) a tool 
for realizing good governance, with its focus increasingly on citizen participation 
in decision-making, transparency and accountability, efficiency and effectiveness 
of development and investments. Since it offers citizens and communities to 
participate in something "tangible" that impacts their lives directly and has the 
potential to improve their immediate living environment, it may be a more 
effective approach towards civic engagement, as compared to promoting 
democratic participation in general terms (Carley, Jenkins et al. 2001). Van den 
Broeck (2006) and others take the discussion further, arguing that it is not just 
participation in planning, but a 'co-production' of visions, concepts, policy and 
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decision making and implementation, that holds the key to successful planning 
and plan implementation. 
2.3.7 New goals, new approaches (D): Planning for disasters, before and after 
disasters 
In 1978, Ian Davis discussed issues related to shelter and housing, particularly 
emergency shelter, in the aftermath of natural disasters, noting that (a) the pre-
disaster context had an important bearing on the impact of the disaster as well as 
the post-disaster situation; and (b) that decisions taken in the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster (Le. during the relief phase), can have important 
implications in the longer term (Davis 1978). A seminar at the University of 
Trondheim in 1987 brought together a number of experiences on reconstruction 
after natural disasters as well as wars. Subsequently, an international workshop 
held at the University of York in 1991 proposed some guiding principles for 
reconstruction after wars (Barakat and Cockburn 1991). However, the gap 
between theory and practice persisted, and these were rarely applied in reality. 
Over the last few years, there has once again been a renewed emphasis on 
planning for disasters, both natural and man-made. Hurricane Katrina, the 
Kashmir earthquake, and the Indian Ocean Tsunami have once again 
demonstrated the dire need to reduce vulnerability of urban areas and their 
residents, especially the poorest and most vulnerable, to natural disasters. At the 
same time, planning is also emerging as a critical element (and often a crucial 
gap) in post-disaster recovery. Ingram et a1 (2006) argue that hastily devised, 
reactive policies often fail to address the root causes of vulnerability and, in the 
long term, may even exacerbate the social, economic and environmental 
weaknesses that turn natural hazards into large-scale disasters. They propose that 
redevelopment policies should be carefully developed, on the basis of 
comprehensive, site-based assessments of risk and vulnerability, and in 
consultation with all stakeholders. 
81 
Chapter 2: Cities and War, Governance and Planning 
There is also a growing acceptance among practitioners as well, that sustainable 
recovery and development warrants a swift and smooth transition from relief to 
development stages, with the application of a combination of crisis mitigation, 
response, recovery, economic development and sustainability strategies (UN-
HABITAT 2004b). Planning is also increasingly being seen as an important part 
of the armoury of potential solutions that can facilitate such a transition and lead 
to sustainable development. 
New Urban Planning, an approach recently put forth by a group of planners from 
across the world, is being promoted as a mechanism to ensure that a long-term 
perspective is retained even while emergency needs of the communities affected 
by conflict and disaster are being addressed. Planned reconstruction and a 
governance approach that emphasises inclusiveness and partnership, can nurture 
social and civic capital in the aftermath of a disaster or conflict. Plans can 
provide a framework for different interests to work together in a common 
purpose, and a transparent and accountable arena for negotiation of conflicts 
over development, both within civil society and between private and public 
interests (Farmer, Frojmovic et al. 2006). 
2.4 Conclusion 
Cities and war, destruction and reconstruction have always gone hand in hand, 
as cities have always been important targets in any conflict, whether ancient or 
modem. While the nature of wars has undoubtedly changed in the post-Cold 
War era, cities, city-dwellers and the urban way of life continue to be seen as 
strategic targets, a phenomenon some authors label as 'urbicide'. 
Planning has historically been a multifaceted instrument which has been applied 
to protect cities from outside aggression, organise the socio-political structure 
within cities, facilitate economic activity and improve the quality of life of 
citizens. Since the 1950s, urban planning has witnessed a tumultuous cycle of 
rise, fall and resurrection. The 1950s are viewed by many as 'the golden age' of 
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planning, an era when planning was seen as positive, progressive force, the 
means by which government could deliver equitable and efficient development, 
and contribute to the greater public good (Hall 1988; Cherry 1994). In the 1970s, 
however, it came to be viewed as long-drawn and futile exercise. As urbanisation 
progressed at a pace that seemed impossible to plan for, urban management, and 
later urban governance, emerged as alternatives to urban planning. Yet, planning 
never really vanished completely. New forms of planning have emerged in the 
last two decades to tackle the new challenges of poverty, exclusion, deterioration 
of the environment, and disasters, both natural and man-made. In some cases, 
planning has also been used to further the not-so noble objectives of the division 
of cities and communities, and the suppression and exclusion of certain 
populations. 
The role of planners and planning in post-war reconstruction efforts has also 
varied considerably since the end of the Second World War. Planners played a 
prominent and indeed visionary role in the reconstruction of Germany, Britain 
and other European countries after the Second World War. However, in many 
post-Cold War conflicts, they have been marginalised as the emphasis on 
immediate relief and recovery gained currency. The emphasis in recent decades 
has largely been on ad hoc interventions - shelter delivery, reconstruction of 
symbolic buildings, and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, rather than on 
undertaking systematic, strategic urban planning with a long term development 
vision, aiming to enhance inclusion, sustain ability, peacebuilding and/or conflict-
resolution26• In some cases, the private sector took over the task of planning and 
rebuilding destroyed urban sites or even entire cities. While there have been a 
limited number of cases, for example in Kosovo, Somalia and Afghanistan, where 
new forms of planning have been (or are being) introduced to rebuild conflict-
26 This is despite evidence, both from practice and literature, that planning can be a force for 
social change, positive as well as negative. Bollens (1998) argues that urban planning can be an 
important factor in ameliorating or intensifying ethnic conflict in polarised cities, as planners 
play neutral, partisan, equity-oriented or conflict-resolving roles. 
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destroyed cities and territories in a systematic manner, these are few and far-
between. The different approaches adopted towards post-war reconstruction in 
the period following the Second W orId War, and the role of planning in each of 
these, are examined in detail in the next chapter. 
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3.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter described how planning, cities, war and reconstruction 
have always gone hand-in-hand. However, in recent reconstruction efforts, 
planning, and planners, have largely been marginalised - mostly because 
planning is viewed as a long-term, development-oriented activity, whereas 
'relief and 'reconstruction' have a sense of urgency about them. A range of 
examples have been used in this chapter to build an appreciation of the roles 
played by urban planning in conflict-affected cities. The responsibilities of 
transitional administrations, one of the modalities used by the international 
community for the governance of war-affected states and territories, particularly 
vis-a.-vis post-war reconstruction, are also reviewed in this chapter. 
The first part of this chapter reviews the theory and practice of contemporary 
post-war reconstruction. The second part explores how planning has been used -
or not used, or worse, abused - in past reconstruction initiatives, and the impact 
of the different approaches adopted. The third section discusses the role of 
transitional administrations, and how they have approached post-war 
reconstruction in general, and urban planning in particular. The last section 
brings it all together and highlights key aspects that need to be explored in 
greater detail as part of the field research. 
3.1 The major elements of post-war reconstruction 
Reconstruction of war-tom societies is an extremely complex process, which 
needs to address not only issues of physical destruction but also aspects of social 
and economic recovery as well as peace building. These are complicated further 
by the lack of institutions and the fragile social fabric that often emerges after a 
conflict (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998; Barakat 200Sa). Barakat defines post-, 
conflict or post-war reconstruction as a range of inter-related activities designed 
to reactivate economic and social development, while at the same time creating a 
peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence (Barakat 200Sa). 
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Defined in this way, it extends beyond simply reverting to status quo ante, or 
're'creating what existed before the war, to include strategic choices which 
would pave the way for a better future27• 
The limited, but rapidly expanding, body of literature on post-war reconstruction 
and development is only just beginning to combine conceptual understanding 
with lessons from practice. In this process, a few broad principles of post-war 
reconstruction and recovery have started to emerge. There is a growing emphasis 
on the importance of post-conflict development which goes beyond simply 
reconstruction or rebuilding to encompass the establishment of 'a new social 
contract', and which is closely related to the context and causes of the conflict 
(Junne and Verkoren 200Sa). Barakat (200Sb) proposes seven 'pillars' that form 
the basis for sustainable recovery and reconstruction, including: 
• A clear and collective vision for post-war recovery, at least for the medium-
term, if not for the long-term future; 
• Early and broad-based participation, involving all stakeholders, towards the 
development of national vision for recovery; 
• Restoration of a secure environment and the rule of law; 
• Reconciliation, restoration of trust, and re-establishment of a justice system; 
• Equityin the distribution of the benefits of reconstruction and peace, and the 
relative importance accorded to the needs of different groups, sectors and 
geographical areas; 
27 Some organisations have even begun to favour the term 'recovery' over 'reconstruction' in post-
war contexts, on the basis that 're' construction suggests a return to status quo ante, or that it can 
be too restrictive in its focus (mainly emphasising rebuilding of physical assets, housing and 
infrastructure (Barakat and Zyck 2009). In this study, however, the terms post-war 
'reconstruction' and 'recovery' are used interchangeably, and are aligned closely with the 
definition proposed by Barakat in the previous paragraph. 
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• Reconstruction and development, including physical, economic as well as 
social aspects, using a range of interconnected strategies at different levels 
(national, regional and local); and 
• Assessing and developing capacities for recovery from conflict. 
While the importance of physical reconstruction is underscored by a large 
number of authors as well as practitioners, most point out that it should go hand-
in-hand with economic reconstruction, aim to tackle inequity in society, should 
be a means to refonn governance structures, and should ultimately serve to 
connect rather than further divide previously warring communities (Brown 
2005; Junne and Verkoren 2005b; Zetter 2005). Zetter, in particular, emphasises 
that physical reconstruction should not be treated as simply an end in itself - it 
is, rather, a means and an integral component of reconstructing and reviving 
societies devastated by conflict. Housing and landed property, for instance, are 
not simply a physical requirement for survival and safety, but an important 
economic asset, an instrument to rebuild livelihoods, and an It ••• important social 
and cultural commodity" (Zetter 2005: 156). Similarly, Brown (2005) suggests 
that infrastructure can be a tool bring communities together, stimulate the 
economy and sustain livelihoods, and assist in consolidation of peace. Sustainable 
infrastructure, as defined by Brown, encompasses It ••• physical assets that provide 
net benefits to a community. its neighbors, and the environment on a long-term 
basis"(Brown 2005: 104). 
Zetter, Brown and others highlight the importance of a strategic vision and 
strategic framework to guide reconstruction and development, as well as the 
enablement and empowennent of communities in the process. Zetter (2005) also 
proposes two more essential preconditions for sustainable physical 
reconstruction programmes - linking relief and rehabilitation to recovery and 
development, and rebuilding institutional capacity - which are also being 
increasingly recognised as key issues by international agencies involved in post-
conflict reconstruction efforts such as UNDP, UN-OCHA, UN-HABITAT, 10M 
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etc. Brown, on the other hand, suggests that relief and development must be seen 
as separate but concurrent processes, neither sequential nor overlapping, and one 
should not dilute the other (Brown 2005). 
Both literature as well as lessons from the field point towards the importance of 
balancing short-term reconstruction priorities with a long-term vision for 
development, and ensuring that '~ .. in the rush to reconstruct after conDict, long-
term sustainability is not compromised" (Brown 2005: 102). Like other forms of 
aid, housing, infrastructure and other elements of physical reconstruction can 
serve as connectors or dividers (Andersen 1999; Brown 2005), particularly in 
divided communities, and this aspects must be carefully considered while 
developing a strategic framework or plan for reconstruction. "The importance of 
getting it right the first time cannot be overstated"(Brown 2005: 103). 
3.2 Urban planning in post-war reconstruction 
3.2.1 Planning for reconstruction after the World Wars 
The First World War (1914-18), surprisingly, spared most major European cities. 
Only the cities directly involved in the fighting (for instance, Lille and Liege) 
suffered noticeable damage. Thus the period after the war was dedicated more to 
the construction of public housing and expansion of industrial areas, rather than 
planning of new settlements. In Britain, planning for reconstruction started in 
1916, and housing was clearly the immediate priority. A strong push was made 
for state provision of housing through local authorities, which led to the 'homes 
for heroes' campaign. Recommendations on density, site planning and house 
design were also adopted, though town planning legislation was most definitely 
'an appendage of housing' (Cherry 1982: 23). The powers for town planning were 
eventually vested in the Ministry of Health, created in 1919. In Germany, the 
preparation of the first city-wide, comprehensive urban development plan - for 
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the city of Hamburg - was a significant innovation. In other parts of Europe -
France, for instance - the influence of modernists like Le Corbusier increased28• 
World War-II (1939-45), on the other hand, had a devastating impact on cities 
'. 
across Europe, as well as in Japan. The period after the War was marked by a rise 
in the profile of planners and the significance of planning in national recovery 
efforts in various European countries (inter ali." Britain, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Poland). A large number of planners and decision-makers 
viewed the destruction of cities during the War as an opportunity to address the 
ills that existed earlier and 'build back better'. Planning for towns and cities was 
clearly an integral part of national recovery efforts as a large number of cities 
were completely or partially destroyed. The widespread destruction provided the 
space (physical as well as political) to rebuild on a large scale, and reform the 
entire planning system, at national, local and even international levels. It is as a 
result of some of the new approaches adopted after the War that ideas such as 
extensive land acquisition, zoning, density control and pedestrianisation of city 
centres carne to the fore (Diefendorf 1989; Cherry 1990; Jankowski 1990; 1993; 
Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). 
In Britain, bold approaches to rebuilding were encouraged in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, with a vision of a new and sustainable future. There was 
consensus on the need for improved circulation, open spaces, and a better quality 
of the living environment for rich and poor alike. The Coalition cabinet seemed 
in favour of radical reconstruction. Lord Reith's famous exhortation to 'plan 
28 The Athens Charter, an outcome of ClAM IV held in 1933, promulgated what it claimed were 
collectively agreed guiding principles for modern urban planning. However, the version that 
appeared in print in 1943 was under Le Corbusier's own name, and largely reflected his personal 
thinking and approach, focusing on high-rise residential blocks, strict zoning, the separation of 
residential areas and transportation arteries, and the preservation of historic districts and 
buildings (Ward 2002). For many years, these principles were adhered to by most European 
countries, albeit to different degrees. The United Nations in 1976 criticised it on the basis that it 
" . .. degrades the town to a mere machine and neglects social and sociological implications. The 
strict separation of places of work and residence has led to the creation of dormitory towns and 
also to high costs both for individuals and governments for home-to-work traver (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1976: 7). 
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boldly and comprehensively' echoed in every city planner's ears as planning, and 
planners, enjoyed unprecedented political and community support (Cherry 1990; 
Diefendorf 1990; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002; Larkham 2004). Plans were 
developed quickly and considerable progress made in their implementation even 
as the war went on. There was a surge of interest in town planning as media 
campaigns were launched soon after the bombing raids to engage the citizens in 
developing a new vision for the cities. Larkham (2004) also points out that as 
many plans were prepared in-house by local authorities as by external actors or 
consultants, and there was often little qualitative difference between the outputs. 
The shape and form the plan took was always an inherently political and 
negotiated, rather than merely 'scientific', exercise (Larkham 2004: 30). Indeed, 
although planners had powerful visions about how their cities should be rebuilt, 
their efforts were often undermined by the broader political and economic 
context, the rising costs, as well as the changing perceptions of the decision-
makers and community alike. As resources dwindled, the same Coalition 
government in Britain seemed to have retreated from its commitments, and was 
no longer prepared to support any radical efforts - whether in the area of 
legislation, policy, plans or resources - until the war ended. Some concluded that 
': .. the real purpose of the ideas proposed in the dark days of 1940 and 1941 was 
simply to raise morale. Once they had served their purpose, they could be quietly 
Wed off' (Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002: 6, emphasis original). At the local 
government level, too, a similar trend was observed, and was further reinforced 
by the disenchantment of the private sector with the government's extensive 
involvement in reconstruction. Property owners and developers, as well as 
retailers and other traders, resisted any suggestions of radical changes in urban 
layout and form, and in some cases agitated for restoration of status quo ante. 
Public enthusiasm for reconstruction flagged and the very necessity of town 
planning began to be questioned, for example, in cities such as Plymouth 
(Powers 2002). The repair and provision of homes seemed to be the top priority -
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indeed, sometimes it appeared to be the only priority - of the people. Planning 
slowly became synonymous with housing. 
In the long-term, it can be said that the post-war period gave an enormous fillip 
to planning in Britain, eventually providing direction to future growth and 
development, both physical and sectoral. Since the war, till date, there has been a 
continuous reinvention of planning in post-war Britain. New Towns, in 
particular, are a key innovation, and 32 of these have been created in the UK 
since 1946 (Hall 197 4; Department of Planning Oxford Brookes University 2006). 
In West Germany, too, although a number of radical and utopian approaches 
were mooted to rebuild the bombed cities, in the end, however, most cities and 
planners adopted a pragmatic approach to planning. The focus was on 
modernising cities using the opportunities afforded by the bombing, such as the 
complete destruction of inner city slums. In many cities, plans prepared under 
the Nazi regime (which was strongly pro-planning) were applied whole-
heartedly without realizing that they failed to respond to changed realities. 
Fischer (1990) and Diefendorf (1993) assert that there were strong continuities in 
planning ideas, approaches and activities after the war with those developed 
before Hitler's 12-year Reich, as well as during the Nazi period. Nazi planning 
had generated not only '~ .. megalomaniac monumental buildings"(Fischer 1990: 
132), but also technocratic, modem town plans, as the regime was willing to 
support planning with the necessary legal backing and financial resources. Urban 
renewal programmes, creation of new residential suburbs and new industrial 
cities, regional planning, and redesign of 23 large cities, were all activities carried 
out during the Third Reich (Fischer 1990; Diefendorf 1993)29. To a large extent, 
these pre-war planning models helped shape post-war planning interventions. 
29 The most far-reaching of all the planning activities during the Third Reich was the nationwide 
program for redesign (Neugestaltunj) of a large number of existing cities. The implementation of 
this programme required the acquisition of large tracts of land - either through purchase or by 
force - as well as large-scale demolition and clearing of areas that were to be redeveloped. These 
proved to be an immensely valuable asset after the war and facilitated enormous the task of post-
war reconstruction. 
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The final shape and form of most West German cities, including Munich, Bonn, 
Frankfurt and Kiel, was determined by an over-arching emphasis on 
modernisation and functionality. 
Grebler (1956) notes that the rebuilding of cities in Western Europe after World 
War-II exhibited a distinct pattern of continuity and persistence with the pre-
war approaches to urban planning. Despite the tabula rasa opportunity offered to 
many cities by the war, most didn't choose to rebuild in a manner that was 
radically different from the pre-war city, whether in terms of location of the 
cities and distribution of population, or new land use patterns and physical 
improvements in the urban environment. Nor were any efforts made to create 
" ... a new urban pattem designed for protection against future war" (Grebler 
1956: 463). Others also suggest that there were strong continuities in the 
planning approaches adopted before, during and after World War-II, and that 
many European countries, had in fact a head start as '~ .. radical urban 
reconstruction was in the air" even during the inter-war period (Cherry 1990: 
210, emphasis original; Fischer 1990; Diefendorf 1993). Davis (1987) proposes 
that the potential for bringing about radical change in urban plans and city 
development after conflicts is rather over-estimated in most situations, and the 
opportunities to introduce radicaV utopian planning schemes can be quite 
limited, thanks to factors such as previous investments in services and the 
complex patterns of land ownership. This theme will be explored in greater 
detail within the context of Mostar in later chapters. 
In Eastern Europe, planning systems after 1945 were largely modelled on the 
Soviet approach, with an emphasis on centrally-directed planned economic 
development, and a focus on sectoral, rather than physical planning, especially in 
the years immediately after the War. SpatiaVphysical planning was subservient 
to economic planning, and was mainly seen a technical tool to help realise the 
objectives of economic plans, ensure rational allocation of resources and 
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distribution of economic activities in order to promote equitable development 
(Dawson 1987; Nedovic-Budic 2001). 
Although both Germany and Japan fell under occupying powers/transitional 
administrations after the war, urban planning never gained the popularity or the 
support in Japan that it had garnered in Germany or the rest of western Europe. 
This was despite the fact that over 100 cities and towns across Japan were 
classified as 'war-damaged'. Planning for reconstruction was initiated very soon 
after the war ended, with the fundamental aim of preventing the uncontrolled 
expansion of large cities and conurbations and promotion of growth of small and 
medium-sized provincial towns (Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). However, this 
initiative eventually failed because both architects and businessmen wanted big 
cities to remain dominant. The reconstruction of Tokyo was the other main 
preoccupation of leading political figures as well as architects and planners. Once 
again, although 28% of the city was destroyed in the War, planning finally 
played a much smaller role in the rebuilding of Tokyo than was envisaged, 
mainly due to the lack of support from the Metropolitan and national 
governments, and the prevarication of local officials. The rapid and uncontrolled 
growth of the city, financial constraints and an orthodox financial approach, too, 
played their part, as did the American disapproval of '~ .. such idealism in a 
defeated and shamed country" (Ward 2002: 214). 
In the United States, of course, the planning ideal didn't receive such 
condemnation. In fact, the period after World W ar-II witnessed an increasingly 
closer link between urban planning and national defence strategies. This is 
reflected in, for example, the idea of 'defensive dispersal' in America which, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, gained currency in the 1940s and 1950s, and 
supported the deliberate dispersal of population and industries to reduce the 
vulnerability of cities to a nuclear attack (Farish 2003; Light 2003). 
The problem with the widely-accepted perspective of urban planning history 
until the Second World War, is that it assurne~ that societies were homogeneous 
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and the basic objectives of planning were purely technical, and/or positive -
public good, improvement of living environments, provision of housing and basic 
urban services to all, green cities, were the overarching goals. This discussion 
often ignores the class divisions promoted by Hausmann's remodelling of Paris, 
Hitler and Speer's implicit Nazi ambitions that were played out through urban 
planning and housing policies between 1933-45 (Jaskot 1996), or the 
exclusionary, racist objectives of planning in South Africa, Zimbabwe and many 
other colonial outposts (Mabin and Smit 1997). In the post-World War-II 
analysis as well, these negative dimensions of planning often take a backseat and 
the focus firmly remains on urban planning as a predominantly technical tool for 
managing socio-economic development and ensuring environmental 
sustainability, rather than an instrument of oppression and division, in its intents 
as well as methods (Yiftachel2000; Kamete 2007). 
3.2.2 Urban planning in contemporary post-war reconstruction 
liThe greatest challenge is to use the reconstruction process [in 
Beirut} to weld the divergent sectors of the multireligious society 
and to create, along with economic prosperity. a stronger sense of 
national unity. Yet reconstruction also has the potential to 
aggravate old tensions between groups and to renew internal stn'fe. " 
(Stewart 1996: 487) 
In the post-World War-II world, planning hasn't disappeared entirely from the 
arena of post-war reconstruction, but it has certainly become fragmented and 
used selectively. Its use as a prominent tool of post-war reconstruction has come 
mainly in situations of strong central control, whether under an occupying 
power, or a strong national government. In Jerusalem, for instance, since the six-
day war of 1967, Israel has used various instruments of urban planning to 
reinforce its occupation of the Palestinian Territories3o, In Beirut, Lebanon, the 
plans and the process of reconstruction after the civil war ended in 1990 were 
30 These include, for instance, the expanding Jewish settlements; building permissions, zoning 
and built form regulations; the roads cutting through the West Bank; and most recently, 
installation of green spaces by removing Arab settlements in Jerusalem. 
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pushed through by powerful elites without sufficient consultation with the local 
stakeholders. The free hand given to the private sector in planning for 
reconstruction has been widely criticised as divisive and exclusionary. Another 
example of the use of urban planning for assertion of power, but with little 
positive impact on the lives of those affected by the conflict, is that of the 
reconstruction of Fao after the Iran-Iraq war that lasted between 1980-88. The 
explicit aims of the reconstruction 'campaign' (as it was called), were to restore 
peace, and to attract displaced families back to their original settlements. The 
implicit objectives, however, were to establish the cities of Basrah and Fao as 
icons of resistance to the Iranian forces, as symbols of Iraqi pride, a declaration of 
Iraq's ability and self-sufficiency to rebuild itself, and to establish the President 
as a I~ • • hero of war and defence as well as of peace and reconstruction" (see 
Barakat 1993: 20). 
In the following sub-sections, some of these examples are discussed in greater 
detail. It is important to understand the predominant objective and envisaged 
outcomes of the planning process (which may not always be positive), the tools 
utilised, the timing of plan preparation (if at all), and the extent of involvement 
of various stakeholders, in order to be able to appreciate the importance of 
planning for conflict-affected societies. 
Planning to restore pride and consolidate power 
In many cases, especially after 'liberation' of any sort, reconstruction of symbolic 
structures and sites emerges as top priority for the nationalist powers and 
becomes a key goal of planning. There are many examples of the use of planning 
for restoring national pride and asserting power, including Warsaw (Poland) 
after the second World War, Fao (Iraq) after the Iran-Iraq war, and Beirut, after 
the end of the civil war in 1990. In each of these cases, planning was also used by 
the regime in power to consolidate their position after a devastating conflict. The 
examples of Fao and Beirut are discussed in greater detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
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A pioneering study by Barakat (1993) illustrates the use of urban planning in 
Basrah and Fao in southern Iraq as a mechanism for restoring national pride. 
While demonstrating the importance of a strong (though dictatorial, in this case) 
state for the development and implementation of town plans, it highlights 
equally, the futile symbolism and ineffectiveness of planning when it is done 
without any involvement of the local people. 
The reconstruction of Basrah and Fao was the only planned effort undertaken by 
the Iraqi government following the end of the war with Iran, which lasted from 
1980 until 1988. The reconstruction process was led by the Supreme Committee 
for the Reconstruction of Basrah and Fao (SCRBF). This Committee was 
established by a Presidential Decree, headed by the President himself, and 
involved senior members of the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, including the 
Prime Minister. The major policy decisions taken included the rebuilding of 
Basrah and Fao within a short period of 3 months each, the engagement of only 
local experts and deployment of local skills and resources, and a heavy reliance 
on the government's own construction capabilities. 
While the reconstruction efforts in Basrah were limited to infrastructure repair 
and city beautification, the city of Fao was rebuilt from scratch according to a 
new plan, as it had been utterly devastated by the war. In December 1988, the 
Ministry of Local Government announced a design competition for a new plan of 
Fao. The competition was limited to its own planners, and five proposals were 
produced within six weeks. Later, the government also asked private 
architectural offices to contribute to the rebuilding of Fao by proposing designs 
free of cost. The emphasis of the winning plan was on a large central open space, 
several monuments representing the Iraqi victory, and a number of residential 
districts. When the city was officially opened by the President in October 1989, 
all the symbolic squares and monuments planned had been constructed, as well 
as most of the political and administrative buildings, but only a few facilities such 
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as schools and hospitals, and a handful of houses for government officials 
(Barakat 1993). 
The planning process in Fao was hasty, piecemeal and top-down, as was the 
implementation of the plan. Local communities were neither consulted during 
the plan preparation, nor involved in the actual reconstruction of the city. Large-
scale acquisition of land by the government freed it from speculation and 
reinforced central control, allowing the authorities a free hand in plan 
implementation. The overarching emphasis was on symbolism and 
'monumentalism in architecture and town planning' (Barakat 1993: 49), rather 
than any short- or long-term needs of the citizens of Fao, and it was in the end 
an ineffective bureaucratic exercise with little positive impact on the lives of the 
people affected by the conflict. 
Another recent instance of the application of planning to assert power is the 
reconstruction of Beirut downtown (Centre Ville) following the war in Lebanon 
which lasted between 1975 and 1990. The conflict converted the city into a 
battleground, and witnessed the creation of the "Green line", a demarcation zone 
between the main warring militias. The city centre was part of this zone, and was 
closed off and virtually emptied out. Businesses, offices and residents all moved 
out towards the suburbs. Between 1975-90, Beirut's infrastructure was shattered, 
about 180,000 housing units destroyed and a similar number damaged. The 
destruction left between 300,000-500,000 people homeless or displaced (Davie 
1993; Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Tabet 1993; Stewart 1996). 
Numerous plans were also developed during this period specifically for the 
redevelopment of Beirut city centre, first in 1977, then in 1983, and again in 
1991. The last of these formed part of a broader programme for the 
reconstruction of Lebanon, titled Horizon 2000. It was also proposed at this time 
that a single (private) real estate firm expropriate all the land in the centre and 
take over the rebuilding process. Law 117 of 7 December 1991 provided the legal 
basis for the creation of such a company, known by its French acronym SoJidere. 
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Billionaire businessman and then Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was the single 
largest shareholder in this company, and those who had their properties 
expropriated were also given shares. When completed, the Beirut Central 
District (BCD) would house 40,000 people and host 100,000 daytime workers 
within 4.5 million square metres of mixed-use space, including offices, retail, 
government buildings, leisure and cultural facilities (Stewart 1996; Makdisi 
1997a; Charlesworth 2003). 
While the planning and reconstruction of Beirut is largely seen as a positive and 
forward-looking exercise, critics of the process believe that the reconstruction of 
the Centre Ville in line with the vision of one man (Prime Minister Hariri) has 
simply served to reinforce the power of the political and financial elites. 
Conceived and implemented without any public participation and/or 
accountability, the process of redevelopment of BCD deepened the divisions in 
Lebanese society rather than promoting or facilitating reconciliation. It 
exacerbated social polarisation by creating islands of prosperity and privilege for 
the rich while excluding the poor entirely (Stewart 1996; Charlesworth 2003). 
"The failure to thoroughly address the needs of the poor is perhaps 
the most risky aspect of Beirut's reconstruction.... Violence rooted 
in poor urban areas, where groups such as Hezbollah and Amal 
operate, could squash economic recovery before it even takes root. " 
(Stewart 1996: 502) 
Planning for control and division 
'~ .. in the West Bank planning is war carried out by other means. " 
(Coon 1992: 210) 
According to yiftachel (1995; 2000), the negative roles of urban planning have 
rarely been considered by prominent thinkers and writers in this field, who have 
chosen instead to focus on its role as a positive force and an instrument for 
reform. However, there are a number of examples where urban planning has 
been used by one community to subjugate, control or marginalise another. 
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Examples include Kosovo, Israel, Palestine and South Mrica, where planning has 
been used by powerful actors to assert the dominance of an occupying power, or 
that of one community over another. In these cases, the planning process is 
punitive rather than supportive, and relies heavily on what is often selective 
interpretation of existing laws, regulations and plans. Planning is used as a tool to 
displace 'undesirable' segments of the population (usually another community), 
and in extreme situations, becomes a means for ethnic cleansing. This was seen 
in Israel in the 1950s, when 'development towns' were built to house the less 
desirable (and less influential) members of the Jewish community, namely the 
Mizrahi Jews (Yiftachel 2000); in Kosovo during the period of Serb domination, 
especially between 1989 and 1999; and in South Africa during the era of 
apartheid 
A more extreme example of the use of planning for furthering the goals of 
occupation and control is that of Jerusalem and the West Bank. It has been 
argued that although town planning may appear to be an insignificant aspect of a 
rather more complex political and military situation in occupied Palestine, it has 
in fact proved to be one of the foremost tools to sustain the Israeli occupation 
(Coon 1992; Weizman 2007). The Israeli approach to planning in Jerusalem has 
been described as 'partisan planning', which blatantly serves the interests of one 
community over another (Bollens 1998; 2000). 
Indeed, Israel's goal as well as strategy in Jerusalem has been to expand Jewish 
neighbourhoods to such an extent, and in such a manner, that physical division 
of the city becomes impossible. Thus the Old city and the Palestinian areas have 
been surrounded with Jewish population, which would make it impossible to 
return to the pre-1967 status31 • As Jerusalem is governed under Israeli law, the 
local government is allowed to expropriate up to 40 percent of private land 
31 The UN resolution of 1947 proposed the creation of an international zone around Jerusalem. 
However, Israel took control of West Jerusalem in 1948, and East Jerusalem in 1967, 
subsequently merging both to form the Jerusalem municipality which is administered under 
Israeli law. 
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without compensation while preparing a detailed plan, as well as to reparcelland 
in any way it chooses32, Other national government agencies also have extensive 
powers to expropriate land for developmental purposes (Coon 1992; Bollens 
2000). Interestingly, there is no statutory planning framework for Jerusalem -
the last statutory plan for West Jerusalem was prepared in 1959 and no outline 
plan has ever been prepared for the areas annexed in 1967. Development is 
guided by the selective application of zoning and other regulations to the 
different parts of the city, 
Partisan planning by Israel is by no means restricted to Jerusalem alone. While 
Jerusalem is administered under Israeli law (however questionable this may be), 
the remaining area of the West Bank should, in theory, be governed under the 
Jordanian laws prevailing in 1967. However, Israel has used 'security enactments' 
or military orders that ostensibly concern security issues, to supersede all 
previous laws, including the Jordanian Planning Law. The development of the 
Palestinian villages and towns has been restricted through the deployment of 
planning tools such as built area restrictions, density and zoning regulations. 
Furthermore, no development plans of any sort have been prepared for most of 
the Arab areas, which has meant that the Palestinians cannot apply for any 
building permits at all, and thus cannot undertake any construction on their own 
land. This has had a direct impact on the lives of the Palestinian people, their 
livelihoods, living conditions and national aspirations (Coon 1992; Bollens 1998; 
2000). 
At the same time, the development of Jewish settlements has been promoted and 
supported, and efficient road infrastructure constructed across the West Bank, to 
serve the dual goals of connecting the Jewish settlements and slicing Palestinian 
settlements and agricultural lands into unviable and disjointed parts. Pullan et aI, 
argue that while much has been made of the separation barrier that Israel has 
32 These powers are based on The Planning and Building Law. The land expropriated is supposed 
to be designated for public use only, but this is seldom the case on the ground. 
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erected in recent years, the road system developed by the Israelis in Jerusalem 
and the West Bank is in fact a far more important and permanent feature 
'~ .. designed to segregate and dominate the Palestinian movement in order to 
ensure the continuity and safety of Israeli passage" (Pullan, Misselwitz et al. 
2007: 175). 
The examples above illustrate how urban planning has been used as an 
instrument of post-war reconstruction since the beginning of the 20th century. 
After the Second World War, urban and economic planning were applied in 
tandem to catalyse national recovery, and to instil a new hope for the future in 
war-affected societies. However, in the second half of the century, urban 
planning featured mainly in situations of strong national government control, 
used either with the objective of restoring lost national pride, or for building a 
power base for the post-war government. In these cases, it has done little to 
encourage reconciliation or build a widely-accepted or endorsed vision for the 
future. 
In situations where strong national governments are not in charge, however, the 
role of planning, and the importance accorded to it, has been rather different. 
Recent conflicts have witnessed the emergence of new governance arrangements 
in the aftermath of conflict, in the form of international transitional 
administrations. The approaches adopted by these administrations towards post-
war reconstruction in general, and urban planning in particular, are discussed in 
the following section. 
3.3 The role of Transitional Administrations . m post-war 
reconstruction 
3.3.1 Introducing transitional administrations 
International intervention in conflicts can range from, and quite often evolves 
from, preventive diplomacy to armed intervention, to peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuild.ing after conflict. These roles 
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have transformed over the years in response to the changing nature of conflict 
and the growing complexity of post-conflict situations. Pe ace building , in 
particular, is a term of more recent origin and includes activities that can serve to 
" .. . reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on 
those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (United 
Nations 2000: 3). The UN Panel on Peace Operations suggests that peacebuilding 
includes activities such as the strengthening of the rule of law, reintegration of 
former combatants into society, improving respect for human rights, supporting 
democratic development, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation. 
Many of these responsibilities, if not all, rest with international administrations 
set up in the aftermath of conflict (United Nations 2000)33. 
This section focuses on the role played by international administrations, 
sometimes also referred to as 'transitional administrations' , 'international 
territorial administrations', or 'international civilian administrations', in war-
affected territories. It reviews the different conceptualisations and types of 
transitional administrations discussed in literature. Further, it examines the 
mandates and functioning of a few selected transitional administrations in the 
post-Cold War era, and their role in the post-war reconstruction effort. An 
attempt has been made to include not just UN administrations but also those 
operating under the authority of regional powers such as the European Union 
(e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and other occupying powers (e.g. in Iraq)34. 
33 According to Stahn (2008), despite the increasing significance of the role of transitional 
administrations. the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations (2000) devoted only "a few 
paragraphs" to the subject of transitional administrations (p.3). Subsequent UN documents such as 
the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats. Challenges and Change (2004). and the Outcome 
Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly (2005). which 
recommended the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. also failed to specify the role 
ofTAs as part of peace building activity. 
34 The approaches adopted by other international agencies such as the World Bank and other 
specialised UN agencies such as UNDP. UNHCR etc. are not discussed here as this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. which focuses mainly on the role played by Transitional Administrations in 
post-war reconstruction and recovery. 
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"International administration" is neither a formally defined practice, nor an 
institution, under any international law, code or norm. It is therefore often ad 
hoc in the form it takes, usually a loosely bound political arrangement that 
borrows from imperialist and colonial practices, mandates and trusteeship 
systems (Wilde 2001; Baskin 2003; Chesterman 2004; Mortimer 2004; Caplan 
2005a; Stahn 2008). Caplan (2005a) uses the term synonymously with 'UN 
administration', which is not the case with many other authors who adopt a 
broader perspective to include administrations that do not derive their authority 
from the United Nations. However, most authors agree that international 
administration constitutes a practice distinct from complex peacekeeping, post-
conflict peacebuilding, as well as from state-building, which is defined in 
literature as encompassing efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases establish ab 
initio, institutions and structures of effective governance, thus going beyond 
traditional peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities (Chesterman 2004; Caplan 
2005a). 
State-building is seen as one of the responsibilities of an international 
administration, whose scope can extend from making and enforcing laws to 
exercising total fiscal management of a territory, civil administration, running of 
customs, restoring law and order, establishing police and judicial systems, and 
political institution-building. It may also include wide-ranging social, economic 
and political reform, including instituting a regime of human rights. Physical 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the territory, including provision and 
maintenance of schools, health facilities and other services and public utilities, 
may also be included as a responsibility of international administrations (Jackson 
2004; Caplan 2005a). 
There is, of course, a 'territorial' basis for international administration, that is, it 
implies control over a territory, which could either be a country (for instance 
post World War-II Germany), or a part of it (for example, Kosovo) (Stahn 2008). 
However, in establishing international administrations, there is also an implicit 
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assumption of their temporary nature, that is, '~ .. that once the tern'tory has been 
pacified and politically reorganised, self-government shall be restored" (Jackson 
2004: 23). The non-permanence of international administrations and their (non-
sovereign) territorial jurisdiction is seen as a defining characteristic, even if there 
is no end-date specified (as in the case of Kosovo). The label of 'transitional' is 
thus very often applied to international administrations35• Chopra (2002) and 
Chesterman (2004) define transitional administrations as operations where all 
powers of the state are assumed by an international authority or an occupying 
power, on a temporary basis: 
"the total but temporary governorship of a territory and its 
population applicable when the reigning polity [has] 
disintegrated (in places like Somalia), the sovereign [has been] 
forced out (as from Kosovo), or the occupying power [is] 
transferring the authority to another sovereign (as [in] Eastern 
Slavonia or the Brcko Corridor. "(Chopra 2002: 980) 
Based on this definition, and in order to emphasise the non-permanent nature of 
the international administrations being studied, the term 'transitional 
administration' will be used consistently throughout this and subsequent 
chapters. 
3.3.2 The evolution oftransidonal administrations 
International administration of war-affected territories is not an entirely new or 
post-Cold War era trend, even though it has (re)gained prominence over the past 
two decades. Many authors point to examples such as the Free City of Danzig 
and the German Saar Basin (or, the Saar), which were administered by the 
League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s; the Allied occupation and 
administration of post-war Germany and Austria; as well as the UN's various 
3S The terms 'interim' or 'provisional' on the other hand are used to denote local or national 
governments which are installed immediately after the conflict, often pending a national 
election. For example. in Kosovo. pending resolution of the status of the territory. the name given 
to the governmental structure was "Provisional Institutions of Self-Government," In Afghanistan. 
an "Interim Government" was established in 20ot-02. soon after the war ended. The same 
terminology was applied in Iraq. 
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initiatives in the 1960s, for example in Congo, West Irian, South West Africa 
(later Namibia), as precursors to the more recent international administration 
initiatives. They also point out that the imperial administration of non-sovereign 
states is a centuries-old phenomenon (Wilde 2001; Chesterman 2004; Mortimer 
2004; Stahn 2008). 
Since the 1990s, transitional administrations of different shapes and form have 
been seen in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Administration in 
Cambodia, or UNTAC, 1991-92); the former Yugoslavia (including UN 
administrations in Eastern Slavonia - 1996-98, and Kosovo - 1999-present; EU-
led administrations in Mostar - 1994-96, as well as at the country level in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 1995-present); East Timor (United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor, or UNTAET, 1999-2002); Afghanistan (United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, 2002-till date); and Iraq 
(the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, 2003-04). These have derived their 
authority from different sources, based on widely variable mandates, and have 
performed a variety of functions36• Stahn (2008) points out that these have largely 
been piecemeal approaches, one experiment following another ": .. without a 
systematic analysis of the flaws and benefits of each engagement"(p.3). 
Historically, according to Wilde, international' transitional administration (or 
international territorial administration, ITA, as he prefers to label it) has been 
used to respond to two types of problems - the 'sovereignty problem', or the 
'governance problem', or a mix of the two (Wilde 2001). In the former, the 
dispute is about who exercises control, and/or the status of the territory. This was 
the case, for example, in Saar, where the League of Nations was asked to 
administer the territory for fifteen years after the First World War, with neither 
36 Chesterman (2004) provides a useful historical account of transitional administrations during as 
well as before the UN era, focusing on five key aspects - peace and security, the role of the United 
Nations as government, establishing the rule of law, economic reconstruction, and exit strategies. 
Stahn's account ofTAs (2008) is extremely comprehensive and covers every form ofTA since the 
administration of the Saar Territory by the League of Nations (1920-35). It, however, focuses 
mainly on the dimensions of international law and how it influences the practice of T As. 
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Germany nor France in control (though German sovereignty was formally 
preserved during this period), eventually concluding with a plebiscite. Similarly, 
in Eastern Slavonia, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern 
Slavonia (UNT AES) was established in 1995 to ensure a smooth handover of the 
territory from 'local Croatian Serb Authorities' to the Government of Croatia. 
A 'governance problem', in this context, is when the problem is not the identity 
of the local actors in control of a territory, but the quality of governance they can 
or are expected to ensure. They may either be incapable of any governance at all, 
or be unable to provide 'good governance' that is, there may be a perceived risk 
that governance under their authority will '~ .. conflict with certain policy 
objecdves"rvvilde 2001: 592). Examples include, for instance, the United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, which followed a complete collapse of the 
state in both these territories and the resulting governance vacuum. In Mostar, 
the EUAM was set up in response to both a sovereignty problem (the failure of 
local actors to govern the city jointly), as well as a governance problem (the 
opposition to reunification which was an avowed goal of the international 
community). 
Caplan (2005a) distinguishes contemporary transitional administrations based on 
factors such as the degree of authority assumed by the administration (ranging 
from supervision only to direct governance), the purpose or the envisaged end-
state (which might be clearly defined or ambiguous), and the range of actors 
involved. Alternatively, transitional administrations could be discussed according 
to the broad aims of the administration, such as decolonisation, pending peaceful 
transfer of control to an existing government, pending holding of elections, 
administration as part of an ongoing peace process, or responsibility of 
maintaining law and order in the absence of a (legitimate) governing authority 
(Chesterman 2004). Irrespective of the typology, it is important to understand 
the problem that the transitional administration is set up to address, its mandate 
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and the scope of its functions, as all these would have a bearing on any 
assessment of its performance in post-war reconstruction. 
3.3.3 Mandate, accountability and activities 
The mandate of transitional administrations can range from simply the holding 
of elections (and maintenance of law and order in the meantime); preparing a 
territory for merger with a state, or for independence; support to, and/or 
coordination of, physical and economic reconstruction; to complete control in 
political, administrative and military terms, for a definite, or in some cases, an 
indefinite period of time. In Afghanistan, following the fall of the Taliban in 
November 2001, a "light footprint" approach was adopted, whereby it was agreed 
that any UN assistance should I~ • • first and foremost, bolster Afghan capacity -
both official and non-governmental - and rely on as limited international 
presence and as many Afghan staff as possible" (Chesterman 2004: 89). As 
Afghanistan did not face a 'sovereignty problem', " .. .forms of Afghan sovereignty 
[were} carefully preserved" (Mortimer 2004: 9), and the UN Assistance Mission 
in Mghanistan (UNAMA) was established with an extremely limited mandate -
to support civilian administration and the process of rebuilding and national 
reconciliation. UNAMA's mandate is renewed (and reviewed) annually. In 2006, 
it included support to the peace process; assistance to the implementation of the 
Afghanistan Compact; promotion of human rights; and continued management 
of all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development 
activities in coordination with the government (UNAMA 2007). 
In Eastern Slavonia, follOwing the signature of the Erdut Treaty between the 
Croat and Serbian authorities in November 1995, the UNTAES was established in 
order to facilitate the transfer of the territory from one state to another, i.e. from 
Serb control to Croatia. UNTAES, which included a civilian as well as a military 
component, had a clear objective, which was to '~ .. reintegrate the region, 
demilitarised and secure, into the legal and constitutional system of the Republic 
of Croal1a'{Reichel 2000: 9). Its mandate and time frame were equally well-
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defined. The military component included demilitarisation of the region, 
monitoring the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and maintenance of 
peace and security. The civilian component included responsibilities pertaining 
to civil administration and functioning of public services, the establishment of a 
temporary police force, facilitating refugee and IDP return, organising elections, 
and assisting in physical and economic reconstruction. All these were to be 
achieved within a maximum of two years. While the powers of the administrator 
were fairly extensive, legislative authority, administration of justice, as well as 
'developmental' activities such as the revival of agriculture, industry. trade and 
other sectors of the economy. banking and financial services were excluded from 
the mission's mandate (Reichel 2000; Stahn 2001; Chesterman 2004). 
In Mostar, the EUAM was established in 1994 in order to bring the city under a 
unified command, when the warring parties could not agree on its status or its 
governance structure. EUAM was set up to " ... temporarily solve the sovereignty 
problem caused by the failure of local factions to agree on goveming the city 
jointly. It also responded to a govemance problem by replacing govemments in 
West and East Mostar opposed to unification with a (single) govemment 
supporting unification"0/Vilde 2001: 593). The EUAM derived its mandate from 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). which was signed between the EU. 
the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina. the Mayors of West and East Mostar. 
and other key politicalleaders from both sides. As per the MoU. the EUAM was 
expected to facilitate the development and stabilisation of a single. multi-ethnic 
city of Mostar. ensure freedom of movement across the front line. contribute to 
the holding of democratic elections. assist in ensuring the protection of human 
rights, facilitate the return of displaced populations, and support the physical and 
economic reconstruction of the city (EUAM 1998). The establishment of the 
EUAM also had an important symbolic connotation - through it, the 
international community was signalling its commitment to a united and 
multi ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. and its unambiguous refusal to condone a 
109 
Chapter 3: Post-war reconstruction, urban planning and TAs 
partition of the country. While the mandate was fairly broad, it was agreed that 
the European Union (EU) would administer the city for a maximum of two years. 
The ultimate objective was the establishment of a single, functional, city 
administration. 
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the 
other hand, was essentially a 'supervisory operation'. with a weak but open-
ended mandate - that of supervising and ensuring the implementation of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement (Caplan 2004). The official OHR website describes it as 
" ... an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing implementation 
of civiHan aspects of the accord ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina" 
(Office of the High Representative 2007). The Dayton Peace Agreement 
mandated the OHR to undertake a wide variety of tasks ranging from monitoring 
the implementation of the peace settlement; coordinate the activities of civilian 
organisations and agencies in this regard. including providing 'general guidance' 
and facilitating the resolution any difficulties that arise in connection with 
civilian implementation of the peace settlement; and basically ensure that the 
various state and entity-level institutions function effectively and '~ .. in a 
responsible manner" (Office of the High Representative 2007). However. the 
High Representative had no regulatory Or enforcement powers (Stahn 2008). 
Over time, the broad and 'vague powers' of the OHR were reinterpreted to 
" ... encompass various govemmental acts, including the passing of laws and the 
dismissal of elected officials" (Wilde 2001: 584). It is indeed true that, faced with 
unwillingness of local politicians to comply with Dayton. the OHR has acquired 
increasingly wide-ranging and binding powers. A watershed in this regard was 
the Bonn Conference, held in December 1997. where the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC) authorised the OHR to remove from office public officials who 
undermined or violated the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement in any way. 
and to impose laws as he saw fit, if the state and entity-level legislative bodies 
failed to do so (Caplan 2004; Chandler 2006b; Office of the High Representative 
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2007; Stahn 2008). Since then, the OHR acted as the highest executive authority 
in BiH, ruling on issues as wide-ranging as stalled legislation and amendments to 
constitutions of the two entities, removal of elected officials from office, the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line in Sarajevo, etc. (Stahn 2008). Since 2002, however, 
there has been a steady, sometimes even sharp, annual reduction in the number 
of times the 'Bonn Powers' are used by the High Representatives (Ashdown 
2007) 37. 
In Kosovo, the mandate of UNMIK laid out by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) was much more extensive, and has been described by 
various authors as 'unprecedented', 'exceptional', and a 'novelty' (Matheson 2001; 
Stahn 2001; Yannis 2004). It was also paradoxical, as the UN avoided taking a 
position on the final status of Kosovo, and Resolution 1244 was worded in a way 
which seemed to satisfy Kosovo's aspirations as well as Serbia's sovereignty, a 
phenomenon described at the time as 'virginity and motherhood combined' (see 
Chesterman 2004: 80). Yet, the international administration replaced the 
Yugoslav authorities, assuming full administrative responsibility, which 
encompassed " ... aU legislative and executive authority [ ... ] including the 
administration of the judiciary" (see Yannis 2004: 69). It was responsible for the 
establishment of a functioning interim civil administration, including the 
maintenance of law and order; promoting the establishment of substantial 
autonomy and self-government, including the holding of elections; and 
facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's final status (Matheson 2001; 
Yannis 2004). KFOR was asked to facilitate demilitarisation and generally 
provide a secure environment for these tasks. 
Only a few months after the adoption of Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, the 
Security Council also decided to establish a similar transitional administration in 
East Timor (UNT AET), which was once again endowed with wide-ranging 
37 For a critical evaluation of the work of OHR and more broadly, the international community, 
in BiH, see Bose (2006) and Chandler (2006b). 
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powers and responsibilities, including 'all legislative and executive authority' and 
the administration of justice (Stahn 2001). In both Kosovo and East Timor, the 
United Nations acted as an interim government for the territory. In the latter 
case, however, the end-state was clearly specified - the independence of East 
Timor, which was achieved in May 2002. UNTAET's mandate was to facilitate 
the transition to independence, including the holding of democratic elections 
and the adoption of a constitution, and, in the meantime, to administer the 
territory as the de facto government. 
In Iraq, state building was not the primary goal of the US-led invasion in 2003. 
The intervention I~ •• was meant to be a limited exercise in regime change and 
then state reform [ ... j It was this neoliberal model of limited state reform that 
guided policy development aimed at stabilising post-war Iraq"(Dodge 2008: 143). 
The post-war reality, however, turned out to be quite different and rather more 
complex than what was envisaged by those who had planned the intervention. 
As the United States and Britain, rather than the United Nations, took charge of 
post-war governance of the country, the responsibility for overseeing 
reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq initially fell to the Office of Reconstruction 
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), established in early 2003 under the aegis 
of the Pentagon. However, it came to be seen as a failure and was quite soon 
replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority, or the CPA (Dodge 2008). The 
Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) recognised the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (including the United States and Britain), as the occupying power in 
Iraq (Chesterman 2004). As pre-war illusions about 'limited reform' dissolved, 
the CPA, like its UN counterparts in Kosovo and East Timor, was also endowed 
with a sweeping mandate: 
'To restore conditions of security and stability. to create conditions in 
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, 
. (including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and 
local institutions for representative governance) and facI1itating 
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economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development. " (see 
Halchin 2005: 1) 
A key issue facing contemporary international administrations, and one closely 
linked to where they derive their mandate and legitimacy from, is that of 
accountability. International administrations, particularly those put in place by 
the United Nations or a coalition of countries, can have many masters. Each of 
the UNMIK pillars in Kosovo was led by a different organisation (OSCE, 
UNHCR, EAR), which was obliged to follow its own line of accountability. The 
Transitional, Administrators are accountable to the body that appoints them. 
Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Kosovo and East 
Timor were accountable to the UN Security Council. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the High Representative is directly accountable to the Peace Implementation 
Council, and is also obliged to report periodically to the European Union, the 
United States, Russia, and other interested governments or parties, including the 
United Nations. In Caplan's words: 
"There is, then, a fundamental contradiction that lies at the heart of 
these initiatives: while international administrations seek to promote 
democracy, among other objectives, they are on many ways 
undemocratic in the manner in which they function. There is no 
separation of powers: executive, legislative and judicial authority are 
vested in a single individual [ ... j whose decisions cannot be challenged 
by the local population, whose actions are not always transparent, and 
who cannot be removed from power by the community in whose 
interests he or she exercises authority ostensibly. "(Caplan 2005a: 196) 
Within the context of this research, the discussion on responsiveness and 
accountability of transitional administrations has an important bearing on the 
activities undertaken and prioritised by these administrations. As there is little 
evidence of 'downward' vertical accountability of international administrations, 
i.e. accountability to the local communities and local elected leaders, it is 
possible that the activities they undertake may respond to the perceived rather 
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than the 'real' priorities of the local communities. This is certainly one of the 
questions to be explored in greater depth during the field research on Mostar. 
Caplan (200Sa) classifies the major types of activities that are undertaken by 
international (transitional) administrations under five headings: public order and 
security, refugees and IDPs, civil administration, political institution-building, 
and economic reconstruction and development. Clearly, these are not mutually 
exclusive, and often impact one another significantly. Capacity-building of local 
officials and communities remains a common theme that cuts across all these 
categories. Depending on their mandate and capacity, different transitional 
administrations may have different areas of emphasis, but they all undertake at 
least some activities in all the categories listed above. 
Establishing public order and security is one of the most important as well as 
urgent tasks of any international administration established in the aftermath of a 
conflict. The activities undertaken can range from local law-enforcement to 
establishment and training of the local police force, investigation of human rights 
abuses by local forces, and establishment of the judicial and penal system. 
The return of refugees and IDPs to their place of origin depends in great 
measure, of course, on the security situation. At the same time, returnees also 
look for availability of employment, housing and basic services, as well as the 
legal infrastructure to ensure the restoration and upholding of their rights. 
International administrations often aim towards status quo ante, or I~ •• re-
establishing, where appropriate, the mixed commum'ties that existed prior to the 
war" (Caplan 200Sa: 81). The degree to which this is desirable or achievable has 
been questioned by many, especially in the context of Bosnia where majority 
returns in early years led to significant ethnic consolidation, the later (and 
continuing) emphasis on minority returns has meant that many displaced 
persons do not receive help for reintegration when they are unable or unwilling 
to move back to their pre-war communities, and the economic and social 
condition of many minority returnees remains precarious (Heimerl 2006). 
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Regardless, return and reintegration are still seen as an extremely important 
benchmarks and indicators of the level of security, the prevailing humanitarian 
conditions, and the overall success of any transitional administration. 
The civil administration role of international administrations is perhaps the most 
widely recognised, and is closely linked to political institution-building and local 
capacity-building. Most transitional administrations ultimately aim to establish 
effective public administrative structures, institutions and practices, and train 
local individuals who could sustain these after the withdrawal of the transitional 
administration. The challenge faced by the international authorities - both in the 
task of civil administration but also political institution building, see below - is 
achieving a balance between efficient administration in the short term, and 
strengthening local capacities in the long term . 
. Capacity-building requires a phased approach. In Eastern Slavonia, the civil 
administration arrangements progressed from sole UN administration to co-
administration to complete self-administration fairly smoothly (Reichel 2000). In 
Kosovo, the 'dual desk model' was applied - with limited success, it must be said 
- whereby each administrative department was co-directed by a Kosovar and an 
international staff member before an eventual handover (Chesterman 2001; 
Caplan 2005a). 
Political institution-building is closely linked to civil administration which 
inevitably involves making political decisions. It also witnesses a difficult trade-
off between efficiency goals and local capacity-building objectives. Total control 
and limited transfer of power to local institutions or individuals can result in low 
local capacities when the eventual handover happens, and frustration among the 
. locals in the meantime. Too rapid a transfer, on the other hand, can reinforce the 
power of divisive elements, and thus perpetuate the divisions within the 
community. The key aspects of political institution-building include the design 
of the political structure and definition of the key principles underpinning this, 
the potential clash of new institutions with old (pre-war) institutions, and the 
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decision-making process, i.e. who actually determines all these aspects. An 
important aspect that deserves mention here is the promotion of norms such as 
democratisation, as part of the political institution-building process. Democracy 
is now viewed as a settled norm, but internationally-led (or imposed) democracy 
always has a sub-text, which could include aims such as the defeat of nationalist 
elements and parties, the promotion of women in politics, and the guaranteeing 
of minority rights. Local populations are rarely allowed to choose the form of 
democracy they want or need (Caplan 200Sa; Chandler 2006b). Stahn notes that 
international territorial administrations can be seen, not without reason, as 
instruments promoting the agenda of liberal peace, i.e. peace through political 
and economic liberalisation, and installing practices of democracy, good 
governance and the rule of law, based on the assumption that the 
(~ .. establishment of a liberal democratic polity constitutes the best means to 
ensure stable peace"(Stahn 2008: 19). 
Similarly, economic reconstruction and development in the aftermath of conflict 
has also, over the past two decades, been guided by norms such as economic 
liberalisation and structural adjustment, based on the 'Washington Consensus' 
developed in the 1980s (Paris 2004; Dodge 2008). Economic regeneration is 
widely accepted as being critical to avoid a resurgence of conflict and establish 
peace in the long-term. In the aftermath of conflict, most international agencies, 
particularly the World Bank but also other organisations and donor countries, 
prescribe a formula for economic recovery which combines physical 
reconstruction, economic development, and structural transformation (Bojicic-
Dzelilovic 2002; Caplan 200Sa). However, Paris (2004) argues strongly for a 
review of the strategy adopted to transform war-affected states into liberal 
market democracies, suggesting that 'Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation', 
or IBL, should be the preferred approach of transitional administrations, focusing 
initially on political stability and effective administration, in order to build a 
sustainable peace. 
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3.3.4 Transitional Administrations and physical reconstruction after conflict 
As discussed briefly above, physical reconstruction of the war-affected territory 
is one of the immediate responsibilities of most transitional administrations. 
Providing emergency shelter, restoring public services such as electricity, water 
supply and sanitation, rebuilding major roads and public buildings are all tasks 
undertaken either by Transitional Administrations themselves, or by other 
international organisations, under the overall stewardship of TAs. 
In Eastern Slavonia, however, physical reconstruction was not the top-most 
priority of UNT AES, which was focusing on demilitarisation and preparing the 
region for reintegration into Croatia. The direct costs of repairing war damage, 
estimated at $1.2 billion, remained beyond the immediate resources of the 
Government or the Transitional Administration. Reconstruction was promoted 
through the establishment of fully functioning local municipalities, but these 
were constrained by lack of resources and capacities. No plans were drawn up for 
physical and economic reconstruction, and while the main objectives of 
UNT AES were achieved, the economy remained stagnant, and unemployment 
soared (United Nations 1997). 
In Mostar, on the other hand, reconstruction of the city formed a very 
prominent part of the objective of EUAM to reunify the city. This is in fact one 
of the few cases where the transitional administration took the task of managing 
the reconstruction process entirely upon itself. According to a report by the 
International Crisis Group, between 1994-2000, the international community 
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Mostar, with the EU alone spending 
approximately 200 million ECU (Euros) (ICG 2000). Rebuilding of infrastructure 
and housing repair were key priorities for the EUAM. Public services were 
restored by mid-1995, when the city once more had access to water and 
electricity. Small enterprises were supported through loans and grants in order to 
bolster employment and revive economic activity. Although a fair amount of 
Mostar's infrastructure, some public buildings, and some housing was rebuilt by 
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the EUAM, this was undertaken in a piecemeal fashion, without any overall 
plan, with limited thought to the future (Yarwood 1999). ICG suggests that in 
terms of actually achieving reunification of this divided city, international 
community and EU efforts have failed. 
"After six years of intemational community assistance and supervision, 
the administration, economy, infrastructure, education, police and legal 
systems of Mostar remain sharply divided along ethnic lines." (ICG 
2000: 1) 
In fact, most international organizations (especially NGOs) involved in 
reconstruction across Bosnia have done so without any planning framework, and 
without any involvement of planners (Skotte 2003). This has resulted in 
reconstruction that is ad hoc, piecemeal, and often bitterly contested, and 
recovery that is, at best, partial, fourteen years after the conflict ended. 
In Kosovo, where a complex administration was established with four lead 
partners (the United Nations, OSCE, UNHCR and the European Union), the EU 
was assigned the responsibility for economic as well as physical reconstruction. 
Rebuilding of economic and social systems, including the development of a 
market-based 'economy and the resolution of trade and banking matters, were 
included in this brief. Reconstruction and economic recovery was to occur in 
I~ •• three overlapping phases, encompassing immediate humanitarian reJie£ 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential services (power, water, sanitation, 
health, education), and the creation of a viable market economy and social 
system" (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001: 110; Matheson 2001). An assessment 
conducted by a joint UNEP/UNCHS38 Balkans Task Force in May 1999 reported 
widespread destruction of housing, public buildings and infrastructure facilities, 
leading to complete disruption of services such as water, sanitation and power, 
across Kosovo. Ethnically mixed towns such as Peja and Mitrovica sustained 
massive damage. Various assessments reported that nearly 120,000 houses were 
38 United Nations Centre for Human Settlements - now known as United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) 
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destroyed or damaged by the conflict in 29 municipalities of the province, with 
most of the damage caused by fire, but also by gunfire and artillery. Major 
infrastructure was also heavily damaged, and public utilities, already suffering 
from years of neglect and under-investment, all but collapsed. The economy was 
in disarray as both capital and human resources flowed out of Kosovo. Public 
administrative and service structures - the municipalities - became largely 
inoperable due to factors such as neglect, war damage and departure of trained 
staff. The mass exodus of Serbs, who had held key positions in all the 
municipalities and other public institutions prior to the war, left enormous skill 
gaps (UNEP/UNCHS 1999; Department of Reconstruction (UNMIK) 2000; 
Leurdijk and Zandee 2001; Minervini 2002; Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS) 
2007). 
As a result of the humanitarian assistance provided by KFOR and UNMIK 
immediately after the war, before the winter of 1999, 95% of the planned 
'winterisation' programme had been completed, and most Kosovars had access to 
shelter during the winter season (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001: 115). It was 
announced that the humanitarian programme would be phased out by mid-2000 
to make way for rebuilding and reconstruction, particularly shelter, housing, 
infrastructure and social services (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001). Urban and/or 
regional planning, however, didn't receive any mention in either the 
reconstruction mandate of the international administration in Kosovo, or the 
strategies that were developed subsequently by the leading international 
players39• This was despite the fact that the general and detailed urban plans in all 
the municipalities, prepared by centralised institutions at least two decades ago, 
39 UN-HABITAT's Urban Planning and Management Programme in Kosovo, initiated in 2002, 
was the first intervention by any international agency that focused on issues of urban planning. 
This was a comprehensive capacity-building programme focusing on strategic planning, covering 
all 30 municipalities and involving nearly 100 local urban planners. The programme trained local 
urban planners to develop plans that were strategic in nature, responsive to local needs and 
priorities, and prepared in consultation with all stakeholders. The programme did not, however, 
force the pace of plan preparation, which did not begin until 2004 in most municipalities. 
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were outdated and un-implementable. The municipalities had limited capacity in 
respect of the preparation and implementation of development plans. Urban 
planners were dispirited and focused on routine administrative tasks, rather than 
on developing a new vision or new development strategies (Narang and 
Reutersward 2006). 
In Pristina, due to the absence of any spatial or urban plans, illegal and irregular 
construction is widespread. In September 2000, Rexhep Luci, the city's leading 
urban planner, was shot dead within days of issuing instructions to demolish 
three of the most blatant illegal structures. A new regulation on construction, 
promulgated soon after, was named after him (UN-HABITAT 2003b; ESI 2006). 
Despite the new regulation, however, there were estimated to be about 15,000 
illegal constructions in Kosovo in 2003, most situated in Pristina. Unplanned 
housing and comm~rcial developments encroach on open spaces and place major 
strain on infrastructure, leading to frequent water and power cuts, deteriorating 
road networks and sewage systems. Rooftop construction, another major problem 
found in Pristina, has both legal (ownership) and safety implications. Illegally 
constructed petrol stations on agricultural land, located all along the main roads 
leading out of the city, are a serious threat to the environment (UN-HABITAT 
2003b). 
Towards the end of 2003, the municipality signed a contract with an 
international consortium, led by a Pristina-based company, for the preparation of 
a new strategic plan for the city - 'Strategy 2020', The plan was prepared rapidly, 
based on limited and often inaccurate data, weak situation assessments and 
virtually no public consultation. It was adopted by the Municipal Assembly in 
July 2004 - till date, however, it remains un-implemented. Meanwhile, 
reconstruction in Pristina, and across Kosovo, proceeds without a plan (ESI 
2006). 
'[In PristinaJ illegal construction is rampant. Buildings are constructed 
without regard to safety standards, and unplanned housing setdements 
120 
Chapter 3: Post-war reconstruction, urban pJanning and TAs 
and commercial developments place major strain on infrastructure. The 
city's historical centre has heen filled with new, high-rise construction. 
Buildings listed as national historical heritage have heen neglected, 
some even destroyed Infrastructure is deteriorating: water cuts are 
frequent, the road network is harely maintained, and the sewage system 
is deteriorating. Puhlic spaces, parks and markets are falling into 
disrepair. Municipal services are unreliable." rESI2006: 1) 
In East Timor, when the UNTAET was established, nearly 80% of the 
buildings in the country had been damaged or destroyed, including private, 
public and government buildings. More than half of the population had fled 
or had been forced out. This left huge capacity gaps, with hardly any 
working civil servants, teachers or policemen left in the territory (Galbraith 
2002). By the end of the mission, most refugees had returned home and 
started to rebuild their lives. According to the World Bank, bottom-up, 
community-based reconstruction programmes were fairly successful, as 
demonstrated by the Community Empowerment and Local Governance 
Project (Rohland and Cliffe 2002). However, at independence, East Timor 
was ranked among the lowest in the world in terms of human development 
indicators, with over 40% of its population living below the poverty line. 
Land and property issues were deferred by UNT AET to the future East 
Timorese government, local economic development was minimal, re-
establishment of services such as water supply, electricity and 
telecommunications was limited at best, and transportation continued to be 
a 'disaster' (Reis 2002). 
The above examples illustrate how physical reconstruction undertaken by 
T As has yielded very mixed results. Questions relating to why this has been 
the case, why reconstruction has seldom had the desired impact on 
economic recovery under transitional administrations, and whether (the 
absence of) planning has played any role in this process, merit careful 
examination as part of the field study in Mostar. 
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3.4 Role of other international agencies in physical reconstruction 
Apart from transitional administrations. there are also many other international 
players dealing with issues of reconstruction in post-conflict situations. These 
include multilateral institutions such as the W orId Bank. the International 
Monetary Fund. the European Union and European Commission. the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). and various 
regional development banks; specialised UN agencies such as OCHA. UNDP, 
UNHCR. UNICEF. FAO. UN-HABITAT and others; international NGOs. such as 
the International Organisation for Migration (10M). ICRC and IFRC. various 
voluntary aid organisations, etc.; regional networks and initiatives. e.g. the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe; as well as bilateral donors,. usually 
operating through their international aid divisions. The work of all these diverse 
actors cannot be comprehensively reviewed or summarised here, and extends 
beyond the scope of this research. However, these are important actors in the 
arena of post-war reconstruction, and can complement, reinforce or undermine 
the work of transitional administrations. In order to understand and review 
without bias the work of the Transitional Administration in post-war 
reconstruction in Mostar, part of the field analysis will be devoted to assessing its 
relationships with other local and international actors operating in the arena of 
post-war reconstruction. 
3.5 Conclusion: Urban planning in post-war reconstruction efforts, 
under the aegis of transitional administrations 
Traditionally, reconstruction after wars and disasters was seen as an opportunity 
to introduce extensive physical improvement measures as well as policy change. 
This was a time when planning. and planners, occupied centre-stage, as a tabula 
rasa was presented to them. It was inevitably an extremely political process, yet, 
some results were achieved. Today's reconstruction processes, however, seem to 
offer but an illusion of possibilities of real change. The sheer complexity of actors 
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and approaches in post-conflict situations, and the repeated application of 
'segmented project efforts' (Hasic 2006: 15), often undermines any attempts to 
use physical reconstruction for achieving long-term goals such as development, 
sustainability, peace and reconciliation. 
This research comes at a time when we are witnessing the revival of urban 
planning as an instrument of sustainability, good governance and inclusion. Yet, 
as far as international transitional administrations are concerned, planning still 
plays a marginal (if any) role in the reconstruction of cities and towns after a 
conflict. The approach of transitional administrations towards reconstruction 
seems to be guided by the overarching agenda of economic liberalisation. The 
unquestioned dominance of the liberal market economic paradigm could be one 
of the reasons for the marginalisation of planning (physical- regional or urban -
as well as economic), which is traditionally associated with a strong state. 
Historical experience has demonstrated, however, that urban planning is a vital 
ingredient in the process of national recovery after wars. It has an important role 
to play in the continuum between relief and development, and in achieving a 
balance between short-term priorities of the people and a long-term perspective 
for local and national development, as well as between the demand for historic 
reconstruction and the pressure for modernisation (Diefendorf 1990; Zetter 1996; 
Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). As Zetter states: 
"Too often in post-conflict recovery programmes, 'disaster as a 
development opportunity' [ .. .] is sacrificed to short-term priorities. 
Yet it is the longer term developmental outcomes and priorities 
which are much more likely to secure lasting peace and 
reconcih'adon. II (Zetter 2005: 162) 
Berdal and Caplan (2004) believe that as transitional administrations try and 
broaden the international support for their mandate in order to enhance their 
legitimacy, and augment their resources, this can in fact severely compromise 
their ability to administer effectively. Thus, while large sums of money are 
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poured into reviving the economy and private sector development, this is quite 
often done without any strategic plan or vision for the future. The same seems to 
be the case in housing reconstruction and restoration of public services. 
While mandates and activities may vary from one situation to another, post-war 
transitional administrations seem to be here to stay. It is also a fact that these 
administrations have a pivotal role to play in post-conflict reconstruction, 
whether through direct execution (e.g. EUAM in Mostar, CPA in Iraq), setting 
priorities (e.g. UNMIK in Kosovo), and/or overall coordination (e.g. OHR in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). Most authors who have reflected on the work of 
transitional administrations agree that the contribution of these structures to 
post-conflict recovery and conflict mitigation, if not transformation, has 
generally been positive (Chesterman 2004; Mortimer 2004; Caplan 200Sa). 
However, lessons drawn from past experiences point to the importance of a clear 
and time-bound mandate with (preferably) a specific end-state to aim for; an 
appropriate level of military, financial and human resource allocation; an 
appropriate level of decentralisation between the international masters (UN, EU, 
coalition partners, as appropriate), nationaVcentralleadership of the transitional 
administration, and local actors; and the willingness and ability to work with a 
wide range of domestic interlocutors, as critical factors for success (Chesterman 
2001; Schoups 2001; Chopra 2002; Baskin 2003; Rathmell 2005). Baskin also 
points towards the " .. . gap between unlimited fonnal intemational authon'ty and 
limited international operations capacity" as a common problem with recent 
transitional administrations, especially in the Balkans (Baskin 2004: 129). 
Clearly, the presence of the international community in general, and transitional 
administrations in particular, can be both a challenge and opportunity for 
planning. These actors bring to the table their own political agendas and 
reconstruction approaches, the latter quite often sectoral and short-termist in 
character. Institutional structures in the immediate aftermath of conflict are 
often weak or non-existent, legislation and policy fuzzy at best. Involvement of a 
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third party, an external actor, leads to increased complexity in the governance 
system. At the same time, however, it also offers an opportunity to take decisions 
in a systematic yet swift and effective, if less democratic, manner. Unfortunately, 
while planning has been used and abused by local political interests as a 
mechanism to establish control or advance particular ethnic and/or national 
interests, the international community, and particularly Transitional 
Administrations, have been slow to embrace urban planning as a critical element 
in its own relief and recovery approaches. There are no clear answers as to why 
this is the case. It could be a question of whether it is actually appropriate or 
legitimate for transitional administrations to take a long-term view on behalf of 
the places and people under their jurisdiction. Caplan (200Sa) suggests that 
international administrators often deliberately defer longer-term or sensitive 
decisions to a future domestic authority or institutions, in order to emphasise 
their own 'interim' nature, and bring to the forefront the end goal of transferring 
responsibility to the local authorities. 
Alternatively, the neglect of urban planning (and other such 'long-term' tasks) 
could be attributed simply to the inefficiency of large international operations, 
and their unwillingness to do more than absolutely necessary. A final possibility, 
of course, is that transitional administrations underestimate the importance of 
planning for the future, failing to understand that all short-term decisions have 
long-term impacts, that urban planning can help in building economically self-
reliant and sustainable communities and societies from the bottom-up, and that 
the lack of a shared vision for the future can exacerbate and perpetuate conflict, 
thus undermining goals of reconciliation and a durable peace. 
This chapter, thus, raises a few unanswered questions that will be examined 
more carefully while studying the case of Mostar, which is the focus of this 
research. The first set of questions deals with the conceptual understanding of 
TAs and other external actors in post-war environments - in the case of EUAM, 
whether the Administration understood the pre-war context in Bosnia and 
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Mostar adequately, and whether they used this understanding to inform their 
decisions on strategies, interventions and partners. The second set of questions 
addresses programming issues - how were priorities for physical reconstruction 
determined by the EU Administration, and what role was played by local actors 
and stakeholders in this process. The third set deals with the ability of the 
administration to anticipate the political complexity of the task at hand, and the 
structural barriers that they might be faced with, in addressing this task. A final 
set of questions deals with how the Administration, and other agencies 
responsible for reconstruction, viewed and approached urban planning, and to 
what extent their views were 'in sync' with those of local political and technical 
actors. These aspects are explored in greater detail in the next chapter on Bosnia, 
as well as in the field analysis. 
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4.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on urban development patterns and planning approaches in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina before, during and immediately after the conflict that 
lasted from 1992-95. The major pre-war phases that are discussed include the 
Ottoman era (1463-1878), the rule of the Austro-Hungarians (1878-1918), the 
inter-war period, and Yugoslav era following the Second World War, until the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. The purpose of this analysis is to establish the historical 
context of the study, and determine whether the roots of the conflict in Bosnia 
can somehow be traced back to historical development patterns, governance 
arrangements and socio-economic differences between the different ethnic 
groups. However, it must be stated at the outset that the body of literature 
available in English, addressing issues of urbanisation and planning in the 
Balkans under the Ottoman empire, and subsequently under Austro-Hungarian 
rule, is extremely limited. 
The first part of the chapter provides a historical overview of urban development 
and planning in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prior to the conflict that broke out in 
1992. The second part looks at the conflict itself, its causes and manifestations, 
particularly the destruction of cities and what some authors have called 
'urbicide.' The third section looks at the main elements of post-war 
reconstruction in Bosnia. The final section draws some conclusions about the 
relationship between urbanisation, planning and conflict in Bosnia. 
4.1 Urban development and planning in pre-1992 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
As most cities and towns that exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina today were first 
established by the Ottomans, this account of the urban history of the country 
starts in the fifteenth century, when Bosnia became a province of the Ottoman 
empire. The discussion is organised according to the four major phases in this 
period - four hundred years of Ottoman rule from the middle of the fifteenth 
128 
Chapter 4: Urban planning in pre- and post-war Bosnia 
century (1463) until almost the end of the 19th century (1878); the Austro-
Hungarian era which lasted about forty years from 1878 until the end of the first 
world war in 1918; the inter-war period, 1918-1945; and the post-war era, from 
1945 until the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992. 
4.1.1 The urban history of Bosnia and Herzegovina - A glimpse into the 
Ottoman era 
Four hundred years of Ottoman rule significantly influenced the social, political 
and economic landscape of the Balkans, including modem-day Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Vucinich (1962) provides a comprehensive account of Balkan 
society under the Ottomans, touching upon issues of feudalism (closely related to 
land tenure), social and economic development, the differentiation between 
Muslim and Christian societies, and the relative power of urban and rural 
settlements and their respective citizens. He highlights that while adoption of 
Islam was not compulsory and non-Muslims were allowed to practice their own 
religions, society was clearly segregated between Muslims and non-Muslims, and 
this distinction manifested itself in many ways - for instance, in terms of income, 
taxes and property laws. While the non-Muslims paid higher taxes, they were 
exempt from serving in the army or to pay Zakat (or alms, proportionate to one's 
savings), which was compulsory for Muslims. Many authors assert that non-
Muslims were distinctly inferior to Muslims and that this was also reflected in 
the territorial organization of the city (Yerolympos 1993; Todorova 1996; 
Grodach 2002; Malcolm 2002). A more balanced understanding, however, would 
suggest that the obligations of citizenship were simply different for Muslims and 
non-Muslims, and that the Ottomans maintained, to a large extent, the church 
and other institutions which had existed in the Balkans prior to their conquest 
(Inalcik 1996). 
Broadly, the population of the Ottoman empire was organised in "non-territorial 
ecclesiastical communities" (Toynbee 1955: 122), each called a millet. The millet 
did not occupy a particular geographical area - these confessional-based 
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communities intermingled and were spread all across the Empire (Vucinich 1965; 
Goodwin 1971). At the same time, the millet was also not ethnically 
homogeneous. According to Vucinich, 1~ • .It consisted of communities isolated 
from each other, enjoying different social, political and economic privileges and 
weakly linked through an ecclesiastical administration" (Vucinich 1965: 61). 
There was, however, a certain extent of (vertical) social mobility among all 
groups, as well as 'ethnic and cultural fusion' (Vucinich 1962: 612), particularly 
in frontier regions, where religious rituals and social customs of various groups 
gradually began to influence each other, and eventually '~ .. popular Islam in the 
Balkans became quite different from the conservative urban Islam found in the 
old Muslim world"(Inalcik 1996: 24). 
In terms of urban development, the Ottomans played an important role both in 
the renovation of old cities and the building of new ones, as well as construction 
of strategic structures such as fortifications, roads and bridges (Bublin 1999). The 
road network was a primary concern, and was maintained diligently across the 
empire. The urban centres {imarets} came up initially along the main road 
networks, through the system of Vakuf (charitable endowment for public 
welfare, also referred to as Wakf,' Vakfiye. Vakifby different authors). These 
imarets. built at regular intervals along major highways and usually comprising a 
mosque, hospital, travellers' inn, water installations, roads and bridges, provided 
the nucleus for most major cities across the Ottoman Empire. The state granted 
estates to the Vakun- and controlled them to a large extent, but the planning of 
the imarets was left to the founders of the Vakun-. The city of Sarajevo, for 
instance, grew around the imaretendowed by Isa Bey (InaIcik 1973). 
Through this system, gradually, all cities in the Balkans began to demonstrate 
distinct Ottoman characteristics, such as the centrality of mosques and mosque 
complexes {kiilliye}, clustering of houses into self-contained neighbourhoods 
with central open spaces or courtyards {mahallas}, the inns {hans} and public 
baths {hammams}, a clear demarcation of residential and business districts, and of 
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public, semi-public and private spaces (Goodwin 1971; Puljic 1992; Bublin 1999; 
Malcolm 2002). Socio-religious traditions such as the Vakuf ensured that these 
institutions and public amenities were maintained (Goodwin 1971). Traditional 
Ottoman towns are described as "intimate ... [where] each neighbourhood 
retained its identity" (Goodwin 1971: 451). While there were no hard divisions 
by class, " ... in nearly all cities the Christians, Jews, and Gypsies [ .. . ]lived in 
their own quarters. " (Vucinich 1965: 54; Inalcik 1973) 
However, in the eighteenth century, as Slavs began to move to the cities in larger 
numbers. the ethnic and social structure of the Balkan cities began to change. 
The Carsija (the district where the commercial and artisan shops were located. 
and which also functioned as the social and cultural heart of the city) and 
kahvehane (local tea-houses and gathering places) still played a central role, but 
churches emerged as new foci together with mosques. and Christian guilds of 
craftsmen and merchants began to gain prominence alongside their Muslim 
counterparts. Ottoman authorities encouraged the creation of Christian 
churches, both Catholic and Orthodox (Vucinich 1962; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 
1999). In 1839, the Sultan signed the Tanzimat Charter, which facilitated a 
transformation of the old socio-political system and granted equal rights to all 
Ottoman subjects, both Muslim and non-Muslim (Yerolyrnpos 1993; Malcolm 
2002). Despite this. Balkan cities throughout the 19th Century remained 
segregated to a large extent, with ~ .. a polyethnic population living in separate 
residential quarters each with an introverted. strictly supervised communallik 
of its own. "(Yerolyrnpos 1993: 236) 
While most contemporary authors emphasise the multiethnic fabric and 
multicultural character of major Bosnian cities (especially Sarajevo, Mostar and 
Banja Luka) under the Ottomans (in fact, until 1992) (Plunz, Baratloo et al. 1998; 
Kron 2000; Bose 2002; Pasic 2004), Vucinich (1965) offers an important insight 
into the historical divisions between the Muslims and the Christians, stating that: 
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"Both the Muslim and Christian sectors of Ottoman society were 
divided into two basic parts - rural and urban. But since the Balkan 
city population was predominantly Muslim and the Balkan rural 
population was predominantly Christian, the city symbolized the 
place of the Muslim ruler, tax collector, and security agent. 
Conversely, the village symbolized the home of the oppressed and 
exploited Chnstian peasant, taxpayer, and food-producer. The two 
societal components came to represent a struggle between two ways 
of life, which deepened and expanded as time went on. The 
protracted separation of village from city with hardly any 
interchange between them led to a dichotomy of mores, habits and 
customs f. .. J After the Ottoman Empire expired, the village-city 
conDict continued, even though the city lost its Turkish character. 
This unabn'dged chasm is one of the major present-day problems. " 
(p.603) 
4.1.2 Developments under the Auscro-Hungarian empire (1878-1918) 
In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary gained administrative 
responsibility for the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria-
Hungary's principal objectives in the Balkans were (a) as Turkish power receded, 
to fill the vacuum and become the dominant political and cultural force in the 
region; (b) to serve as the bridge between east and west; Christianity and Islam; 
and (c) to keep Russian influence and pan-Slavism at bay. Russia and Austria-
Hungary initially avoided confrontation by carving up their respective spheres of 
influence. However, in 1908-09, Austria-Hungary moved to formally 'annex' 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which brought it to the brink of war with Serbia, and 
consequently, Russia (Williamson 1991). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed a number of socio-economic changes under 
the brief reign of the Austro-Hungarians. The population of the two provinces 
almost doubled between 1878 and 1910 (from 1 million to nearly 1.9 million) -
this was mainly attributed to better medical and sanitation facilities. 
Industrialisation gained momentum, and metallurgy, forestry, mining and 
textiles emerged as key sectors of the economy. Concessions were awarded to 
private entrepreneurs to start profitable industrial operations. Kallay, the 
Austrian administrator of Bosnia between 1882-1903, firmly believed that 
132 
Chapter 4: Urban planning in pre- and post-war Bosnia 
economic development and prosperity was the best way of ensuring continued 
Austrian control of the province (Pinson 1993). Tax collection mechanisms were 
improved as Hungary, in particular, didn't want the provinces to be a burden on 
the Empire and was staunchly against investing its own resources into the region 
(Taylor 1981; Williamson 1991; Pinson 1993). The expanding bureaucracy, 
mostly comprising foreign public officials, also resulted in the development of 
the service economy, especially around Sarajevo (ESI 2004). 
Literacy, land reforms and agriculture, however, were put on the backburner, 
even though the imperial authorities had cited the "unresolved agrarian 
question" as one of the causes of under-development, and consequently, 
instability, in the province (ESI 2004: 8). The reasons were partly political. As 
discussed in the previous section, land ownership patterns under the Ottomans 
were based on religious groupings, with predominantly Muslim landlords and 
mainly Christian serfs. Land reforms would have upset the Muslim landlords and 
benefited predominantly the Orthodox Christians (Serbs), which was not 
desirable as taxes on land made up a significant chunk of the revenue of the 
Austrian administration in Bosnia. Furthermore, such reforms could have 
potentially strengthened the pan-Slav movement. For these reasons, land reforms 
were avoided by the Austrians, despite the expectations from especially the 
Christian kmets (bonded peasants) that a Christian administration would free 
them (Williamson 1991; Pinson 1993). This was also the reason for not tackling 
the problem of i1~teracy. Although new political and administrative systems 
were introduced from 1910 onwards, Catholics and Muslims retained the upper 
hand politically over Orthodox Serbs (Williamson 1991). 
While agriculture was neglected, industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded 
apace. The occupying forces were accompanied by a motley collection of 
administrative staff, road-builders, archaeologists, merchants and businessmen, 
craftsmen and other settlers from all parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire 
(Taylor 1981; Bublin 1999). This greatly influenced the urbanisation process as 
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well as the character of Bosnian cities. The Austro-Hungarians built an extensive 
network of roads and railways (the railway network expanded from 290 km in 
1880 to nearly 1510 km in 1910), waterworks and power stations, and 
refurbished and extended urban centres across Bosnia and Herzegovina. New 
legislation and regulations relating to construction were issued, and new 
European-style neighbourhoods with wide streets on grid-iron patterns, a mix of 
high rise apartment blocks and villas, soon began to appear in most major cities. 
A number of military structures, prisons, barracks and military hospitals were 
also built in this period, as were key administrative and public buildings, public 
libraries, and schools (Taylor 1981; Williamson 1991; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 
1999; Pa~ic 2004). The bureaucracy administering all this development expanded 
as the years went by - and most of the new officials were non-Muslim, and non-
Bosnian (Pinson 1993). 
The Austro-Hungarians did not, however, destroy the Ottoman quarters, unlike 
other cities in newly-independent Balkan states (including Greece, Romania, 
Serbia and Bulgaria), where the focus of city planning was to obliterate all signs 
of Ottoman rule (Yerolympos 1993). In Mostar, the Austro-Hungarian 
developments did not interfere with the old city but created entirely new 
quarters to the west, predominantly for the occupying forces and administrators. 
Whether such a marked demographic distinction between the new and old parts 
of the city persisted throughout the Austro-Hungarian period as well as 
afterwards is explored further in the next chapter. 
The planning of all these developments was controlled by the Austrian 
administrator and the Ministry of Finance, and executed by the military or 
professionals from the Empire - in other words, it was highly centralised, and 
had little involvement of the local population (Pinson 1993). 
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4.1.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the inter-war period 
There is very little literature tracking the development of Bosnian cities in the 
inter-war period, Le., between 1918-1945. Those authors who do examine this 
phase note that this was overall a time of decline and stagnation with respect to 
economic and urban development, as well as architecture (Bublin 1999; Yarwood 
1999). This is not surprising, as this was also the time when the Great Depression 
started in the United States (1929) and spread across the world, and Yugoslavia 
was no exception. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was mired in a constant tussle 
between the various nationalist groups during this period. The Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, formed on December 1,1918 following the end of the First 
World War, was transformed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 by King 
Alexander. Political and territorial reorganisation within the Kingdom continued 
until the Second World War (Malcolm 2002; Schuman 2004). Bosnia in 
particular, seems to have become '~ .. an economic backwater within the new 
Kingdom ofYugoslavia"(ESI 2004: 9). Three-quarters of its population depended 
on subsistence agriculture in the decade prior to the Second World War (ESI 
2004: 9). 
The limited urban development and planning which took place in this phase 
seems to have been influenced by the 'City Beautiful' movement in the United 
States, the Garden City movement in Britain and Beaux-Arts in Paris. An 
important planning 'achievement' of this period was the passing of the Building 
Act in 1931, which made the Regulatory Plan the key instrument of urban 
development. This act focused on physical planning issues and regulated aspects 
of zoning, densities, land use, building heights, buffer zones etc. However, it did 
not strictly define the format of planning documents or the process of plan 
preparation (Nedovie-Budie and Cavrie 2006). 
4.1.4 Urban development and planning in socialist Yligoslavia 
After the end of the War, Yugoslavia evolved into a federal socialist state, and an 
era of intense industrialisation and urbanisation set in across the country. In all 
135 
Chapter 4: Urban planning in pre- and post-war Bosnia 
the countries of East Central Europe (including Yugoslavia) where communist 
governments came to power after World War-II, Soviet-style socialism was 
adopted as the predominant economic model. Immediately after the war, only 
economic, sectoral planning was practiced. Spatial planning was clearly 
subordinate to economic planning, and in fact mainly a tool to ensure that 
economic goals such as rational allocation and/or redistribution of resources were 
met. It was only in the late 1950s and 1960s that comprehensive regional and 
urban plans were introduced. These too, were centrally-driven. "Central 
planning authorities decided the location of the various forms of infrastructural 
development, and the local authorities were simply expected to execute them" 
(Enyedi 1996: 111). 
Urban development and planning in the classical Soviet model reflected the 
communist ideology of nationalised means of production and property, rejection 
of the market, and a general priority of public and collective interests over 
individual or private ones. The goals of planning were to correct the ills of the 
capitalist society and to develop new settlement as well as urban patterns that 
reflected a classless society (Nedovic-Budic 2001). Urbanisation under socialism 
was thus based on two principles - (a) egalitarianism (equalisation of living 
conditions, both between and within settlements, which meant adoption of strict 
standards and norms for per capita space and provision of services, as well as 
uniformity in design and layout of apartments, apartment blocks and 
neighbourhoods), and (b) planned urbanisation (Le. central allocation of 
development funds/investment resources and a strict hierarchy of settlements in 
order to reduce regional inequalities and increase efficiency). Due to the 
emphasis on public interest, the state was naturally the most powerful actor in 
planning - not only as the main decision and policy-maker, but also the chief 
land developer and provider of housing. The development strategies were 
developed by experts, politicians and bureaucrats, focusing on 'political, 
economic and strictly professional issues' (Enyedi 1996: 113). The citizens were 
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not consulted, except for the exhibitions of city plans where they had the 
opportunity to leave written comments (Enyedi 1996; Nedovic-Budic 2001). 
Yugoslavia was slighdy different from other communist states of eastern and 
central Europe in that the communist group which took control of the country 
after the War was more or less 'indigenous'. Their leader, Josip Broz 'Tito' was 
keen to retain a degree of independence from the Soviet Union, which controlled 
the other Eastern European countries4O. As Yugoslavia was composed of a diverse 
range of nationalities with a history of conflict, a strong federal structure was 
gradually adopted in order to keep the country together. with devolution of a 
considerable amount of power to the constituent republics and autonomous 
provinces. Furthermore, the country had been among the poorest in the region 
before the war. had suffered extensive wartime damage, and demonstrated 
significant inequalities between the different republics and provinces. The 
northern republics of Croatia and Slovenia. due to their proximity to the Austro-
Hungarians, were considerably more developed than the central and southern 
regions comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Montenegro. The Soviet model thus had to adapt to the specific circumstances of 
Yugoslavia, and a form of 'market socialism' was introduced in the mid-1960s 
(Dawson 1987). 
According to Vujosevic and Nedovic-Budic (2004), urban planning in former 
Yugoslavia witnessed three distinct phases since the end of the Second World 
War - central command planning (1947-65). political decentralisation and 
societal self-management planning (1965-1989), and 'democratic' planning 
(1989-present)41. Each of these phases had different political, economic and 
governance characteristics, which significandy influenced the planning system. 
40 In 1948. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform (the Soviet-dominated network of 
communist parties from across Eastern Europe). 
4. The paper cited deals particularly with present-day Serbia. hence the third category is defined 
by the authors as a continuum stretching from the fall of communism in 1989 until the present 
day. 
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In the first phase. the communist ideology was extremely strong. a clear priority 
was accorded to collective interests over private ones. and the state owned and 
distributed the means of production and property. which were nationalised. 
Urban land was nationalised and monopolised by the national government 
(although there was no collective ownership of rural land). This was the phase 
when urbanisation and industrialisation were rapid. a high level of investment 
was made in the construction of high-rise. multi-apartment housing for workers 
moving to urban areas. and urban planning was seen mainly as the means to 
achieve economic goals - national and regional growth objectives. reduction in 
inequalities and a classless society (Dawson 1987; Nedovic-Budic and Vujo~evic 
2004; Vujo~evic and Nedovic-Budic 2006). 
In the second phase. between 1965 and 1989. there was a movement towards 
political decentralisation. and decision-making was shared between central. 
republican and commune levels of government (Fisher 1965)42. The economic 
system also evolved. as 'self-management' of enterprises by their employees 
became the norm. Market-oriented reforms related to banking and foreign 
investments were initiated. Yet. urban land continued to be allocated through 
non-market mechanisms. 
Just like land. socially-owned housing. provided by the state or its enterprises to 
their employees. was the predominant housing model in the urban areas. Rural 
housing was largely self-built and privately owned. Early in this phase. the 
responsibility for provision of urban housing was shifted from the state to 
socially-owned enterprises (Petrovic 2001). In the 1980s. another shift took place 
as the enterprises moved away from providing flats. towards granting housing 
loans to employees so that they could choose their own housing strategies. More 
flats built by socially-owned construction firms. affordable but not of very high 
quality, also appeared on the market (Petrovic 2001; Tsenkova 2005). The 
42 A commune, or 'komuna', was conceptualised as a well-defined socio-economic community, 
not just an administrative unit of local governance ('op§tina') (Fisher 1965). 
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distribution of socially-owned flats, however, created 'a new type of social 
inequality' (Petrovic 2001: 213), one based on in-kind rather than cash income, 
as flats were allocated mainly to the elite, professional or otherwise qualified 
workers. Others relied on self-built construction, often illegal, in the suburbs and 
rural areas, a practice which continues to this day. Housing thus reflected the 
broader political and economic situation as well as changes that took place in the 
different phases of the Yugoslav era. 
During this period (1965-92), plans for different levels also proliferated suddenly, 
and by end of the 1980s, the country had one of the most de centralised systems 
of planning, including spatial planning. New planning acts were passed in each of 
the republics in the 1960s, and again after the adoption of the new Federal 
constitution in 1974. Integrated planning approaches were adopted, and the Acts 
w~re accompanied by comprehensive guides and manuals, covering aspects of 
socio-economic, environmental and physical development (Nedovic-Budic and 
Cavric 2006). The communes were designated as the main planning and 
implementation authorities, and regional plans were also prepared for the 
republics and provinces, but none at the federal level (Nedovic-Budic and 
Vujo~evic 2004). While major infrastructure projects (in other words, decisions 
on the location of large investments) remained the responsibility of the central 
government. spatial and urban policy and planning was largely the domain of the 
sub-national authorities. 
A large number of planning documents were produced during this phase, 
including long-term socio-economic and spatial plans. long and medium-term 
urban plans, short-term plans for specific sites or development projects, as well as 
plans for rural settlements. though regional plans were not very popular. 
Furthermore, the planning process was carried out by multi-disciplinary teams, 
and is described as being " ... over-loaded with various types of individual group 
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and general public participation" (Nedovic-Budic and Vujosevic 2004: 14)43. Yet, 
planning in this phase failed to achieve the key goal of reducing the development 
gap between the different republics, and even between regions within the 
republics (for example, Kosovo in relation to the Vojvodina and the rest of 
Serbia). 
Bosnian cities and planning were not untouched by the different phases 
witnessed across the rest of Yugoslavia. Bosnia had large mineral deposits, and in 
the initial years of the socialist era emerged as the industrial heartland of 
Yugoslavia (Gregory 1973)44. Central Bosnia, a remote, inaccessible region 
surrounded by mountains, emerged as the hub of military industries in the 
former Yugoslavia, precisely because of its unfriendly Iocational attributes. In the 
1950s, enormous investments were made in '~ .. defence-related projects across 
the mountainous centre, building the impressive network of roads, bridges and 
tunnels which still form the core of Bosnias transport infrastructure r ... J mJ1itary 
industries became the driving force behind industrialization" (ESI 2004: 10)45. 
Prior to its collapse, over fifty per cent of Yugoslavia's defence industry was 
located in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ESI 2004). 
Industrialisation brought with it rapid urbanisation, and urban settlements, small 
and large, with variable levels of services and infrastructure, developed across the 
republic. Besides Sarajevo, the key urban centres were Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla, 
43 Interestingly, Fisher (1965) points out that although there is evidence of plans being changed 
on the basis of objections raised by the citizens, this took place only when the changes involved 
were not seen to affect the fundamental concept of the plan. When the concept or underlying 
principles of the plan were challenged, the comments were usually ignored. Of course, any public 
discussion only took place after the plan had been fully drafted, rather than in the early stages of 
the process, which continues to be a characteristic feature of the planning system in Bosnia even 
today. 
44 This situation later changed as it didn't have a diversified economic base and continued to rely 
on basic industries, and soon lost its comparative advantage vis-a-vis the other republics (Gregory 
1973). 
45 The Soko aircraft factory was set up in Mostar during this period, and other towns such as Novi 
Travnik, Sarajevo, Gorazde etc became hosts to other factories producing armaments. The 
defence industry not only supplied the Yugoslav army but also exported extensively to other 
'non-aligned' countries (ESI 2004). 
140 
Chapter 4: Urban planning in pre- and post -war Bosnia 
Zenica, Doboj and Bihac. A polycentric urban system implied that there was a 
clear hierarchy of settlements, with regional and sub-regional centres as well as 
smaller settlements, playing distinct roles. An extensive road network was 
created and airports built in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla and Bihac 
(Bublin 1999). 
Figure 2: Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2005. (Source: UNESCO Old City nomination 
file. courtesy S. Dernirovic. urban planner . Grad Mostar) 
The pinnacle of Bosnia's industrial development was reached in the 1970s, when 
investments in industry finally started to show impact on the development of 
local populations. Standards of living and education rose. Universities were 
established in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar, focusing on ti •• • techmcaJ subjects 
such as engineering and metallurgy" (ESI 2004: 13). The number of people 
engaged in white-collar (managerial and technical) jobs increased. Yet, even at 
its peak, work-force participation (percentage of working-age population in 
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employment) in Bosnia never exceeded 35 per cent. extremely low by modem 
standards (ESI 2004). 
All through this period, agriculture was clearly neglected (Gregory 1973; ESI 
2004). Agricultural policy in Bosnia focused mainly on co-operatives or agro-
combines. which held a mere 10% of agricultural land. The rest was held 
privately in small holdings by subsistence farmers (ESI 2004). These seljaci 
(peasants) were viewed by the authorities as '~ .. backward and ideologically 
suspect, prone to religious sentiment. They were long excluded from social 
benefits such as pensions and health insurance [and} were also poorly 
represented in political structures"(ESI 2004: 30). 
As mentioned above, new planning acts were passed in each of the republics. 
first in the 1960s, and again in the 1970s, accompanied by detailed guidelines. 
The urban form of this period was fairly standardised and strictly regulated. 
across Yugoslavia. However, as Bosnian life had been influenced by different 
religions and empires over the past five hundred years or so, it had a rich and 
varied cultural heritage. To some, Bosnia, with its '~ .. ethnic mix and history of 
multicultural coexistence "was a symbol of a united Yugoslavia (Ali and Gusheh 
1999: 12). Yet, Bosnia claimed a unique cultural heritage of its own, articulated 
in particular through its urban fabric and built form - a combination of the 
Turkish-oriental and Austro-Hungarian styles. It appeared difficult to reconcile 
the legacy of the Ottomans with Serb and Croat nationalism, as well as with 
Yugoslav secularism. The Bascarsija in Sarajevo, which was organised according 
to Ottoman urban principles but at the same time contained all of Bosnia's 
religious institutions, as well as prominent Austro-Hungarian structures, clearly 
symbolised this paradox (Ali and Gusheh 1999). 
Initially the Federal Government's response to this dilemma was the massive 
demolition of the Bascarsija. This was also in line with the communist agenda of 
the suppression of all aspects of religion, ethnicity or culture. In the 1960s, 
however, changes in political circumstances led Tito and the government to 
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abandon the unitarist approach in favour of a " ... Yugoslav commonwealth in 
which all ethnic groups were given home rule and the right to full national and 
cultural affirmation"(Doder 1993: 12) The Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a 
'nation.' Areas such as the Bascarsija were now seen as historic districts to be 
preserved. The view of Bosnia's cities, and Bosnia as a whole, as a melting pot, 
and thus a fitting representative of a multi-national, harmonious Yugoslavia, has 
been actively promoted ever since. 
Eventually, conservation plans were drawn up for historical areas such as 
Bascarsija in Sarajevo and the Carsija and Stari Grad in Mostar. In 1986, Mostar 
received the Aga Khan Award for Architecture for its effective preservation of 
the old town, in an economically sustainable manner (Pa~ic 2004) 46. At the same 
time, however, high rise residential towers appeared in Bosnian cities, an 
unmistakable sign of the socialist state, and illegally built housing clusters 
emerged in the suburbs (Hasic and Roberts 2000; ESI 2004). 
In the 1980s, Yugoslavia witnessed a number of tumultuous changes that led to 
its rapid descent into war. The period after Tito's death in 1980 had witnessed 
growing nationalism in all the republics, and a number of attempts by the richer 
ones (Croatia and Slovenia) to gain more autonomy. The economic decline had 
also started in the beginning of the 1980s as large scale industrial projects proved 
to be technically or economically inefficient (ESI 2004). Although the 
Communist party retained its hold on Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s, in 1989, 
with the fall of the Berlin wall, communism lost its footing all across Eastern 
Europe. In Yugoslavia, it deepened the divide between the republics - the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia broke up in January 1990, and three months later, 
the communists were ousted from power in Slovenia and Croatia. On the other 
hand, Communists remained in power in Serbia and Montenegro. This led to a 
further polarisation of Yugoslavia, which already reeling under the impact of the 
46 See footnote 83 in Chapter 6 for details. 
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rise and increasingly aggressive manifestation of Serbian nationalism under 
Slobodan Milosevic. 
The post-communist, pre-war period between 1989-92 was marked on the one 
hand by increasing democratisation and the emergence of a civil society, while 
on the other, it witnessed a re-centralisation of power, growing ethnic and 
regional conflicts, economic and social collapse, and eventually, the violent 
break-up of the country. According to Bennett (1995), '~ .. communism had 
helped to hold Yugoslav society together for almost forty-five years, and its 
demise made a major reorganisation of the state unavoidable" (p.12). 
Planning, too, was affected by these changes. This was the third phase of 
planning in the former Yugoslavia, also described by Vujosevic and Nedovic-
Budic (2004) as 'democratic' planning. It was, in fact, far from democratic, as the 
policy of re-centralisation took away planning powers from lower levels as the 
republics assumed the key role in socio-economic as well as spatial/urban 
planning. "By the end of the 1980s, both the system and the practice of socio-
economic and spatial planm"ng in Yugoslavia was dysfunctional" (Vujosevic and 
Nedovic-Budic 2006: 279). New market-oriented approaches to planning were 
now being explored. 
Table 2 on the following page provides a comparative assessment of the socio-
political structure, economic activities and key elements of spatial/urban 
development in the four major phases of Bosnian history discussed above. 
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• Most important influence on 
Bosnian history, culture, social 
structure, urbanisation pattern. 
• Adoption ofIs1am not compu1sory 
and non-Muslims were allowed to 
practice their own religions 
• Yet, society clearly segregated 
between Muslims and non-Muslims 
- e.g. in terms of income, taxes and 
property Jaws. Source of perceived 
historical divide between Muslims 
and Christians, urban and rural 
• "MiUet'sysrem a key characteristic 
- non-geographical, non-ethnic but 
loosely confessional-based groups 
enjoying different social. political. 
economic rights. 
• Mainly agriculture, with 1argely 
Muslim land-awners and Christian 
serfs. 
• Urban economies based mainly on 
trade, guilds of craftsmen and 




• Largely a continuation of Ottoman 
policies, but with streamlined 
administration and improved 
taxation. 
• Dominance of Muslims and 
Catholics over Orthodox Christians 
(mainly Serbs). 
• Induction of large numbers of 
public officials from other parts of 
the Austro-Hungarian empire to 
administer Bosnia 
• Development of primary industries 
such as metallurgy, forestry etc. 
• Unsuccessful attempts to encourage 
private investment, particularly 
from within Bosnia, concessions 
awarded to foreign entrepreneurs. 
• Neglect of agricuhure and failure to 
address land reform. 
Ineer-war period 
(1918-1945) 
• Constant political and 
territorial reorganisation. 
• Tussle for power between 
various nationalist groups. 
• Three-quartenofthe 
population depended on 
subsistence agriculture. 
• Period of general stagnation. 
Post World War-II until the collapse of 
Yugoslavia 
(1945 -1992) 
• Principles of egalitarianism (between 
regions and nationalities), planned 
development, and a form of "market 
socialism'. 
• Cross-subsidisation between republics. 
• Bosnia emerged as the centre of the 
military industry, considered one of 
the better-off republics due to its 
strong industrial base. Increasing 
migration to Bosnia from other 
republics. 
• Limited investments in social sectors. 
• Per capita income just 35 percent of 
Yugoslav average in 1971. 
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• Expanding bureaucracy also led to • New universities with focus on 
development of local service technical education established in 
economy in key towns. 1970s; rise of whit~ollar jobs in 
industry. 
• By late 1980s, inefficiency of 
investments - industrial decline of 
Bosnia. 
• Neglect of agriculture throughout the 
socialist era - only 10% agricultural 
land held by co-operatives, rest in 
small holdings by subsistence farmers. 
Spatial/ urban • RespollSl"1e for the initiation of the • Expansion of road and railway • Limited urban development. • Spatial planning subordinate to 
development 'urbanisation' process and networks, industrial units, influenced by City Beautiful economic planning. tool to realise 
pattern development of towns and cities. waterworks and power stations. movement in the us. goals such as redistribution of 
• Largely based on Is1amic principles barracks and garrisons Garden city and Beaux-Arts. resources and egalitarianism. 
of city planning. centrality of the • Expansion and "Europeanisation- of • Building Act of1931 made • Comprehensive. top-down regional 
mosque and the marketplace, cities and towns. improvements in the Regulatory Plan the key and spatial planning introduced in 
segregation of public and private infrastru.cture water supply and instrument of urban 1950s and early 19605. 
spaces. sanitation. deve1opment. 
• Development of polycentric urban 
• Reflection of the social systems • Construction of imposing public system. 
(vUu£ milled) in spatial pattern buildings. wide roads, squares and 
• Heavy reliance on experts and expert 
• Different communities led plazas institutions for planning. 
independent lives in clearly 
• Central command planning slowly 
segregated quarters. gave way to self-management 
planning. to finally some form of 
'democratic' planning. 
• Formalistic, overly complex systems of 
public participation. 
• End of 1980s, planning system 
bureaucratic, 'dvsfunctional'. 
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4.2 Cities, plans and planning in times of collapse: Bosnia 1992-95 
4.21 The collapse of Yugoslavia and Bosnia ~ descent into war 
"Bosnia resembled the Yugoslav Federation uniquely among 
Yugoslav republics in its mix of nationalities, lack of an absolute 
ethnic majority, and intricate power-sharing formulas for managing 
ethnicity. "(Cousens and Cater 2001: 19) 
Indeed, these were the main features that set Bosnia and Herzegovina apart from 
the other Yugoslav republics. In the early 1990s. when the break-up of 
Yugoslavia began to gather momentum, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
comprised 44 percent Muslims, 31 percent Serbs, about 17 percent Croats and 8 
percent who described themselves as Yugoslav or 'other' (1991 census data, 
available on www.fzs.ba). While Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a 'nation' 
at par with other constituent nations of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, 
Macedonians and Montenegrins) in the 1960s and named as such in the new 
Yugoslav constitution adopted in 1974, this was never accepted by the Serb and 
Croat leaders, who continually advocated that the Bosnian Muslims were in fact 
Serbs or Croats of Islamic faith. Croatian President Tudjman's views that the 
Bosnian 'nation' was an artificial creation and had no historic legitimacy, were 
well-known (Silber and Little 1996; Kumar 1997; Bose 2002). 
The documentation, analysis or reinterpretation of the Bosnian conflict is not the 
mission of this research. It has been adequately covered by numerous historical 
accounts4', However, as the conflict forms the backdrop and the basis for this 
project, it is important to review some salient aspects, especially the causes of the 
conflict, which is interpreted by some as the war between the rural and the 
urban. Undoubtedly, the destruction of the major cities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and widespread ethnic cleansing of populations to establish 
.7 For comprehensive coverage and discussion of the causes and trajectory of the Bosnian conflict 
and the Dayton Accords. see accounts by Silber and Little (1996). Kumar (1997), Holbrooke 
(1999). Bose (2002). Malcolm (2002). Schuman (2004). 
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ethnically homogeneous territories, was a key feature of the conflict (Coward 
2004). This is discussed in the next section on 'urbicide.' 
In terms of simple historical facts, the conflict was triggered by the collapse of 
the formal structures of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Slovenia and Croatia were 
the first to secede, declaring independence in June 1991. They were awarded 
international recognition in January 1992. Bosnia was caught between the 
ambitions of Presidents Tudjman & Milosevic of Croatia and Serbia respectively, 
who wanted to carve up the territory to create Greater Croatia and Greater 
Serbia, leaving a rump and almost certainly unviable Muslim state. While 
desperately attempting to protect the territorial integrity and the multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious character of their republic, which was being threatened by 
Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
conducted a referendum on independence in March 1992. Bolstered by the 
overwhelming vote in favour of independence (there was a 63% turnout -
mostly comprising Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats - and 99.4% of those who voted 
were in favour), the Bosnian government declared independence on 5 April 
1992. It was recognised as an independent state by the EC and the United States 
on 6 and 7 April, respectively (du Pont 2002; Malcolm 2002). By then, the siege 
of Sarajevo had already been initiated, with Serb artillery moving into positions 
surrounding the town. It became effective within days of the declaration, lasting 
for over 3 years. In July 1992, the Bosnian Croats proclaimed their own quasi-
state (or 'statelet', as it is referred to by some) - the 'Croatian Community of 
Herzeg-Bosnia' (Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg-Bosna), hereinafter referred to as 
Herceg-Bosna, with Mostar as its capital. By 1993, this had led to a breakdown in 
Muslim-Croat relations, and precipitated heavy fighting not just for the control 
of Mostar but also the mixed areas around it (Bose 2002; du Pont 2002) 48. 
48 Whether the war was primarily a case of internal conflict or 'civil war' among Bosnians. or that 
of 'aggression' of Serbia (and later Croatia) against Bosnia is still being debated amongst academics 
and analysts. Malcolm (2002) holds the view that throughout the history of Bosnia, " .. . leaving 
aside the economic conflict between landowners and peasants, the 'national' animosities within 
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According to various assessments, approximately 250,000 people (nearly 6% of 
the pre-war population of 4.3 million people) are estimated to have been killed 
and about 50% of the pre-war population was forcibly displaced during the war 
in Bosnia (UNDP BiH 2007). Almost all the major Bosnian cities lay in ruins at 
the end of the conflict. 
4.22 Urbidde. mono-ethnic dties. divided dties 
Many authors support the contention of Vucinich (1962) that a 'chasm' had 
historically existed between the rural and the urban way of life in the Balkans. 
Prodanovic (2002) suggests that anti-urban sentiment 'traceable to biblical times' 
(p. 141), fuelled by ethnonationalist propaganda from latter-day politicians 
seeking to expand their personal fiefdoms, and a thorough manipulation of the 
media to achieve this objective, was the key cause behind the destruction of all 
Balkan cities. Indeed, the Bosnian war is considered by many as 'a war of the 
city' (Shaw 2004b: 145), drawing on rural and small-town hatred of the city and 
its cosmopolitan and inclusive culture, and manifest in the destruction of 
symbols of that culture (Coward 2004; Shaw 2004b; Radovic 2005). Radovic 
introduces the concept of palanka (small town; also used as a synonym for 
provincial, or, depending on the context, provincialism) to account for the social 
and physical destruction of Yugoslavia. He proposes that " ... the Yugoslav wars 
have begun as wars of xenophobic. exclusive palanka against the pluralism and 
inclusiveness of Yugoslav cities" (Radovic 2005: 149), and suggests that the 
conflict between the two ways of life (palanka versus city) started long before the 
outbreak of war. 
At the same time, other authors warn against such oversimplification of the 
nature of the conflict in the Balkans, as one between the cosmopolitan towns, the 
peaceful plains and the quarrelsome mountain folk (Bougarel 1999), or 
stereotyping the rural-urban divide as one between primitivism and modernity, 
the country have reached the point of inter-ethnic violence only as a result of pressures coming 
from outside Bosnia s borders" (p. 234). 
149 
Chapter 4: Urban planning in pre- and post-war Bosnia 
or xenophobia and inclusiveness (Bougarel 1999; Grodach 2002)49. Bougarel goes 
on to propose the following explanation for the destruction of Sarajevo and 
Mostar: 
"Forty years of accelerated modernization and urbanisation have 
shifted the traditional antagonisms between town and countryside 
into the towns themselves, endangered the balance of the urban social 
system and broken down the structures of the rural one. This is 
probably the reason why towns like Sarajevo and Mostar were at the 
centre of the war between 1992 and 1995, whereas they remained 
relatively untouched by the fighting of World War II " (Bougarel 
1999: 165) 
An interesting perspective is offered by Abazovic (2002). who uses Boars 
classification of various scenarios and dynamics of ethnic relations. to reflect on 
the destruction of Sarajevo. Boal proposes that five scenarios - Assimilation, 
Pluralism, Segmentation, Polarisation and Cleansing - can be used to describe 
ethnic relations in cities. and that these are reflected equally in the urban fabric 
(Boal 1999). He suggests further that these scenarios form a circle rather than a 
liner progression. as cities demonstrating characteristics of Assimilation 
(undivided) move gradually (or rapidly, as the case may be) towards Cleansing 
(also undivided), or vice versa, with the intensity of division increasing from 
Pluralism to Segmentation and further to Polarisation (Boal 1999). Abazovic, 
using Boars framework, describes how Sarajevo had always been pluralist rather 
than fully assimilated, how signs of segmentation emerged around the time when 
the Constitution of SFRY was adopted (1974), and how, during the war, 
segmentation changed almost overnight to polarisation (Abazovic 2002) so. This 
also supports the hypothesis made by Bougarel above that the destruction of 
Sarajevo and Mostar was a consequence of the growing imbalance within urban 
49 Taking this perspective into account. Coward (2006) later refines his previous argument and 
contends that the destruction of the built environment is significant in its own right. as a distinct 
form of political violence. rather than violence against a 'perceived cultural characteristic of the 
lives lived in amongst these buildings: (Coward 2006: 425) 
50 I have also used Boal's framework to discuss the division of Mostar in the next chapter. 
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society, rather than an attack on 'urbanity' by 'primitive rural forces', which in 
turn was brought on by the socialist policy of urbanisation and modernisation 
within a short span of time. 
Bublin (1999) and Prodanovic (2002) provide evocative descriptions of the siege 
of Sarajevo, the slow strangulation of 'Sarajevan' life, and the obliteration of the 
city's landmarks - the Bascarslja, major mosques, churches and other structures 
from the Ottoman era; the City Hall, from the Austro-Hungarian period; houses 
and apartments, schools, hospitals and public buildings. The city faced mortar 
fire, grenade attacks, as well as sniper fire. As most buildings from the Ottoman 
era were made of wood, many of the damaged structures were pulled down and 
used for firewood during the siege, contributing further to the destruction of 
historic Sarajevo. 60% of the city's buildings were destroyeds1 • Before the war, 
Sarajevo had a mixed ethnic population of 50% Muslims, 30% Serbs (Orthodox) 
and less than 8% Croats (Catholic); in all it was home to more than 23 different 
religious or national population groups (Abazovic 2002). The Serbs who 
remained in the city after the conflict were either forcibly evicted by Serb 
militia, or fled fearing reprisal. Muslim refugees from Republika Srpska took 
their place. Sarajevo is now 80% Muslim, and has been described variously as a 
frontier city, an urban interstice, a traumatized and dislocated city (Rowland 
1995; Bollens 2006). Mainly, it is a largely mono-ethnic city, with few signs of its 
retum to multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism. 
Other Bosnian cities and villages, including Banja Luka, Brcko, Gorazde, Tuzla, 
Pocitelj and Srebrenica, just to name a few, also witnessed widespread 
destruction and ethnic cleansing. The destruction and division of Mostar -
another city symbolic of heterogeneous and multicultural Bosnia - captured 
international attention like no other city in the Balkans. A comprehensive 
51 Powerful depictions of the siege of Sarajevo were also conveyed through the multimedia 
exhibition created by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Association of Architects in 1992-93, titled 
Warchitecture-Sarajevo: A Wounded City', Some of the images are reproduced in Lang (1995), 
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account of the destruction, division and reconstruction of Mostar, and the 
debates surrounding the latter process in particular, follows in the next chapter. 
Urban destruction during the war also included the destruction or removal of 
cadastral and property records, plans and maps. According to the World Bank, 
systems for the registration of property rights in BiH have been disorganised 
since the Second World War, during which a large proportion of records were 
damaged or destroyed. During the socialist period, changes in ownership were 
often not registered due to the high transaction costs and taxes. During the war 
(1992-95), more records were lost as many public buildings were bombed. 
Tsenkova (2005) suggests that in about 20% of the Bosnian towns and cities, no 
land books exist because of the destruction caused by the war. This destruction of 
records and archives, displacement of large numbers of pepple, and the 
breakdown in institutional capacity in the aftermath of the war has led to a 
situation wherein legal records (where they exist) no longer match the situation 
on the ground. In most cities, urban plans and maps have also either been 
destroyed or are out of date, and no longer reflect the de facto boundaries, land 
use or occupancy (World Bank 2006a). 
4.23 Overall economic and social impact olthe war 
Of course, the destruction of housing and infrastructure was not confined to 
urban areas alone. Estimates. of housing destruction vary. The World Bank 
estimates that 412,000 housing units across the country were destroyed or 
significantly damaged (World Bank 2000, as cited in ESI 2004: 15). According to 
the European Commission, across the country, over 80,000 houses were 
completely destroyed, while about 270,000 were significantly damaged (20%-
70%), out of a total housing stock of 1.3 million units (ECHO 2000). Electricity 
generating units and transmission lines were destroyed, as were water and 
sanitation systems. 70% of school buildings and nearly 40% of health facilities 
were damaged or destroyed. Industrial production capacity was more or less 
wiped out as 45% of the industrial plants were destroyed - at the end of 1995 
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industrial output was estimated to be between 5 - 10 per cent of the pre-war 
level, according to different estimates. Bosnia had always been one of the poorer 
republics in the former Yugoslavia - its per capita GDP in 1990 was less than 
one-third of that of Slovenia (US$1900 in comparison to US$6S00 in Slovenia) 
(World Bank 1996)52. During the war, this fell by about 80 per cent. The direct 
material and economic damage caused by the war has been estimated at US$50-
60 billion, leading to widespread unemployment and poverty (World Bank 1996; 
ECHO 2000; World Bank 2004). 
Along with the disastrous economic consequences, the social impact of the war 
has also been devastating. According to latest estimates, nearly 18% of the 
population of BiH was below the general poverty line in 2004. Gross 
unemployment was 30% in 2006 and was mostly long-term in character, with 
the unemployed, in particular men, at a high risk of falling below the poverty 
line (UNDP BiH 2007). 
UNDP's latest Human Development Report also highlights long term and 
widespread social exclusion as a key impact of the ethnic division resulting from 
the war. Ethnic division facilitates and exacerbates social exclusion in many 
ways, but its effects are felt particularly in the returns process: 
<~s a consequence of poorly integrated return to pre-war residences, 
national minorities are one of the most distinctly socially excluded 
groups. This is reflected not only in their limited political 
participation and access to service provisions, but also in terms of 
ah"enation from regular social processes in the areas where they live. " 
(UNDP BiH 2007: 10) 
52 As explained in an ESI report, high levels of industrial investment in Bosnia meant that it was 
officially treated " .. . as a 'developed republic' and denied the civJ1ian investments channeled into 
Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, even though it remained objectively one of the poorest parts 
of Yugoslavia [ ... J In 1953, it had a per capita income of 74 percent of the Yugoslav average; by 
1971 this had fallen to 35 percent" (ESI 2004: 11). 
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4.3 Post-war reconstruction and recovery 
The political context for post-war recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
provided by Washington Agreement between Bosniacs (Muslims) and Croats, 
establishing the Muslim-Croat Federation, signed in March 1994; and the Dayton 
Accords, concluded in November 1995. 
4.3.1 Washington and Dayton 
The Washington Agreement, signed by the Bosnian Prime Minister, Croatian 
Foreign Minister and a representative of the Bosnian Croats, sought to end the 
conflict between the Bosniacs and the Croats. It provided a framework for 
establishing the Federation and established a Transitional Committee to develop 
the Constitution of the Federation, an agreement on military arrangements and 
governmental structures, and a Preliminary Agreement of the Confederation 
between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation. It laid out the structure of 
the central government and the cantons, the broad division of responsibilities 
between these levels, and the responsibilities of the legislative, executive and 
judicial arms of the government. It also provided for a unified military. The 
exercise of local self-governance was to be through the municipalities53• An 
important exception, however, was the city of Mostar which had been divided 
by the war and which was claimed by the Croats as the capital of Herceg-Bosna. 
The Washington Agreement established that Mostar would be governed by an 
EU Administrator for up to two years (Washington Agreement 1994; leG 2000). 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
better-known as the Dayton Accords or the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), 
was signed in November 1995, and formally concluded the conflict in Bosnias4• 
The Agreement, along with its 11 Annexes (one of which - Annex 4 - included a 
53 The establishment of all-powerful Cantons, however, has undermined the last tier of 
government. namely the municipalities. See discussion below. 
54 The Dayton Peace Agreement was sealed after much arm-twisting on the part of the United 
States and other Western powers. For an 'eyewitness' account of the process and the negotiations. 
see Holbrooke (1999). 
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new constitution), provided the basis for establishing a consociational system of 
government in Bosnia and Herzegovina55• The Agreement asserted that the 
boundaries of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were inviolable, but at the 
same time facilitated an internal territorial division through the formation of two 
entities - the Bosnian-Croat Federation, or FBiH (controlling 51 % of the territory 
of the country) and Republika Srpska, RS (controlling 49%), which were (and 
continue to be) largely independent. 
4.3.2 Bosnia ~ multipJe transitions 
Since the 1990s, Bosnia has experienced a variety of 'transitions.' The first, of 
course, has been the transition from war to peace, which has been largely 
accomplished. The stabilisation of the security situation by NATO's 
Implementation Force (IFOR, later christened Stabilisation Force, or SFOR) was 
achieved through rapid deployment along ceasefire lines, separation of the three 
armies and other militia working in tandem with them, and their subsequent 
demobilisation. This process was successful in bringing down the risk of renewed 
armed conflict (Cox 2001). NATO concluded its mission in 2004. Since then, the 
EU maintains a military operation (Operation EUFOR-Althea) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, comprising 6,300 troops, with the objective of ensuring continued 
compliance with the Dayton Accords (EUYOR 2008). 
Another indicator of the transition to peace is the level of minority returns. 
According to UNHCR, by the end of September 2007, 446,215 former refugees 
and 577,750 IDPs had exercised their right to return, out of an estimated 2.2 
million persons who were forcibly displaced during the war (UNHCR 2007). The 
returns have followed a cyclical pattern, beginning after the signing of the 
55 Consociationalism is a model of government developed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart 
particularly for plural and divided societies. It is based on consensual and broad-based decision-
making across groups. rather than a majoritarian approach which is usually deployed in 
democratic states. Consociationalism and confederalism (strong self-rule of federal units) is built 
into all levels of the Bosnian state established by Dayton. For a full discussion on the structure of 
the Dayton state. and the characteristics, advantages and criticisms of the consociational system. 
see Bose (2002; 2005). 
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Dayton Accords, declining in subsequent years, rising again in 2002, and 
declining again since 2003. These cycles have coincided with factors such as 
property repossession rates and the availability of funds for reconstruction. 
However, minority returns (defined as returns to an area where the returnees 
would now be in a minority) remain an area of concern and a major political 
issue, and repossession and reconstruction have not always resulted in the 
permanent return of the minorities to their pre-war homes (UNHCR 2007). 
The second transition is that from being a 'constituent republic' in a federal state, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is now a federal state in itself, with a weak centre and 
two strong ethnically-based constituent Entities. The Dayton Accords provided 
for the establishment of an entirely new system of 'consociational confederal 
government' (group-based power-sharing), and one where the " .. .federating 
units, rather than the federal government, are the dominant layer of 
government" (Bose 2006: 20), the merits of which are still being debated. In a 
nutshell, the country is governed by the constitution of the common state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the constitutions of Republika Srpska (RS) and the 
Bosnian-Croat Federation (FBiH). The presidency comprises three members, a 
Serb, a Bosniac and a Croat, who assume power by rotation every eight months. 
The joint presidency's major mandate is foreign policy, and a limited range of 
inter-entity matters, while it is the Entities that hold most of the real decision-
making power for the territories under their control (Cox 2001; Bose 2002). One 
of the major differences between the Entities is that FBiH is divided into ten 
cantons, with devolution of decision-making powers as well as resources, while 
there is no such intermediate level of decentralisation in RS. The municipalities 
in FBiH play a relatively weak role as a result of the cantons' primacy - liThe 
canton is clearly the decisive layer in this multi-tiered framework of 
government" (Bose 2002: 79). However, special constitutional provisions have 
been made for the two mixed cantons - central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva 
- and it is mandatory for them to devolve their powers in the field of education, 
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culture, radio and television, local business and tourism to municipal 
governments (Bose 2002). 
The third transition that Bosnia has faced, since 1989, has been from socialism to 
a market-led economy, which is yet to yield results in terms of sustainable 
economic growth. Between 1989-92, after the collapse of communism, other 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe began their economic and social 
transformation while Bosnia was slowly dragged into a war. After the signing of 
the Dayton Accords, in 1996, the World Bank opened a mission in Sarajevo and 
established a $150 million Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Supporting 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's transition from a socialist to a market economy, as well 
as facilitating post-war reconstruction and economic recovery, were key 
priorities for the Bank (World Bank 2004). Its brief included establishing and 
maintaining macro-economic stability, development of modern customs and tax 
systems, the privatisation of industry and service sectors, establishment of a 
central bank and a common currency (which was particularly problematic), and 
clarification of fiscal relations between the State and the Entities. In Bosnia the 
last of these tasks was especially complicated because of the weak state 
government and the all-powerful Entities, who were keen to retain as much 
control over their own affairs as possible. Being stronger financially (in 
comparison to the State) considerably bolstered the political strength of the 
Cantons and Entities. Furthermore, the fiscal arrangements followed the pattern 
of decentralisation in the two entities, which meant that the internal taxation of 
structure of each Entity was necessarily different (in the Federation significant 
taxing and spending powers were devolved to the cantons, while in the 
Republika Srpska there was a much more centralised system), and therefore had 
to be addressed differently (World Bank 1996; World Bank 2004). 
The other key element of the economic reform agenda in Bosnia was the 
privatisation of pre-war industry, which can at best be described as 
unsatisfactory, at worst, a complete failure. Many observers point out that most 
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Bosnian policy makers as well as the international community assumed that once 
the war was over, the Bosnian economy would make a quick and painless 
transition to a market-oriented system, and that privatisation would be the 
panacea for the failing public sector enterprises and utility companies (Pugh 
2002; ESI 2004; Gallagher 2005). This was based on a shallow understanding of 
the pre-war economy in Bosnia, described as I' •• • relatively diversified, a well 
developed industrial base, ranking among the leaders of the region, and a highly 
educated labour force" (World Bank 2002, cited in ESI 2004: 15). This assessment 
failed to take into account, however, that Bosnia's pre-war industry was riddled 
with problems, such as outdated technology, huge workforces and large volumes 
of enterprise debt. It also underestimated the socio-economic impact of the war 
and the need for social protection for large sections of the population, at least in 
the short- to medium-term, as well as the interests of the nationalist elites in 
controlling the economy. The latter phenomenon has in particular been 
extremely damaging, as "ethnic privatisation" (Papic, as quoted in Pugh 2002: 
474) has taken root, and nationalist elites have taken over most of the pre-war 
enterprises and siphoned off their assets. Unsurprisingly, the number of serious 
investors willing to take on these enterprises has been few and far-between (ESI 
2004). 
The International Crisis Group has pointed out at regular intervals that while the 
flow of international aid to BiH is diminishing, a viable private sector is yet to 
emerge and there is little private investment - foreign or domestic (ICG 1999; 
leG 2001). This was confirmed in an evaluation conducted by the Bank's 
Operations Evaluations Department (OED) in 2004, which reported that the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the promotion of private-sector 
involvement in general, has been 'largely unsatisfactory' between 1996 and 2004 
(World Bank 2004). Other (clearly more independent) reflections are 
considerably more critical of the privatisation effort which was led by USAID, 
describing it as misguided and wholly unsuited to the context, a technical rather 
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than a political exercise, and more concerned with the fact of privatisation rather 
than the outcome (Donais 2002; Pugh 2002; Gallagher 2005). Gallagher states 
that: 
" a deeply inappropriate fonn of privatisation was imposed from 
1998 onwards. [ ... j Under a finnly neo-liberal economic agenda, it 
was assumed that privatisation would stimulate the economy and 
create accelerating social benefits. [ ... j The USAID plan allowed for 
no less than twelve privatisation agencies, one for the RS, one for the 
Federation and another for each of its cantons. Besides the 
opportunities for corruption, this unwieldy approach offered 
politicians the chance to confirm the effects of ethnic cleansing by 
means of ethnically exclusive privatisations. f. .. j A parasitic 
leadership grew even richer than it had been in wartime and acquired 
private title to much of the fonnerly socially owned economy." 
(Gallagher 2005: 139-140) 
The ESI report cited earlier reinforces this assessment and points out that the 
privatisation process had no benefits for the citizens: 
"The pn·vatisation process tumed into a costly charade [' . .J Granting 
citizens the right to acquire shares in companies which in many cases 
had negative asset value was a purely notional compensation. No 
effort was made to restructure companies in advance of the sale, and 
no system of privatisation through liquidation was established. 
Voucher pn"vatisation attracted neither new managers nor new capital 
to change the trajectory of the companies. "(ESI 2004: 17) 
The result is that local economies, to date, remain under the control of the major 
ethnic group in each area, unemployment is still high, and industrial output 
remains much lower than pre-war levels. The various assessments cited above 
point out that the neoliberal agenda promoted in Bosnia has failed to alleviate an 
already grim post-war socio-economic situation for the majority of the 
population, and has further concentrated power and wealth in the hands of 
nationalist elites. Effective economic transition and sustainable growth, thus, 
remain elusive ambitions for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Another important piece of the jigsaw in the transition from socialism to market 
economy is housing. Although the housing model of former Yugoslavia 
(discussed earlier) has collapsed, it is yet to be replaced by an effective or even 
functional housing strategy for the post-socialist states. Across the region, there 
has been an <: •. overwhelming emphasis on access to homeownership through 
privatisation with legislative action to ensure private property nghts in housing 
and other real estate" (Tsenkova 2005: 40). The same trend is also seen in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The Law on Privatisation of Apartments with Existing Tenure 
Rlghts was passed at the end of 1997, but it is vague in a number of respects and 
has proved difficult to implement. The privatisation of socially-owned 
apartments in urban areas has been restricted to sale of these flats to sitting 
tenants, which in fact has replicated the pre-war inequalities in terms of housing 
access (Petrovic 2001). 
The land and property registration system, though reformed by the Law on Land 
Registry of 2002, remains inadequate, and more than 40% of the country is 
estimated to lack a functional titling system (Tsenkova 2005: 42). New 
construction is hampered by the absence of plans, coupled with a range of 
systemic problems such as the lack of a functioning property registration system, 
a cumbersome building permit process, and the absence of transparent and 
consistent procedures for the auctioning of building land (Tsenkova 2005)56. As a 
result, illegal construction remains widespread, especially on the periphery of 
urban areas57• Furthermore, undeveloped municipal land is yet to be 
denationalised, which means that municipalities and cantons have the right to 
56 This is also borne out by field interview data. as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
57 Sarajevo is estimated to have about 20.000 illegal buildings. mainly due to the absence of master 
plans. which " ... contributes to corrupt practices and ad hoc decision-making in the development 
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allocate land through multiple means (lease, auction, outright sale), which would 
convert to ownership once construction has been completed (Tsenkova 2005)58. 
In Bosnia, the transition from a centralised and subsidised housing system to one 
which is based on private ownership and cost recovery has been further 
complicated by the effects of the war, including destruction of housing and 
property records, the large numbers of displaced persons, the weak and 
increasingly corrupt local institutions, the absence of plans, and, most 
importantly, the weak political will to address these problems. 
4.3.4 The emergence of new (international) actors 
The Bosnian post-war context is further complicated by the emergence of 
multiple external actors with powerful roles. Key among these is the Office of 
the High Representative, a position that was established under the Dayton 
Accords. Annex 10 of the Accords laid down the role of the High Representative 
(HR). As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the major responsibilities of 
the HR were to monitor and ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords, and 
coordinate the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies in BiH in the 
areas of humanitarian assistance; the rehabilitation of infrastructure and 
economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional 
institutions in BiH; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of 
displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of elections (General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995). 
As previously noted, over time, the Dayton-assigned mandate was reinterpreted 
to strengthen the position of the OHR in order to ensure compliance with the 
Accords. However, the last few years have also seen a steady decline in the 
number of decisions adopted by the High Representative (or the number of times 
the so-called Bonn Powers have been applied), with a gradual shift towards 
58 This is also one of the reasons why municipalities have been able to allocate extensive tracts of 
land to displaced persons without any oversight. This is discussed in greater detail in the context 
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decisions which mainly follow-up on policies agreed earlier (Ashdown 2007; 
Solioz 2007). 
The High Representative reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), 
which comprises all the key actors (countries as well as international 
organisations - 55 in all) who helped, in small or large measure, to bring peace to 
Bosnia through participation in the Dayton process. The international 
organisations involved in the PIC include, inter alia, the UN, NATO, UNHCR, 
OSCE, the World Bank, IMF, the European Commission and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The European Union clearly has a 
critical role in this structure, not least because of Bosnia's aspirations to join the 
EU. In 2002, the EU took on a stronger role in coordination of international 
efforts in Bosnia, as the chair of a new 'Board of Principals' established in 
Sarajevo to address day-to-day matters (Chandler 2006a). Since Paddy Ashdown's 
term, the High Representative also acts as EU Special Representative to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. A report on donor support to BiH between 1996-2002 points 
out that the European Union was the largest donor at the State level during this 
period, contributing over 50% of the total sum approved (UNDP BiH 2002), and 
in 2003, it provided half of OHR's operating budget (Chandler 2006a: 39). 
Apart from the High Representative, a number of other external actors also 
assumed important roles in the immediate aftermath of the war. Due to the high 
number of people displaced by the conflict and the ethnic cleansing 
accompanying it, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
was in the forefront of relief efforts. Between 1992-95, operating under 
extremely difficult and often dangerous conditions, UNHCR managed to deliver 
some 950,000 metric tonnes of humanitarian assistance to some 2.7 million 
beneficiaries in Bosnia. It was UNHCR's largest humanitarian operation ever 
(Cutts 1999). In the aftermath of the war, UNHCR was tasked with the 
implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords addressing issues relating to 
return of refugees and displaced persons. The agency's current mandate in BiH is 
162 
Chapter 4: Urban planning in pre- and post-war Bosnia 
to support the Government in providing protection for refugees and IDPs, and to 
facilitate their return and reintegration in their places of origin. Vlhile in the 
initial days after the war UNHCR undertook the task of housing repair and 
reconstruction to support the returns process, in 1999 the strategy of large-scale 
reconstruction and rehabilitation was abandoned in favour of capacity-building 
of local institutions to carry out these tasks (UNHCR 1999). 
Another important player in the reconstruction sector, particularly in the rural 
areas, was the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). In the 
initial phases after the conflict, ECHO was responsible for supporting the return 
and rehabilitation process led by UNHCR, as well as providing health and social 
services. It supported the distribution of food aid and funded public kitchens; 
distributed medical supplies and implemented social health programmes; and 
rehabilitated primary schools, health facilities and basic infrastructure such as 
water supply and gas in rural areas, in support of the returns process (ECHO 
2000). 
The political institution-building process, especially elections, was led by the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Dayton 
Accords assigned the OSCE responsibilities relating to elections, human rights 
and regional military stabilisation. Democracy-building was added subsequently. 
While its work on elections has been phased out with the successful 
establishment of the BiH Election Commission, the OSCE continues to play a 
leading role in the areas of democratisation, education, human rights and 
security co-operation (OSCE 2008). 
Other important actors following the war included the World Bank and the IMF, 
which, along with USAID, spearheaded the economic reform and privatisation 
process, and subsequently, the production of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) for the country. Bilateral aid was mostly directed at the Entity 
level, with the US as the leading donor to both FBiH and RS, followed by Japan. 
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Some of the large European donors such as the Netherlands concentrated their 
assistance in the Federation (UNDP BiH 2002). 
As the emergency phase gave way to recovery and development, agencies such as 
the UNDP also came to play an important role, as did international and local 
NGOs. In the year 2000, 173 international and 365 local NGOs were reported to 
be operating in BiH (du Pont 2002). The European Commission also diversified 
its support through the OBNOV A programme and other modalities. There is, 
however, little evidence of coordination, nor a vision or a strategy for planned 
intervention among these different actors (Skotte 2003; Hasic 2006). 
Clearly, the presence of such a wide range of actors, with diverse mandates and 
operational structures, required a high degree of coordination. In 2002, the 
coordinating mechanism of the international community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was revamped with a view to eliminate overlap and increase 
effectiveness. As mentioned above, a 'Board of Principals' was established to 
serve as the main coordinating body of International Community activity in BiH. 
The Board meets once a week in Sarajevo, and its permanent members are OHR, 
EUFOR, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, the European Union Police 
Mission in BiH (EUPM) and the European Commission. International financial 
institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP are also regular 
participants at the Board of Principals (Office of the High Representative 2007). 
While rehabilitation of housing and infrastructure has clearly been a priority for 
the international community in BiH, urban development and planning have 
hardly featured at all, even in the recovery and development phases. Between 
1996-2002, the sectors to receive highest assistance (donation and credit) at the 
Entity level were industry and social sectors in the Federation (housing came a 
distant fifth, and no mention was made of planning (or even local governance). 
In the Republika Srpska, the maximum assistance was directed to the areas of 
finance, followed by transport and communications in (urban planning did 
receive a mention, though it was clubbed with housing and environment and 
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about eighth in the list of priorities as indicated by available funding) (UNDP 
BiH 2002). 
4.4 Conclusion: Urbanisation, planning and conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
It is clear that the seeds of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were sown in 
different phases of the region's history, and that it was not simply 'ancient 
hatreds' but a combination of historical and contemporary factors that led to the 
war. The Ottoman empire is generally accepted as being tolerant, and its millet 
system did not encourage territorial-based claims from the different confessional 
groups. Yet, their differential treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims 
contributed to keeping the communities apart, and for a while this also led to an 
impression that cities were largely Muslim, islands of urbanity and home to 
educated elites and officials, while rural areas were occupied by Christian 
peasants only too happy to wage war on their urban oppressors. However, as 
more and more Christian Slavs moved to cities, and the Ottoman rulers 
encouraged the construction of public and religious buildings for different faiths, 
this perception gradually changed. At the same time, the cities came to acquire a 
distinct character which can be described as 'plural yet segmented'. This is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 where I use Boars framework to assess 
the level of assimilation, segmentation or polarisation in pre-war Mostar. 
The Austro-Hungarians, while allowing the Ottoman settlements to retain their 
defining characteristics, imposed their own planning systems and introduced grid 
iron layouts, wide roads and prominent public buildings in a combination of 
styles. They usually created separate zones to house their own military as well 
civilian administrators. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman towns existed side 
by side, but overlapped in places. Combined with the (admittedly few) imposing 
modem buildings added during the inter-war period, these gave Bosnian cities 
such as Sarajevo and Mostar a unique character. 
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Following the Second World War, the initial years of the Yugoslav era were 
characterised by a rejection (and often destruction) of any symbols or religious or 
ethnic affiliation. The rapid urbanisation, combined with the emphasis on 
egalitarianism, imposed a very communist, undiversified landscape on cities. In 
the wider regional context, industrialisation generated population shifts between 
rural and urban areas, as well as between republics. Although the strategy of 
industrialisation and planned urbanisation had aimed for reduction in inter-
regional inequalities, this goal was not achieved. Slovenia and Croatia grew 
richer, while Bosnia and other southern republics remained poor - as the gap 
widened, it fuelled resentment, particularly in the rich republics who felt they 
were subsidising their poor compatriots. Growing economic nationalism, in tum, 
fed ethnic nationalism. 
Some authors have argued that the process of rapid urbanisation destabilised 
both rural and urban societies, and ultimately when the war broke out, the 
various types and levels of divisions (inter-regional, intra-regional, inter-city, 
intra-city, and of course, inter-ethnic) simply came out into the open. In effect, 
this implies that cities were not only attacked from outside, they also imploded 
from within. This study views Mostar, which is touted by most as the model 
multicultural, multi-ethnic city in Bosnia, as reflective of this phenomenon. 
The plethora of international actors that took charge of Bosnia after the Dayton 
Accords clearly agreed on the immediate priorities of the international 
community in the aftermath of the war - stabilisation of the security situation, 
repair and reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, and the return and 
rehabilitation of displaced persons, were on top of the agenda. As if by consensus, 
they all discarded the Yugoslav era structures, institutions and policies as 
irrelevant and unsuited for the new Bosnian context, creating parallel structures 
to carry out assessments, disburse aid and manage the reconstruction process. 
Repairing and rebuilding housing for returnees was a clearly a priority, but most 
international organisations that addressed this issue did not even have separate 
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(and professional) units dealing with the housing sector. Furthermore, most of 
these activities were carried out with little consideration for their impact in the 
medium- or long-term. An emergency state of mind prevailed for long after the 
emergency phase. 
The revival of the economy, a key element of recovery efforts, hinged on a rather 
misguided privatisation programme that was driven by an external agenda rather 
than local circumstances. Once again, a contextually-relevant and locally-owned 
strategic vision was absent. Nowhere is this clearer than in the handling of public 
institutions (for example the planning and cadastral institutes), or the larger 
socially-owned industrial units, both of which could have been used (albeit with 
reform) as instruments to support economic recovery and facilitate 
reconciliation, but were instead deemed to be socialist-era relics with no 
relevance to the changed circumstances. 
Although many billions of dollars have been spent on post-war reconstruction in 
Bosnia, the international community clearly failed to do its homework, and 
therefore failed to address some of the fundamental causes of the conflict. 
Without an understanding of the interplay between economic development, the 
patterns of urbanisation, planning and conflict, the strategy for reconstruction, 
recovery and reconciliation cannot but be flawed. The analysis of the situation in 
Mostar in the following chapters aims to discuss this proposition further and 
draw some lessons. 
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5.0 Introduction 
This chapter narrates the story of Mostar, its evolution from a small town to a 
busy industrial centre, its destruction during the war, as well as attempts made 
towards its reconstruction and reunification. Based on published articles, 
unpublished reports and communications, data and statistics as well as field 
interviews, it also attempts to draw up a picture of the complex political scenario 
and governance arrangements before. during and after the conflict, before finally 
examining where Mostar stands to today. In conclusion, Boars framework is 
applied to assess whether Mostar was truly an 'assimilated' community before the 
war, how it has been changed by the war, and whether the mythical pre-war 
cosmopolitanism of Mostar was only confmed to a small urban core. which could 
not have possibly survived when encircled by nationalist forces on all sides. 
5.1 A small town on the Neretva 
Much has been written about Mostar during and after the end of the conflict in 
1994. Prior to the war, however. this model multi-cultural microcosm of 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina only received limited attention from 
historians. researchers, even architects and planners. Malcom's history of Bosnia. 
first published in 1994, mentions Mostar as a centre of resistance between the 
late 18th to early 19th centuries. a town "fiercely guarding" its political 
independence against the rule of the vizier (Malcolm 2002: 91). and a hub for 
later skirmishes as well. 
According to Pasic (2004; 2005). the development of the settlement of Mostar 
coincided with the arrival of the Ottomans in the Balkans - the document that 
first mentions Mostar is dated 1474. A number of authors describe the 
development of Mostar from a minor rural hamlet to a thriving urban settlement 
and the major city in the county of Herzegovina. within a few decades. 
emphasizing its culture of religious tolerance and its functioning as a 
multicultural entity (Puljit 1992; Yarwood 1999; Pasit 2004). The urban form 
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was characteristically Ottoman, with a clear division of business (' bazaar) and 
residential districts ('mahalla). The main street ran parallel to the Neretva, with 
winding narrow streets perpendicular to it leading down to the river. The bazaar 
in Mostar was the centre of manufacturing, commercial and social activity during 
the Ottoman period, and it is estimated that it attained its peak in the mid-
sixteenth century. The old bridge or the Stari Most, the best-known symbol of 
Mostar today, was also built at this time (1566). There are said to be eleven craft-
guilds in Mostar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the leather 
guild the most prominent and successful of these. The residential 
neighbourhoods extended across both banks of the Neretva, and along the 
Radobolje, at this time (Cadra 1992). 
By the eighteenth century, however, the town had begun to decline, mirroring 
perhaps the decline of the Ottoman empire as a whole. The Austro-Hungarians, 
who occupied the city in 1878, initiated its revival by establishing military zones 
to the north and south of the city, west of the old city, the Stari Grad This 
restricted development along the river in the North and South directions. 
Mountains on the east created a natural boundary. Hence the town could grow 
only towards the north-west, which was originally agricultural land (see Figure 
3). 
The Austro-Hungarians also revived the economic fortunes of the town by 
initiating industrial production in Mostar (Cupina, Dugalic et al. 1992). Industrial 
zones were created to the north-west of the city, and a new railway line 
connected the inner city to these (IRClCA 1997; Yarwood 1999; Pasic 2004). 
Along with timber and coal, attention was also paid to development of vineyards 
and the tobacco factory. In 1911, the construction of a power plant brought 
electricity to the city. In Austro-Hungarian times the present-day Bulevar was 
the line of the railroad tracks leading to the station. According to Plunz et al. 
(1998), "The tracks separated the city from the new garden extension to the west 
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that was the provin ce of th e A ustrJans"(p.1 4). 10,000 Austrian officials formed a 
new social group in the city . 
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Figure 3: Map showing the development of Mostar in 1878 (Source: UNESCO Old 
City nomination file. courtesy S. Demirovic. urban planner. Grad Mostar) 
During the rule of the Austro-Hungarians, Mostar also became the seat of the 
Diocese, and a number of prominent Catholic religious buildings came up. In 
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1866, the Church of St. Peter and Paul was built, followed by the construction of 
the monastery which was completed six years later. Other Catholic churches 
were also constructed subsequently. The new town was laid out according to 
European principles, with wide streets and boulevards, and single-family villas. 
The Rondo, the most prominent traffic hub on the western side, is an enduring 
example of the trend at the time. Six tree-lined streets emerge radially from the 
Rondo, and it is today a busy social and cultural nucleus for this part of the city. 
With all the development activity taking place outside the historic core, and new 
infrastructure and public facilities located in the new city centre on the western 
bank of the river, the flourishing old town began to die a natural death in the 
nineteenth century. It was only after 1977 that concerted efforts were initiated 
to restore, protect and revitalize the rich architectural heritage found in the 
historic core of the city (Cadra 1992). 
While the inter-war period was generally characterised by stagnation in urban 
and industrial development, bauxite mining became a prominent activity in 
Herzegovina during this period. Mter the end of the Second W orId War, in the 
Yugoslav era, industrial development proceeded apace with the establishment of 
a variety of industries in and around Mostar, including lumber, tobacco, cotton, 
the aluminium smelter 'Aluminij: automobile and aircraft manufacturing 
company 'Soko: Hercegovina auto, wine-making, and others. The Mostar region 
was horne to a large proportion of the vineyards in BiH, which occupied an area 
of about 5000 hectares along the Neretva river. 40 per cent of this area was 
controlled by HEPOK, an agro-combine which produced about 96 percent of 
commercial wine, and remaining area was composed of small private vineyards 
(ESI 2004). A number of hydro-electric power plants were also established on the 
Neretva during this period. Housing for the employees of various enterprises, 
public and semi-public, was provided by the employers. The 1970s and 1980s 
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Figure 4 illustrates the different phases of development of Mostar since the 
Ottoman era, until 1997. 
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Figure 4: Historical development of Mostar since the Ottoman period, unti11997 (Source: 
Grad Mostar. counesy Z. Bosnjak. urban planner) 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Bosnia, and within the republic the area 
around Mostar, was also an important military centre. Not only did it house the 
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'Vazduhoplovna Gymnasia Josip Marsal Tito: based in the southern part of the 
city. Young boys who wanted to attend military school were trained in this 
Gymnasium. JNA garrisons also existed to the north and south of the city (Bozic, 
in terview )59. 
During the Yugoslav era, because of the aforementioned factors, migration to the 
municipality of Mostar from surrounding rural areas increased considerably. 
According to the 1991 census, the municipality had 126,668 residents, of which 
75865 lived within the urban core. According to Yarwood (1999), just before the 
war, there were 43866 workers in the city, of whom nearly 40 per cent were 
employed in industry (See Figures 5-7). 
NASELJENOST 
MOSTARA 1991 . go 
_ 75865 st. 
_ 2500 -4500 
_ 1000 - 2500 
L 800 -1000 
500 - 800 
_ 300 -500 
_ 100 - 300 
_ < 10051 
1 0~:-----:,:1:0 000::::----::20:-J.:~OO=---~JO~.,a 
Figure 5: Boundaries of Mostar municipality and the total 
population of various settlements within, 1991 (Source: Grad Mostar, 
courtesy Z. Bosnjak, urban planner) 
59 This was the reason why lots of military-educated Serbs lived in Mostar. It also partly explains 
the presence ofJNA troops in such large numbers in and around Mostar when the war broke out 
(Bozic, interview). 
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Figure 6: Population growth of Mostar, 1948-91 (Source: FZS 2008) 
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Figure 7: Pre-war employment breakdown in Mostar, 1991 (Source: City of 
Mostar 2003) 
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5.2 Destruction and Division 
As per the 1991 census, of the pre-war population of 126,668 in Mostar, 34 
percent were Muslim, 29 percent Croat, 19 percent Serb, with the remaining 
population identifying themselves as 'Yugoslav' or others (Yarwood 1999)£,0. Most 
authors observe that prior to 1992, while the Serb, Croat and Muslim populations 
did live largely separately, all three communities were found on both sides of the 
river, and "there were no ethnic ghettos in the city" (Yarwood 1999: 3), 
especially within the urban core. The east bank's 30,000 residents included 6,000 
Croats. The west bank's population of over 45,000 included about 15,000 
Bosniacs (Bose 2002). However, in the Donja Mahala and Luka II communities, 
east of the river, the Muslims constituted over 60 percent of the inhabitants, and 
over 50% Croats were resident in Zahum and Rudnik, to the west (Yarwood 
1999). Figure 8 shows the distribution of different national groups within the 
urban core. One of the key reasons for the mixed population of this area was the 
provision of housing by the employers: 
'[In this period], the organisation/enterpnses where [people1 were 
working gave them an opportunity to get an apartment. So they got it 
from the enterprise where they worked They moved from here [east1 
to there [west1 because that area was used at that time for 
urbanisation. So it was all mixed "(Demirovic, interview) 
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of national groups over the total area of the 
municipality. The outlying rural communities were quite clearly dominated by 
one ethnic group or another. This pattern seems to be reflective of that observed 
all over BiH. According to an OHR official: 
'Tn this country. dunng the war, the proponents of Bill spent an 
awful lot of time and emotion talking about what a wonderful multi-
cultural, multi-national, multi-, multi- state it had been, but actually 
60 However, a recent document of the International Crisis Group suggests that ..... the bulk of 
those who refused to identify themselves [in the 1991 census], up to 12 per cent, would today 
self-identify as Bosniaks. If true, this means that Bosniaks outnumbered Croats by about four to 
three before the war. "(ICG 2009: 2) 
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it was true only of the cities. Because barnng a few exceptions, the 
countryside was al ways h om ogen eous, on e confession -based. We 
really didn 't have very m any villages or sm all towns which were 
mixed. "(Wheeler, interview) 
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Figure 8: National distribution of population in the urban core of 
Mostar. Hrvao' - Croats; Bolnjaci - Bosniacs; Srbi - Serbs; Jugosloveni 
- Yugoslavs; Ostali - Others. (Source: Grad Mostar . courtesy Z. Bosnjak. urban 
planner) 
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Conflict, nationalist or otherwise, did not come to Mostar all of a sudden in 1992. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Malcolm's history points towards Mostar 
as a centre of resistance to Bosnian viziers as well as the Austro-Hungarians , and 
a hub of conflict between various religious groupings, since the 18th century. 
During the Second World War, hundreds of Serbs are said to have been arrested 
by the Ustasa (Croatian nationalist forces) in Mostar and shot before being 
thrown in the river Neretva (Malcolm 2002). The Muslims were not directly 
targeted by the Croatian forces in the war, but were disillusioned at their 
populations not being protected as promised. However, acts of violence by the 
Serbs against Muslims also didn't permit these forces to join hands against the 
Croats. '/1 terrible sy stem of mutually-fuelled enmities was now at work" 
(Malcolm 2002: 188). 
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Figure 9: National distribution of population across Mostar municipality, 
1981 and 1991. Hrvata - Croats; Bosnjaka -Bosniacs; Srba -Serbs; 
Jugoslovena - Yugoslavs; Ostalih - Others. (Source: Grad Mastar, courtesy Z. 
Bosnjak. urban planner) 
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In 1992, a group of Bosniac and Croat architects and planners put together a 
publication titled 'Mostar'92 - Urbicid~ which documents in some detail the 
historic evolution and characteristics of the city, as well as the damage sustained 
in the early stages of the war. In recognition of its unique architectural heritage 
in 1986, the old city of Mostar had been conferred the Aga Khan Award, which 
was a source of great pride for all Mostarian architects. They labelled the 
destruction of Mostar in the war as • urbicid: which became a precursor to the 
concept of urbicide - the deliberate destruction of the urban and what it 
symbolises - diversity and cosmopolitanism (Prodanovic 2002; Coward 2004)61. 
Indeed, over a period of eighteen months between 1992 and 1994. Mostar 
seemed to have witnessed an extreme form of urbicide. Historic monuments, 
religious buildings and cultural symbols were apparently deliberately targeted. 
2000 persons had been killed, 26,000 displaced. over 5,000 buildings damaged or 
ruined, all 10 bridges destroyed (nine by the Serbs, and the Stari Most by the 
Croats) and the urban infrastructure shattered (EC 1998; Yarwood 1999). 
Lying at the heart of one of the two mixed Cantons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
straddling the Neretva river, the city of Mostar was battered by the conflict. The 
Serb-led Yugoslav National Army UNA) started shelling Mostar in May and June 
1992, but soon after the Serbs were expelled by a Muslim-Croat alliance, the 
former allies turned on each other. The Croats aimed to cleanse the city of the 
Muslims and establish it as the capital of Herceg-Bosna (Bose 2002). As the 
Muslims resisted, they were driven out of west Mostar into the areas east of the 
Bulevar, which became the frontline between the Croats and Muslims (see 
Figure 10). East Mostar suffered the greatest destruction due to the two 
offensives, along with the central core of the city - the area around the Bulevar. 
The city was clearly divided into two - Muslims were driven from western 
Mostar and Croats from the east. The Serbs fled the town entirely. In November 
1993, an event occurred that symbolised this complete and (at the time) 
61 A more comprehensive discussion on urbicide appears in Chapter 1. 
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irreversible breakdown of relations between the two communities, and captured 
the attention of the world. The old bridge of Mostar - the Stan' Most, built in 
1566 - was brought down by an artillery unit from the Croatian side. 
'In a war in which multi-ethnicity was itself the enemy, the 
destruction of the bridge appeared to mirror that of the multi-ethnic 
ideal of Bosnia - a place almost defined by bridge buiiding- between 
communities} between nationalities} between faiths. JJ (Silber and 
Little 1996: 291) 
Figure 10: 1994 map of Mostar showing the division of the city along the river and the 
Bulevar (Source: Grad Mostar. courtesy Z. Bosnjak. urban planner) 
The division of Mostar into Croat and Bosniac enclaves, to the west and the east 
of the river, respectively, was seen by many as the most significant outcome of 
the war in Herzegovina. Prior to 1991 , Mostar had a mixed population, the 
highest number of mixed marriages in fonner Yugoslavia62 , and the three 
62 Botev (1994), however, suggests that intermarriage was not such a widespread phenomenon in 
Yugoslavia, and had seen a decline in Bosnia between 1962 and 1989. Also. throughout th is 
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communities shared a common social and cultural life. Richard Plunz recalls that 
during his first visit to Mostar, in 1969, he found (I ••• an orderly, well-functioning 
and integrated urban entity in which three religions with all their traditions and 
symbols co-existed side-by-side" (Plunz 1998: 7). In fact, most authors, usually 
relying on secondary information or on their own pre-war impressions of 
Mostar, weave a similarly idyllic picture of the city, and end it with a 
metaphorical shake of the head, conveying an inability to understand the tragic 
destiny of this model Yugoslav city. As the tone indicates, clearly, since its 
division, the city seems to have lost much of its "multi-" character - it is 
apparendy no longer multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural in the way that 
it was before the war (Yarwood 1999; Bose 2002; Coward 2004). The 
international community's push for the reunification of Mostar seems to be based 
on this superficial understanding of the conflict, its origins, manifestations and 
impact. 
Mostar has also found its place in the discourse on divided cities, which has 
become increasingly fashionable in recent years. Many authors have attempted 
to address the nature and impact of divisions in cities such as Johannesburg, 
Nicosia, Beirut, Jerusalem as well as Mostar, drawing comparisons, and proposing 
urban policy as well as design tools to reunify them (see Davie 1993; Khalaf and 
Khoury 1993; Yiftachel 1995; Makdisi 1997b; Bollens 2000; Yiftachel 2000; Beall, 
Crankshaw et al. 2002; Charlesworth 2003; Bollens 2006; Maka~ 2006; Pullan, 
Misselwitz et al. 2007). 
period, the percentage of intermarriage in BiH consistently remained lower than the national 
(Yugoslav) average (11.9 percent in BiH against 13.0 percent for Yugoslavia, during the last 
reported period of 1987-89 - p.469). Botev's model also suggests that in BiH, both Croats and 
Serbs are more endogamous than they are in other republics. Muslims are less so, but even then. 
he claims that " ... the three communities now at war have remained very much closed 
(endogamous) during the period under study. "(p.47S) He views large urban centres such as 
Sarajevo and Mostar as aberrations. He also questions the usefulness of exogamy as an indicator of 
social integration. pointing out that if this was indeed so. Yugoslavia (and indeed BiR and 
Mostar) would not have disintegrated so quickly. 
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Bollens' and Charlesworth's work on divided cities, and on Mostar in particular, 
merits some elaboration. Bollens suggests in his work on Belfast, Johannesburg 
and Jerusalem that planners can play neutral, partisan, equity-oriented or 
conflict-resolving roles in divided cities (Bollens 1998; 2000). In his more recent 
research, focusing on Sarajevo and Mostar, he suggests that cities can playa 
"peace-constitutive role" (Bollens 20~6: 68), that is, contribute to reconciliation 
and peace-building at national levels, and that urbanism can somehow overcome 
the fault-lines that emerge and become entrenched in the aftermath of ethnic 
conflict. He also proposes that urban planning and policymaking, along with 
design of the urban built environment, can " ... create physical and psychological 
city spaces conducive to inter-group co-existence" (p. 74). This is certainly a 
laudable aspiration. The present research supports Bollens' argument that the 
international community missed the initial window of opportunity to use urban 
policy-making to sow the seeds of peace in Mostar, as a result of which the city 
remains divided and its communities, polarised (Bollens 2006). However, his 
limited emphasis on (a) past urban planning approaches, legal and institutional 
systems, and the possible constraints of 'path dependency'; (b) the limitations of 
the international community (conceptual as well as programmatic, as well as 
international realpolitik); and (c) the determination of local elites to wrest and 
retain control of the planning function, only serve to highlight the superficial 
nature of the 'peace-constitutive' goal he ascribes to cities, and the suggested 
strategies that accompany it, including, for instance, flexibility and porosity of 
the urban form, equity planning, sensitivity to urban ethnic homelands, and 
diffusion of grassroots peacebuilding (p. 135). 
Like Bollens, Charlesworth too places architects at the core of her recent 
research on divided cities (Charlesworth 2003), which seems unrealistic as 
architects are not the only solution-providers, or even the only "mediators", in a 
post-war reconstruction process. She fails to examine the governance context 
adequately in each of the cities examined in her research (Beirut, Nicosia and 
182 
Chapter 5: Destruction and reconstruction of Afostar: myThs, facts, interpretations 
Mostar) - the legal-political-institutional basis for planning in the divided cities; 
the legislation formulated in the aftermath of the war and (particularly in case of 
Mostar) following the transition from a socialist to a market economy; or the role 
of local governments in developing and implementing plans, enforcing zoning 
regulations and building bylaws, and allocating land and other public resources. 
Although she touches upon the issue of divided local governments (especially in 
the case of Mostar and Nicosia), this is all too brief, avoiding any discussion on 
the impact this has on the city's administration, economy, planning and 
reconstruction process, etc. The present study, with its focus on transitional 
administrations, and their approach to post-war reconstruction and urban 
planning, thus differs significantly from the work of these two prominent 
contributors in the area of 'divided cities'. 
5.3 Pre- and post-war politics and governance 
5.3.1 Local govemaDce systems in former Yugoslavia 
As touched upon briefly in the chapter on planning, the governance and 
economic systems went through three distinct phases in post World War-II 
Yugoslavia. The first phase, between 1947-65, was characterised by a distinct 
communist ideology (despite Yugoslavia's break with Stalinism as early as 1948) 
and heavily centralised decision-making. Land development and provision of 
housing were also state functions (Nedovic-Budic and Vujosevic 2004). From 
1963 onwards, however, a series of reforms were introduced, and firmly 
established through constitutional amendments and changes to party statutes, 
and eventually, a new constitution in 1974 (Woodward 1989). There are many 
different views as to what were the factors that triggered these reforms, 
including an intention to democratise or federalise, or to separate the party from 
state institutions, to end Serb domination, or counteract the economic slowdown 
that was facing the country through a process of liberalisation {Carter 1982, Burg 
1983, Cohen and Warwick 1983, Estrin 1983, Banac 1984 - all cited in 
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Woodward 1989). Discussing these factors in detail is neither the aim nor within 
the scope of this thesis. However, the ultimate impact of these reforms is relevant 
- they led to the transfer of significant degrees of authority from the state to the 
lower levels, i.e. to the republics and communes. Each republic built up its own 
system and institutions, including, for instance, a central bank, educational 
system, judiciary and police (Cousens and Cater 2001). The significantly 
decentralised decision -making was also reflected in the planning arena - social, 
economic as well as spatial planning were now firmly controlled by the republics 
and local communities. The Federal level still determined the broad policy 
parameters, but the details were left to the lower levels, and greater participation 
of the population was envisaged in the process (Vujosevic and Nedovic-Budic 
2006). Another round of economic reforms was once again undertaken in the 
early 1980s. By the end of that decade, however, the reforms had failed, the 
economic and political differences between the republics had vastly increased, 
and the spatio-economic planning system was largely dysfunctional, trapped in 
the long and complicated procedures designed to ensure coherence among the 
different levels of plans and to encourage individual and group participation at all 
levels and stages. 
This was also a time of political turmoil, as discussed in Chapter 3, as the 
economic and national differences between the Republics, which dated from the 
pre-Yugoslav era, became increasingly prominent. Calls for increased 
democratisation had led to brutal crackdowns by the communist party on the 
opposition, and questions of national interest were raised again and again, 
eventually resulting in the break-up of the country. 
Against this troubled backdrop, the first multi-party elections were held in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. At the national level, a coalition of Muslim, 
Croatian and Serb nationalist parties came to power after beating the 
communists. At the city level, in Mostar, the Croatian Democratic Community of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZBiH) won a majority and Milivoje Gagro was 
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appointed as the Mayor. The HDZBiH ruled in a coalition with the Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA), which was later to become the main 'Bosniac' party. It 
was only towards the end of 1991 that the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna 
(HZHB) was proclaimed as a 'political, cultural, economic and territorial union' 
of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia Report 1996), later to be 
transformed into a virtual statelet 'Herceg-Bosna', comprising of western 
Herzegovina and central Bosnia, with eventual plans of secession and annexation 
to Croatia. 
Towards the end of 1992, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which was 
organised and controlled by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and which 
in the war against the Serbs had comprised both Bosniacs and Croats, purged 
Bosniacs from its ranks. At this stage the assorted Bosniac militia units as well as 
the expelled Bosniac fighters joined hands to form the Army of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (ABiH). The HVO and the ABiH eventually became the main 
protagonists in the Croat-Muslim war, which left the city indelibly divided. 
5.3.2 Governance and politics in Mostar during the war (1992-94) 
During the war between the Croats and Muslims, along with the physical divide, 
the city administration also split into two. Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999) 
provide a fascinating account of the 'politico-military connection' during the war 
years which made this division brutal and complete. In the early days, a 
heterogeneous political group, loyal to the BiH government in Sarajevo, was 
established around the municipal government's crisis headquarters (in the east). 
However, this formation, led by the SDA, did not survive for long. As the 
conflict progressed, the original population of Mostar left in large numbers, and 
were replaced by refugees from the surrounding areas who were fleeing ethnic 
cleansing, and who, guided largely by their nationalist leaders, converged in 
areas where their community was in a majority (Heimerl 2006)63. 
63 This was reinforced in many field interviews, for example by Behram, Bo~ic and Omanovic. 
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As part of this process, the municipalities of west and east Mostar were 
established, with a Croat (Mijo Brajkovic) and a Bosniac Mayor (Safet Orucevic), 
respectively. All institutions, political or social, as well as economic enterprises 
on the west, were physically captured by the Croats, and purged of Bosniacs. The 
HVO created its own police force, and rather quickly began to assume all 
characteristics and responsibilities of the state. Even when a ceasefire was 
eventually agreed in 1994, and the Washington Agreement was negotiated, the 
HVO continued to insist that the EU protectorate be established only for east 
Mostar, and that the western part of the city be designated as the capital of 
Herceg-Bosna (Bo~ic, interview). And although it signed the Washington 
Agreement and all subsequent agreements, it continued to obstruct their 
implementation and block any moves that could lead to the reunification of the 
city (Bosnia Report 1996; Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999). 
5.3.3 Post-war governance, 1994-till date 
EUAM and the Interim Statute 
As briefly touched upon in the discussion on transitional administrations, the 
Washington Agreement included a provision for the administration of Mostar by 
an EU Administrator, for a period of up to two years. On 24 March 1994, the 
German politician Hans Koschnik, a former Mayor of Bremen from the Social-
Democrat Party, was appointed the European Union's Administrator for Mostar. 
The next agreement followed in July 1994 in Geneva, when a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) was signed to empower the European Union (EU) to 
administer Mostar until the parties themselves could agree to a more permanent 
solution. This MoU was concluded between the Member States of the European 
Union, Member States of the Western European Union, the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Local 
Administration of Mostar East and the Local Administration of Mostar West and 
Bosnian Croats (Stahn 2008). 
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The EUs motivation for intervening in the Bosnian crisis stemmed mainly from 
its political interest in testing its newly-fashioned Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), of which the European Community nations had extremely high 
expectations (Reichel 2000; Juncos 2005)64. It was the first 'joint action' by the 
EU members states under the framework of the CFSP, but was based on an MoU 
because the EU lacked the legal capacity to conclude any formal agreements 
(Stahn 2008)fi5. 
Many of the principles set forth in the Washington and Geneva documents 
formed the basis for later agreements, in particular the Rome Agreement and 
the Interim Statute for Mostar (February 1996), whose provisions superseded 
those of the Geneva MoU. A report by the International Crisis Group (leG 2000) 
provides the complete list of all agreements relating to Mostar. The main goal, 
which was reaffirmed in each of these documents, was the establishment of a 
multi-ethnic, unified Mostar. A video documentary on the work of the EUAM 
describes the objectives of the Administration as (a) providing a unified 
administration for the city, (b) starting the process of reconstruction and returns, 
and (c) bringing life back to normal in the city (EC year unknown). To what 
extent each of these goals were achieved, is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
The Administration had a complex structure. As per the provisions of the MoU, 
the Administrator was obliged to comply with domestic law, and to operate in 
consultation with local parties. Thus the Administrator had three principal 
64 Juncos describes how the EC initially adopted a high profile in the Yugoslav conflict. leading 
the international response and successfully negotiating a ceasefire in Slovenia. In the case of BiH, 
however, which was far more complex, ~ .. The inability to act and even agree on a common line 
dun'ng the first stages of the crisis [ ... J showed the limitations of the newly created CFSP. As the 
conflict intensified, the EC was progressively marginalised by the intervention of other 
international actors, primarily the UN" Uuncos 2005: 95). However, the EC continued to provide 
diplomatic and humanitarian support with the framework of the UN, and also took on the 
responsibility for administering Mostar, with mixed results. 
fi5 Around the same time, checkpoints between east and west Mostar became functional, and 
residents of the two sides were permitted to meet at the demarcation line and talk for two hours. 
Even this permission was granted only to 50 civilians per day (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999). 
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advisers who counselled him virtually on a daily basis - these were the Mayor of 
West Mostar, the Mayor of East Mostar, and a Serb. In addition, he also had eight 
other advisers who guided him on major issues such as refugees, military affairs, 
press and media etc. There were eight departments, viz., city administration, 
finance and taxes, reconstruction, economic and transport infrastructure, 
education and culture, health and social services, public order, and cultural life, 
youth and sports (formed later). Each departmental head had been seconded by 
an EU country, and he/she had two co-heads, a Bosniac and a Croat (EUAM 
1998). In effect, it meant that each departmental head came from a different 
context, was often a political appointee, and had to manage many bosses, which 
didn't augur well for consistency or coherence in policy-making and 
implementation (Yarwood, interview)66. 
While the Administration worked with representatives of both east and west 
Mostar, there were attempts to use the reconstruction process as both a carrot 
and stick towards reunification. In 1996, in an attempt to soften the 'bipolar 
division' of the city (Yetters 2007), the Administration proposed that the 
territory of the former municipality of Mostar, including the town and the 
hinterland surrounding it, be divided into six units of local self-government, or 
"City-Municipalities" (three each with Croat and Bosniac majority), and one 
central zone (under the control of a 'neutral' central city administration). The 
size of the central zone was initially substantial (covering a significant portion of 
the urban core of the municipality on the west as well as the east), but was later 
drastically reduced under Croatian pressure67• This concept was incorporated in 
the Interim Statute for the City of Mostar, devised by EUAM and heavily 
negotiated among all parties, which was published in February 1996. 
66 For a full description of the institutional structure of EUAM, its politico-legal basis and political 
constraints, see Stahn (2008), pp. 301-308. 
67 One of the fallouts of this was extensive rioting by the Croats. and the resignation of Hans 
Koschnik, who felt his position had become untenable due to the lack of support from his 
political masters (Yarwood 1999). 
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The Interim Statute of 1996 charged the (overarching) city administration with 
land allocation and development functions throughout the city, including 
exclusive competence for urban planning and preventing unregulated 
construction and reconstruction, as well as other functions such as finance and 
tax policy, infrastructure, economic policy, public transport and the Mostar 
airport (Interim Statute of the City of Mostar 1996). The City-Municipalities 
were to be responsible for all other issues which fell within municipal 
competence. The result, however, was the six ethnically-based City-
Municipalities became powerful entities in themselves, and when it suited them, 
the three city-municipalities on the Croat side and the three on the Bosniac side 
joined hands along the same lines as the former west and east Mostar. 
"The lawyer from Germany [who was facilitating the discussion} said, 
lets form 'Viestadt" which is the City, and then lets form the city-
areas' - but city-municipalities is something completely different. 
They had this executive level, legislative level, they were like small 
kingdoms within the city... they simply turned into six big city 
administrations. Each of these city-municipalities had its own head, 
the head had its awn administration, they had their own budget ... De 
facto, the city had two parts, the situation continued [as before]. but 
we had a bigger administration. "(Bofic, interview) 
The statute remained unchanged until 2004, during which time the city-
municipalities established cumbersome and expensive administrations, ignoring 
the City government and its prerogatives. Under such circumstances, even all the 
elements of the Interim Statute could not be implemented. 
Indeed, between 1997 and 2003, Mostar seems to have dropped off the 
international radar. Richard Williams, former head of the Mostar 
Implementation Unit, offers the following explanation: 
"These things are ve.ry personality-dependent. In OHR, not much 
happened untl1 Paddy Ashdown came along. That power and dn've 
were crucial. Siml1arly in Mostar, all these guys [heads of OHR-
South} who came after Martin Garrod were extremely weak [ ... } 
Men an appointment came up, names were floated by different 
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countries. So they were not appointed based on competence, but 
because their country felt they could be appointed And there was 
also the element of 'whose tum is it this time?'" (Williams, interview) 
During these seven years, while the OHR-South office failed to act, the six City-
Municipalities took over key functions of the City of Mostar, in particular those 
relating to urban planning, handing out building permits and making land use 
changes at will, allowing construction in contravention of the old spatial plan 
provisions, supporting the construction of controversial religious structures, or 
simply selling off public land to private investors. The City-Municipalities also 
made encroachments into the central zone, often ignoring the existing master 
plan regulations. Each of the six City-Municipalities had established their own 
urbanism departments, and were supported 'technically' by two Spatial Planning 
Institutes - Urbing on the west side, and Urbanisticki Zavod on the east. These 
aspects are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
An internal memo of the OHR-South office observed in 2004 that the biggest 
problems in the City of Mostar were the illegal appropriation of land and illegal 
constructions, which had resulted in huge revenue losses to the city as well as a 
significant deterioration of the urban environment (OHR-South 2004). However, 
the OHR's lack of understanding of the political nature of planning was reflected 
in a column written in February 2007 by then OHR Christian Schwarz-Schilling: 
"The only viable future for Mostar is as a unified city, with a modem 
and efficient admimstration capable of keeping the peace, running 
competitive services, and attracting investment that will create jobs and 
eliminate poverty. Yet the City Council has failed to nominate 
members to the Commission that issues Professional Assessments, even 
though the work of this body is predominantly technical and aimed at 
improving Mostar's urban-planning process! ... JI do not believe anyone 
seriously believes that the urban-pJa.nni.ng process is a matter of 
'national interest~ "(Schwarz-Schilling 2007, emphasis added)68 
68 'National interest' is a very specific term used in the consociational system applied in Bosnia. 
whereby political representatives of the different national groups can veto any decision (at local, 
entity or state level) citing negative implications for their 'national interest.' 
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Elections and local politics 
The post-Dayton federal system in Bosnia is complex and multi-layered. The 
Federation, which is of primary concern to this thesis, is divided into ten 
cantons. There are a total of seventy-three municipalities under these ten 
cantons. The entity-level government has very little direct dealing with the 
municipalities, as defined by the Federal Law on Local Self-Government. Each 
Canton has defined its own local government regulations, including those 
relating to local government functions, financing, municipal administrative 
organs, municipal property, local taxes etc Gokay 2001). In Mostar, however, 
these have been further defined by the successive Statutes of 1996 and 2004. 
The first local election was held in Mostar in June 1996, under the auspices of the 
EUAM. The Interim Statute had drawn up the complex electoral system and 
local governance arrangements for the City of Mostar and the City-
Municipalities, based on proportional representation, with the aim of preventing 
dominance of any single group, and encouraging cross-national cooperation in 
the Councils. However, the international community's hopes that early elections 
would establish local 'democracy' proved to be misplaced, as the nationalist 
parties from both sides (HDZ and SDA) won 95 percent of the vote. Twenty one 
seats went to the SDA coalition, and sixteen to the HDZ. The HDZ refused to 
accept the results, citing irregularities in the election. In a compromise solution, 
the HDZ was offered the post of the Mayor. Elections to the six City-
Municipalities also produced similar controversial results, and the formation of 
governments in the three western City-Municipalities was blocked by the HDZ 
until 1997. In September 1997, local elections were once again held in Mostar, 
along with similar elections across BiH. Once again, the results were along 
predictable national fault lines (Klemencic and Schofield 1996; Bose 2002; Bose 
2003). This trend continued until the 2004 Statute came into force69, which 
69 See pages 195-196 for a discussion on how the 2004 Statute came to be passed. 
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stipulated that 17 councillors would be elected on a city-wide list, and three from 
each of the six electoral districts (erstwhile city-municipalities). The Mayor 
would be elected indirectly, from among the elected Councillors, unlike in other 
municipalities across the country (OHR 2004). 
In the latest elections in October 2008, the second to be organised after the 
imposition of the reunification statute, the SDA emerged as the largest party, 
increasing its seats from 10 to 12. The HDZBiH won only 7 seats for itself, with 
the Croat coalition down to 11 seats from the previously held 14. Although it had 
been agreed prior to the election that the presumptive Croat candidate (Ljubo 
BeSlic, the outgoing Mayor) would be supported by all parties for a second terrn70, 
the SDA's powerful showing altered the facts on the ground, and a major power 
struggle was set in motion, which is till date unresolved (OHR-South 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, the politics-business nexus has also played an important role in 
Mostar since 1996. The leading post-war politician in east Mostar was Safet 
Orucevic, who was a prominent leader of military resistance in east Mostar and 
rose through the SDA ranks during the war. Prior to the conflict he was a private 
entrepreneur involved in the 'slot machine and pool hall business' (Bjelakovic 
and Strazzari 1999: 96). However, as he was 'originally' from Mostar and had 
remained there during the conflict, taking over as Mayor when the city 
administration split, he had earned the respect of the east Mostar community and 
was voted into power in both the 1996 and 1997 elections. He still retains control 
of a large number of properties and businesses in Mostar. 
"Orueevie had bUJ1t up a private property empire in the east. He 
controlled a lot of building construction that went on in the Stari 
Grad, right from Amir Pa/ies time, and also under Koschnik. He was 
heavily involved in the allocation of building permits on the east side. 
He made a lot of money and had real power and influence. He has a 
lot of business interests, protection money and that sort of thing, and 
70 The agreement on a Croat mayor in Mostar was pan of a wider power-sharing arrangement in 
the FBiH, in which it has been generally accepted that Bosniaks "get" Sarajevo and Croats "get" 
Mostar (OHR-South 2009). 
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still pulls a lot of strings though he claims to have withdrawn from 
political life. "(Williams, interview) 
In west Mostar, in contrast, the post-war leaders came from the wider 
Herzegovina region - they 'did not originate from Mostar and did not represent 
the interests of the Mostar citizens' (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 95), a fact 
repeatedly and bitterly cited by a number of respondents during the course of 
this field research. These leaders also exerted direct control on the economy of 
west Mostar. Mijo Brajkovic, who held the position of Mayor of West Mostar 
when the EUAM carne to Mostar, took over the company 'Aluminij' during the 
war, purged it of Bosniac employees, revived it with Croatian and other foreign 
capital, and eventually reopened it as a Croat-only company. Other companies 
such as the Hercegovina Gradnja, Soko, INA-BiH, as well as the Hercegovacka 
Banka are also controlled by senior HDZ/Croat politicians, as are major telecom 
and energy providers (ICG 2000; ICG 2001; Donais 2002; Pugh 2002; Bose 2003). 
'Irresponsible and questionable' foreign investments have only served to 
strengthen the hands of powerful elites, particularly in Herzegovina and west 
Mostar, and served their objectives of keeping the city physically and 
economically divided (leG 2000: 3). The rush to privatise, while the ethnic 
loyalties were extremely strong and assets were controlled by powerful 
nationalist politicians on either side, obviously benefitted the politician-
businessman nexus. As this process was executed along ethnic lines, it has also 
resulted in growing disparity in employment and economic conditions between 
the two sides. This aspect is discussed in further detail in Section 7.2 under the 
theme 'Threats to reunification.' 
Office of the High Representative (OHR) and its instruments 
Following the first post-war municipal elections in Mostar, in September 1996, 
the EUAM Office was transformed into the Office of the Special Envoy for 
Mostar (OSEM), which existed until the opening of the Regional Office of the 
High Representative (OHR-South) in Mostar in January 1997. Between 1997 and 
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2003, however, Mostar did not feature prominently on the international 
community's agenda as it struggled to contain Republika Srpska, whose 
politicians were becoming increasingly belligerent (Wheeler, interview). 
In 2002, when Paddy Ashdown took over as the High Representative, Mostar 
was still '~"a festenng wound, ever since the Koschnik days" (Wheeler, 
interview). Following the appointment of Ashdown, Mostar reappeared on the 
OHR's radar. According to Richard Williams: 
liThe problem facing Ashdown was that BiH couldn't go into the EU 
accession process or the NATO partnership (i.e. economic/poNtieal 
and military integration, respectively, with the rest of the world), 
with niggling problems such as Mostar or Republika Srpska, basieally 
with the country still so badly divided So, RS had to be brought into 
line, and Mostar had to be reunified "(Williams, interview) 
In April 2003, Ashdown appointed the 'Mostar Commission' to propose reform of 
the Interim Statute of Mostar. Members of the Commission were appointed by 
the Mayor and Deputy Mayor while the OHR and OSCE served as its secretariat. 
However, this Commission failed to corne to any conclusion, and was eventually 
disbanded. In September 2003, a new body, the "Commission for the Reforming 
the City of Mostar" was established by the OHR, with the former Mayor of the 
German city of Ruesselsheim Norbert Winterstein as its chairperson. The aim 
was to "".stabilise the situation prior to the municipal elections, to be held In 
early 2004" (Information Note: Rapid Reaction Mechanism - Support to Mostar 
Commission 2003: 1). 
With respect to the Interim Statute, the Commission noted that it had never 
been implemented in the right spirit, and that the six City-Municipalities had 
become 'virtual fiefdoms' that administered all resources and executed their 
rights and obligations '~"each solely for the good of their own people" 
(Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar 2003: 13). 
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In December 2003, this Commission proposed a unification statute for the city, 
which proposed the merger of all City-Municipalities into one, and the 
establishment of a single city administration and city council. However, the 
process of adoption of the Statute was derailed by the political wrangling 
between the two sides in the city council. Eventually, on January 28, 2004, the 
High Representative issued a series of decisions imposing the reunification of 
Mostar. The reunified city was to have a single council and a single 
administration, with six electoral units whose borders would coincide with the 
erstwhile City-Municipalities. 
To ensure the implementation of the Statute, and to address any niggling details 
or points of conflict among the main protagonists, the Bosniac Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the OHR 
established the Mostar Implementation Unit (MIU). This was an advisory body 
with broad discretionary powers, which closely monitored the reform process 
until the end of 2005, when it was eventually disbanded. The MIU reported 
directly to the OHR in Sarajevo rather than the OHR-South office (Williams, 
interview). A number of special teams and committees to manage the 
reunification process were also set up. 
As a result of the lack of progress on several key issues, a Special Envoy (once 
again, Norbert Winterstein) was appointed by the OHR in September 2006 to 
negotiate and arbitrate in various cases of reunification of the city's public utility 
companies. One of the key tasks assigned to him was to ensure the merger of the 
two spatial planning institutions (Urbing and Urbanisticki Zavoc!) into a single 
entity. Once again, this has been a highly politicised process, which reflects the 
importance accorded to the control of land by local political actors. Once again, 
the establishment of the Spatial Development Institute had to be imposed in the 
form of a Decision of the OHR. The political wrangling over spatial planning is 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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The discussion above illustrates the critical role played by the OHR in the 
governance of Mostar, but only since 2003. In the words of Anatoly Viktorov, 
the Deputy High Representative and head of OHR-South office in Mostar: 
"OHR s role and pn'ority is the de jure reunification of the city. The de 
facto reunification is the responsibility of other actors." (Viktorov, 
interview) 
However, the de facto partition of the city created by the war, further cemented 
by EUAM's early decisions, the entrenchment of hardline political parties in 
power, and eight years of application of the divisive Interim Statute without any 
reform whatsoever, has made the goal of reunification, whether de facto or de 
jure, extremely difficult to achieve. 
5.4 Reconstruction of the city and society 
Most of the destruction in Mostar took place to the east of the Bulevar, thanks to 
the repeated offensives against Muslim east Mostar and the relatively inferior 
firepower of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). The cost of repair and 
reconstruction of the damaged urban core was estimated in 1994 at about 
Deutsche Marks (DM) 400 million, excluding the new industrial estates, 
peripheral villages, and historical monuments. If those were included, the cost 
would have doubled. Measured in terms of repair costs, the east had sustained 
four-fifths ofthe damage (Yarwood 1999). 
Yarwood points out that in Mostar, the Spatial Planning as well as Cadastral 
Institutes split into two parts - east and west - as a result of the war, and most 
technical and office equipment was destroyed. The cadastral records themselves 
were intact, but in the hands of one side (the Croats) who refused to share them 
with the Bosniacs (Yarwood 1999)71. As a result, urban plans and cadastre 
71 This was initially done as a deliberate strategic move, as described by an OHR-South official. 
"In 1992, the building of the municipality was in east Mostar, I mean, at that time we didn't make 
any distinction .•. all the public books, such as the cadastre, certificates of births and deaths etc 
etc, were placed in that building, and all those books are originating from Austro-Hungarian 
times. The INA were here around the hills, and most of them were surrounding the east part of 
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documents which survived the war are also out of date, and no longer reflect the 
de facto boundaries, land use or occupancy (World Bank 2006a). 
Similarly, other public institutions and utilities also split into two parts during 
the war. The water and wastewater utility is one such example. The division of 
the company and the war damage resulted in substantial inefficiency in the 
water sector, even though the pre-war Goint) utility had been a profitable 
enterprise (World Bank 2000). Although the EUAM and other bilateral aid 
agencies had undertaken repair and partial reconstruction of the water supply 
system in the years immediately following the war, the system had never been 
fully rehabilitated, and the two companies operated separately. Since the war, 
until the completion of the rehabilitation project undertaken by the World Bank, 
the residents of west Mostar were paying less than half for water as compared to 
those living in east Mostar (World Bank 200Sa). 
Apart from the EUAM, the reconstruction of Mostar was also supported by a 
large number of other external actors. Prominent among these were the 
European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO)72, the Reconstruction and 
Returns Task Force (RRTF), the World Bank, UNHCR and UNESCO, and a 
number of other bilateral donors and international NGOs. 
5.4.1 Reconstruction under the EUAM 
The EUAM was fully established by July 1994 with the objective of initiating and 
supervising the reconstruction of the city and the reintegration of its 
communities. Before its establishment, by mid-March 1994, demarcation maps 
had been signed, heavy weapons pulled out from the front lines, and new 
the city, [soJ the Bosniacs and Croats agreed together to transfer all these books to the west part, 
because they would be more safe. And they transferred this in 1992, but when the city split, all 
those books remained with the Croats. So the Croats had a very good position to blackmail the 
Bosniacs. "(Bofit. interview) 
72 ECHO was active in Bosnia between 1992-2000. working mainly to provide emergency relief 
and humanitarian supplies. including food. medicines. repair and reconstruction support. It also 
supported returns in rural areas through the rehabilitation of homes and infrastructure. and 
support to income-generation projects. 
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checkpoints - six in all - were being set up. The roads were to be open to the 
unrestricted movement of civilians, except males of draft age (Le., 16-60), 
although this did not actually happen until much later (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 
1999). 
The mandated duration of the Administration was two years, which was later 
extended by six months, and the Administrated finally lasted until January 1997. 
Over the course of its term, the EUAM primarily focused on establishing basic 
security and freedom of movement across the city, unifying the police force, and 
the repair and reconstruction of what the Administration saw as the most 
essential buildings and infrastructure. During this period, it poured in about 144 
million ECU (that is, Euros) of donor money into the city, of which nearly 90 
percent was spent on reconstruction, and only 10 percent on the police and 
internal running expenses of the EUAM. The poorer and more damaged east 
Mostar sector received two-thirds of that assistance (EUAM 1998; Yarwood 
1999). 
A rapid building damage survey helped to identify structures which had suffered 
light, medium or heavy damage, and prioritise the repair and reconstruction 
projects. A large number of individual houses and apartment blocks were 
repaired, as were bridges, electricity networks and water supply systems. Schools, 
hospitals and other facilities were also reconstructed. However, any long-term 
planning process under EUAM did not achieve much success, and the focus of 
the Administration remained on repairs, rebuilding, winterisation - emergency-
type activities?3. The expenditure of EUAM under different heads as on 
31.12.1995 is shown in Table 3. 
It is also important to note here that the EUAM's efforts to bring the Croat and 
Muslim sides together for reconstruction or recovery did not bear fruit, and the 
Administration was in fact forced to fund and execute independent 
73 For more details see Yarwood (1999). 
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reconstruction projects on the two sides. The two sides were unwilling to 
negotiate and reconcile - a large part in this was played by the diametrically 
opposite views of the Croat and Bosniac politicians on the status of the city itself. 
The Croats saw Mostar as a Croat city, the capital of Herzegovina, and a place 
where they wielded the kind of authority as the Bosniacs in Sarajevo and the 
Serbs in Banja Luka. They were willing to divide it into two distinct, ethnically 
pure halves, in order to maintain their hegemony. The Bosniacs identified with 
the Ottoman heritage of the city, the Stari Grad and the Stari Most, and were 
unwilling to see the city divided. As a result of the deadlock between the 
political leaders on the two sides, there was a duplication of a large number of 
assets, infrastructure and institutions - separate services and infrastructure 
networks for the Bosniac and Croat zones; segregated schools, hospitals and other 
facilities. The EUAM's approach was described by the then Mayor of East 
Mostar, Safet Orucevic, as '~ .. willing to invest in projects which carried the 
danger of final partition ... investing not so much in a united city. as in the status 
quo" (Orucevit 1996). 
A number of criticisms of EUAM's work, its assumptions, strategic choices and 
outcomes, emerge from field research conducted in Mostar, which are seen by 
many as having had a significant impact on the shape and form of the city in the 
long term. These are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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T bi 3 B akd a e : re own 0 fEUAM di expen ture as on 3112199574 . 
Area of intervention Total expenditure as on % of Total 
31.12.1995 (million ECU) 
Public utilities 16.2 22.1 
• Water and sanitation 6.8 9.3 
• PIT and garbage 4.7 6.4 
• Energy 4.7 6.4 
Construction sector support 
and housing repair 14.0 19.0 
• Construction sector 
support 4.5 6.1 
• Housing repair 9.5 12.9 
Economic sector support 11.8 16.1 
Education, culture. sport 9.4 12.9 
Running and common costs 6.8 9.2 
Municipal administration and 
unified police 6.6 9.0 
• Municipal services 1.9 2.6 
--------
• Police 4.7 6.4 
Health and social services 3.8 5.2 
Transport 3.5 4.8 
• Transport infrastructure 2.6 3.6 
• Public transport 0.9 1.2 
Reintegration of displaced 
persons 1.2 1.7 
Total 73.3 100 
.. (Source: Special Report concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union 
Administration. Mostar (EUAM) 1996) 
74 Final expenditure breakdown of EUAM is part of the archives stored in Brussels. Repeated 
attempts to get access to the archives during the course of this research failed as EU rules stipulate 
that the records cannot be made available to the public until 30 years have lapsed (since the end 
of the Administration). 
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5.4.2 The World Bank 
The W orId Bank first got involved in Mostar in 1996 with a diverse emergency 
portfolio covering a large number of sectors (housing, infrastructure, 
demobilisation, micro-credit, etc.) There were no Mostar-specific activities in the 
earliest days, but the city benefitted from a number of multi-city or regional 
programmes in different sectors. In 1998, the Bank developed a specific portfolio 
of activities for Mostar. The first project undertaken as part of this was the 
reconstruction of the Old Bridge, for which the Bank provided a US$ 4 million 
credit (Francic, interview). In the year 2000, the Bank initiated the next major 
project, which was a US$12 million credit for rehabilitation of the water supply 
and sanitation system. One of the objectives of the project was to 'promote 
reconciliation in the water sector' (World Bank 2005a: 5). which was met 
through the merger of the separate water and wastewater utilities which existed 
in East and West Mostar. In fact, the project was funded on the precondition that 
the funding would only be provided for a single merged utility, and that all of 
the city would be connected to the rehabilitated and extended network (Frantic, 
interview). A single tariff scale was also established and implemented across the 
entire city (World Bank 2005a). 
Subsequently, the Bank has also initiated a solid waste management project for 
the city, which is ongoing, and which once again involved the establishment of a 
single company to manage the upgraded landfill site (even though the other 
functions of waste collection, street cleaning etc are undertaken by two separate 
companies). In addition, the Bank helped to secure grants for the city from the 
USTDA and GEF (US$ 8 million) for background studies on the sewerage system, 
and for construction of sewage collectors, completing the missing network, and 
installing a wastewater treatment plant. 
201 
Chapter 5: Destruction and reconstruction of Mostar: myths, facts, interpretations 
Finally, as part of an urban infrastructure and service delivery project, initiated 
in 2004, the World Bank provided a loan of DS$ 1 million to the city of Mostar to 
prepare an urban management development plan, and promised them another 
DS$ 4 million for its implementation. In the words of a World Bank official: 
"This could be a spatial plan, urban plan, whatever - we are flexible. 
But it will involve a fair amount of baseline data collection, some 
capacity building for the city, and the preparation of a long-term plan 
or development strategy for the city. "(Francie, interview) 
The difference between the reconstruction approach of the World Bank and that 
of the EDAM is significant. The Bank did not force the issue of reunification 
through public statements, focusing instead on issues of efficiency and 
profitability in the core infrastructure sectors, and using their credit leverage to 
establish unified public utilities across the city. Since they had a long-term 
perspective, they also showed their determination to 'wait it out' while the local 
actors got their act together and complied with their preconditions. The World 
Bank has in fact done a lot in Mostar, but has a surprisingly low profile in the 
city, with many people not even aware of their work. 
The EDAM, on the other hand, while promoting reunification of the city 
publicly and vociferously, had to compromise with actors on both sides in order 
to be able to get basic services functional again. They were also perhaps in a great 
hurry to spend their allocated resources within the very short span of two years, 
which the local actors were quick to spot and exploit. 
'The Koschnik administration talked to all sides separately, designed 
projects for two separate parts of the city, and eventually the city was 
split into 6 city-municipalities. The Bank had a different approach 
f. .. } [we} did not get involved with the lower levels of administration, 
we only dealt with them at the city administration level. We never 
met with the city-municipalities independently, unless they were part 
of a wider group of stakeholders, or invited together to a meeting. We 
dealt mostly with the city-level public enterpnses, and supported 
projects which benefitted all citizens and the whole city." (FranCie, 
interview) 
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5.4.3 Other intemationaJ actors and operations in Mostar 
Various institutions and bodies supporting the reconstruction process across 
Bosnia were also active in Mostar, though their precise contribution to Mostar 
municipality is hard to gauge. Key among these are the European Commission's 
Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO), and the Reconstruction and Returns Task 
Force (RRTF), a body established by the OHR in 1997 to develop and implement 
a coordinated approach to return (particularly minority return) and 
reconstruction. Returning minorities to vacant or rural areas was relatively easier 
- however, reintegrating minorities within urban centres was a complex process 
which only gained momentum with the forceful application of the property 
restitution laws. UNHCR also supported this process through various initiatives. 
Many other bilateral donors also financed stand-alone return and/or 
reconstruction projects in Mostar. Led by UNESCO, Italy, Turkey and a host of 
other governments others contributed to the Old Bridge and Old City 
reconstruction. Most others are known by the buildings, monuments or a few 
public spaces they helped to renovate, for instance, the Danish and Norwegian 
Refugee Councils rebuilt some apartment complexes on Santica street which 
were destroyed in the war; the Spanish helped develop the 'Spanish' square and 
the reconstruction of the Gymnasium, etc. However, most donors simply cherry-
picked reconstruction projects without much consultation with the local 
stakeholders or professionals, both during and after the EUAM's tenure. In the 
absence of any overall plan for reconstruction of the city, and little by way of a 
vision for its development, this also seems inevitable. 
In 2001, the EC facilitated the development of an economic development 
strategy for Mostar. Reiterating the principles of free market and 
entrepreneurship accompanied by minimal economic planning, the strategy 
highlighted urban development, agricultural processing, tourism and 
infrastructure, among others, as key areas of focus. This strategy, however, 
remained only on paper. In 2003, another effort was made to develop a Local 
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Economic Development (LED) strategy for the city. This, too, is yet to be 
implemented. The absence of an updated, legally binding and widely accepted 
spatiaV urban plan is seen by many of my respondents (urban planners and 
citizens) as a major hindrance to any serious or systematic economic 
development interventions. 
5.5 Mostar today 
For obvious political reasons, there has been no census in Bosnia since the war. 
This allows local and national politicians from all sides to make irrefutable claims 
on numbers, majorities and minorities. According to the Federal Statistical 
Agency, the estimated population of Mostar in June 2007 was 111,198 (see 
http://www.fzs.baIPodacVustrojl1.htm). However, since 2001, the statistical 
agency has stopped publishing population estimates according to ethno-national 
groups (Vetters 2007). An analysis of the 2008 local election results by the 
International Crisis Group suggests that 53 per cent of the current population is 
Croat, 44 per cent Bosniac, and 3 per cent Serb or other (ICG 2009)75. 
Despite the efforts of OHR and other organizations to promote and support 
reunification, the city still remains deeply divided. A number of Bosniacs have 
returned to the western part of town, but there is very little evidence of Croat 
families returning to the east. Serbs have predominantly returned to rural areas 
of the municipality, as it is harder for people to find jobs in the city and to adjust 
to the level of pre-war proximity which existed in the urban core before the war. 
There are no reliable figures, but most respondents assert that large numbers of 
people have either exchanged or sold the pre-war properties they owned in areas 
where they are now in a minority. Even where people have returned, either out 
of sheer desperation or determination, they have little positive contact with their 
75 This assumes that "all voters for the national parties were of the corresponding ethnicity, and 
that voting for the multinational parties mirrored the voting ratio of the national parties in each 
electoral district. "(leG 2009: 3) 
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neighbours belonging to 'the other' community. According to a Bosniac returnee 
to west Mostar: 
IfJ never really had much time for social or community life even 
earlier [before the war]. And that building where I live, I had moved 
there just before the war, so it was not really the time to make any 
friends. And now, J just see them and say hello sometimes, but J don't 
want or need to get close to them. "(Omanovic2, interview) 
In terms of infrastructure and services, many efforts have been made to unify the 
separate electricity, water and sanitation, and refuse collection utilities. Although 
technically the three hydropower-based public utilities in the Mostar area belong 
to the reunified city as a whole, they are reportedly still controlled by rival 
national factions. The same is true for water and sewer systems, both of which 
have been subject to fierce national battles over the past five years. Now, the two 
water utilities have merged, but they operate two separate teams on the two 
banks (leG 2009). A major step forward has been the agreement to set a single 
unique water tariff all across the city, but whether this has been implemented in 
practice is not confirmed. The establishment in 2007 of a single company to 
manage the upgraded landfill site is seen as a major success - yet, waste 
collection, street cleaning and park maintenance functions are undertaken on the 
west and east by two separate companies (Bubalo, interview). While this would 
in itself not be a problem in a 'normal' urban environment, where competition 
would be encouraged, the fact that these are controlled by national groups 
indicates that the reunification of the services is far from complete. 
Obstructionist tactics from both sides have also plagued the municipal 
reorganisation process since it was initiated in 2004. Vetters (2007) takes up the 
vexed issue of public administration reform in the context of reunification, 
pointing out that the process is still ongoing and fraught with difficulties. She 
highlights in particular the issue of public utility companies in Mostar, which are 
..... still partitioned according to ethno-national cn'ten"a [ ... ] Therefore. the 
inhabitants of Mostar are still facing divided institutions in the field of 
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communal services (water, waste disposal, and electricity), culture, sport and 
recreation, and in other sectors are facing badly perfonning or outright 
dysfunctional administrative institutions. "(Vetters 2007: 189) 
The economic base of the two sides, west and east, also continues to be very 
different, as the east relies mostly on tourism-related earnings, while the west 
has the more modem shops and commercial centres, as well as the solitary 
industrial unit - the aluminium factory - which, as discussed previously, 
employs only Croats. The pre-war agro-combine HEPOK - possibly the only 
other potentially profitable enterprise in Mostar - has not yet been privatised or 
revived. The bloated city administration provides a large proportion of the job 
opportunities in Mostar, but with the process of rationalisation of the 
administration almost complete, this is set to change. Of course, lack of economic 
development and growing unemployment is not a problem of Mostar alone, as 
the failed first round of privatisation provided a major setback to economic 
development across the country (FranCie, interview). In fact, Mostar, Sarajevo 
and other administrative centres of Bosnia are considered more prosperous than 
the other parts, mainly because they host large numbers of public institutions, 
both domestic and international, which provide large-scale employment (ESI 
2004). However, Mostar was a major industrial hub prior to the war, and the fact 
that its former production units are unlikely to be revived soon implies a 
sustained period of unemployment for many. The unemployment level was 
estimated in 1999 at about 50 per cent (World Bank 1999: 15), and in 2002 at 
around 37 per cent (City of Mostar 2003). The major sectors of employment in 
2002 are shown in Figure 11 below. When compared with Figure 7 on pre-war 
employment, it is clear that employment in industry, mining, agriculture and 
fisheries, taken together, is down to less than half of the pre-war level, whereas 
that in public administration has doubled. 
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Figure 11: Employment break-down in Mostar. 2002 (Source: City of Mostar 2003) 
Reporting on an assessment conducted around the end of 1998 soliciting citizens' 
views and priorities for reconstruction and development , the World Bank notes 
that two thirds of the respondents listed industrial development as their top 
priority (World Bank 2000). Despite this feedback, the efforts of the 
international community towards economic development have focused 
predominantly on reviving tourism in Mostar or providing loans for small and 
medium enterprises. The latter initiative, introduced by USAID, only resulted in 
boom in the number of cafes, bet-shops and pansions in a city which already has 
too many such establishments, and which are also now finding it hard to sustain 
themselves (see Figure 12). As mentioned earlier, a few attempts have also been 
made to develop a local economic development strategy for the city, but none of 
these could be implemented. 
"Every child on the street knows that after the second world war, 
Germany made a plan and they didn 't reconstruct infrastructure, 
building, schools, at all. .. no, first thing they reconstructed was the 
economy, factodes, and then the factories reconstructed everything 
else. Here they went vice versa. "(Behram, interview) 
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Figure 12: The economy of east Mostar, in particular relies heavily on tourism-
related activities such as pans ions and internet cafes, and other small 
businesses such as betting shops, bakeries and restaurants (Source: author. 
December 2006) 
In more recent years, attempts were also made by Paddy Ashdown, the former 
High Representative, to revive and internationalise Mostar airport (which was 
another bone of contention between Bosniacs and Croats with each side wanting 
to control it) . In the end, the proposal was reportedly shot down by Croatia 
which did not (and still does not) want competition for its own international 
airports in Split and Dubrovnik (Wheeler, interview). 
The difference between urban and economic profile of the western and eastern 
parts of the city continues to be a source of resentment and an impediment in the 
reunification of the city. The western (Croat) part of the city is generally 
perceived as having better infrastructure and services, greater employment 
opportunities and wages, as compared to the eastern (Bosniac) part. A porous 
border with Croatia, access to international motorways, and a link to the coast, 
make the Croat side more accessible and attractive to residents and visitors alike. 
Visually, too, the two sides look very different. The eastern part is older, with 
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narrow winding streets and older housing, and it also suffered the maximum 
damage during the war, due to greater firepower of the Serb, and later Croatian, 
army. The west has wider tree-lined roads, apartment blocks which suffered 
little damage in the war, and more modern infrastructure. Although reduction of 
inequalities was an integral aim and strategy of the EUAM, many commentators 
and most of my Bosniac respondents believe that the administration did not do 
enough to reduce these disparities between the two sides, although it had the 
opportunity, financial resources and the political clout to do so. 
"They [EUAM] tried to keep political balance, sharing everything in 
two. For example, here on this [eastern] side of the Bulevar, you have 
everything destroyed On the other [western] side, maybe few per 
cent destroyed But for schools they gave 50:50 - so, for 1 mJ1lion here 
you can bU11d nothing, for 1 million there you can improve the 
existing [infrastructure] much. They have on one side Las Vegas, on 
the west, and the other side Harlem, in the east ... "(pa~ic, interview) 
While there is complete freedom of movement across the city, and a single 
public transport (bus) system which covers the whole city, those living in the 
west, particularly, feel very little need to cross over to the east. There are two 
major hospitals, although now there is much more access to the specialty services 
in the one on the west for all citizens of Mostar. After the war, the Mostar 
university'Djemal Bijadic' was evicted from its premises on the west side, and 
took up residence in an abandoned military barracks on the east side. Meanwhile 
a new west-side 'University of Mostar' was established in its former home. The 
main high school. the Gymnasium, which is aptly located on the Bulevar, is now 
legally and administratively reunified as well as reconstructed (see Figure 13). In 
its functioning, however, it is composed of three schools - one teaching the 
Federation curriculum, one teaching the Croatian curriculum, and one for the 
International Baccalaureat. According to an OSCE official, the two priority areas 
for education include the development of common elements of the curriculum, 
and the rationalisation of the large number of secondary schools: 
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"There are 20 secondary schools in Mostar today, mainly because of 
duplication (two engineering schools, two medical schools, two traffic 
schools, two bUlJding/constmction schools, etc.) These have to be 
rationalised, and that has to be done by the city of Mostar" (Palmer, 
interview) 
Figure 13: The reconstructed Gymnasium building, 2009 (Source: Aida Omanovic) 
In terms of social and cultural life, young people still fraternise much more 
within their own groups, because, in the past fifteen years, they have learnt to 
live separately - " .. . they are not used to it [socialising with the others} any more, 
they have their own lives" (Hadzizukovic, interview). The main cultural centre, 
situated at the Rondo in the west, has been given a Croat prefix (,Hrvatski Dom' 
Herceg Stjepan Kosace) , which is viewed by Bosniacs as deliberately exclusionary 
(see Figure 14). There are two theatres, and two football clubs, ethnically based, 
and although they have started playing each other in recent years, the games are 
held under the shadow of possible violence, and often without the presence of 
supporters from the visiting side76• 
76 For example, according to a news report dated 28 November 2008 on Balkanlnsight.com: 
"Ethnic tensions among youths in Mostar soared after a brawl broke out during a local soccer 
match last week. Throughout the week these tensions triggered a series of smaller incidents and 
2]0 
Figure 14: The cultural centre in west Mostar. Note the prefix "Hrvatski Dom" added 
on the top. (Source: author, September 2008) 
Finally, the political environment in Mostar continues to be poisoned by 
ethnically divisive politics, postures and statements, till date. The international 
community was initially taken by surprise by the reversal in roles as it was 
Bosniac politicians who wanted to retain the ethnic-based administration and 
electoral systems in 2003, based on the population distribution of 1991, while the 
Croat parties supported the idea of a unified city. These positions were based on 
the assumption that Croats outnumbered Bosniacs at that point in time, and 
formed the majority in the city77. In the absence of a census, this is difficult to 
confirm or refute, and prompts nationalist parties to continue with their hardline 
positions. The stalemate generated by the latest local elections in Mostar has also 
intensified calls for revision of the 2004 Statute, particularly by the Croats, who 
escalated in a major fight on Friday afternoon, which involved a few dozen youths, local media 
reported over the weekend. "(Tight Security in Bosnian Town amid Clashes 2008) 
77 The demographic see-saw continues since - recent positions suggest that many Croats have 
now left the city due to their ability to emigrate, implying that Bosniacs are once again gaining an 
upper hand in terms of numbers. But this is at the level of guesswork and cannot be verifi ed. 
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insist that the special status of Mostar be revoked and the principles of 'one man-
one vote' as well as direct election of the Mayor, be applied to the city just like 
all other municipalities in the country (Bozit, interview)78. 
5.6 Analysis and conclusions: One city, or two cities in one? 
The aim of the preceding discussion is to demonstrate, first of all, that the city of 
Mostar did not go from a cosmopolitan ideal to a divided city overnight, that the 
division was a product of historical fault-lines as well as a complex interplay of 
political and economic interests that led to the war. I would like to use Boars 
framework (1999) to assess pre-war Mostar against the five proposed scenarios-
Assimilation, Pluralism, Segmentation, Polarisation and Cleansing - as well as to 
establish where Mostar stands today on this spectrum. 
Boal's proposed scenarios and their characteristic features are depicted in the 
Table 4 on the following page. He has also depicted the five scenarios as a circle, 
where a city moves from a state of assimilation (Le. undivided), to cleansing (also 
undivided) after passing through various stages of division (pluralism, 
segmentation and polarisation). 
78 In fact, the appeal of the Croats to the Constitutional Court, challenging the special status 
accorded to Mostar by the new Statute, pre-dates these elections. 
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Scenario Description Mostar during Mostar M ostar Pre-war Mostar Early Mostar 
the Ottoman around the under Mostar during the Post-war today 
and Austro- Second Yugoslavia (1990- war Mostar 
Hungarian era World War (1947-90) 92) (1992-94) 
Assimilation Inter-group differences disappear No No Limited No No No No 
Pluralism Considerable social integration but some Yes Limited Yes Limited No No No 
maintenance of separate ethnic 
institutions and cultural attributes 
Segmentation Tendency towards separation with well- No No No Yes No No Yes 
developed ethnic institutional structures 
(parallel or _, ~trical) 
Polarisation City characterised by severance along No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
ethno-nationallines. Severance may be 
along an international or a latent 
international boundary. 
Oeansing No inter-group differences in the urban No Yes No No Emerging Yes Diminishing 
area because one of the distinctive 
groups bas been driven out or bas 
, chosen' to exit (polarisation at an inter-
regional/inter-state scale). 
Source: adapted from Baal (1999: 588) 
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Unlike other descriptions of Mostar as a melting pot of different groups and 
cultures. which is also asserted by many respondents, this analysis contends that 
Mostar was and had more or less been a pluralist city. which moved towards 
segmentation before the war. and eventually became polarised and cleansed. 
during the war. and is only now (fifteen years after the Washington Agreement) 
beginning to emerge from extreme polarisation (this pattern is shown by the 
shaded boxes in Table 4). Its historic plural character is indicated by the fact that 
through the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian times. the different communities 
came to occupy distinct spatial areas in the city. and separate socio-cultural 
institutions guided their lives, although undoubtedly. they coexisted without 
overt conflict. As the city grew in numbers and density. social integration 
increased The period of the Second W orId War showed some disturbing signs of 
polarisation and cleansing. but in the Yugoslav era. national differences were 
suppressed. not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but across all the republics and 
provinces, and the urban core of Mostar (and other cities) began to show signs of 
assimilation. The multiethnic mix in the urban core of Mostar can in fact be 
attributed to the housing policies of the socialist era. wherein housing for public 
sector workers had to be provided by the employer. As Mostar had a large 
number of public sector enterprises which employed people from all 
nationalities. housing provided by these enterprises naturally also reflected the 
same mix (Demirovic. interview). Thus. the fact that the different national 
groups lived side by side in central Mostar should not be seen as the leading 
indicator of integration or assimilation - the reasons for this lay in the economic 
structure of the urban core. Over the wider municipal area and in the 
countryside. different national groups lived in largely homogeneous 
communities. It can therefore be defined more as pluralism. characterised by 
" ... retention of a degree of ethnic distinctiveness and the sharing of a wide array 
of institutions, and a broadly consensual attitude to the existing 
societaVconstitutional lTamework II (Boal 1999: 589). 
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In the years preceding the war, pluralism gave way to segmentation 
(characterised by Boal as a period of deteriorating interethnic relations, 
insecurity, mistrust and endemic conflict) as national institutions (political, 
administrative and socio-cultural) gained prominence and parallel institutional 
structures were developed. As the conflict grew in scope and scale around 
Mostar, two ethnically cleansed enclaves were created in east and west Mostar. 
Maps and data reflecting the situation across the entire municipality (not just the 
central core) have shown that spatially, there were already clear areas of 
concentration of different ethnic groups in the decades before the war - during 
the war the municipality was divided along these pre-existing (though perhaps 
not prominent) cleavages. 
The analysis of Mostar in Table 4 brings out the weaknesses of Boars model, 
which appears rather simplistic. Reality is more complex, as the scenarios listed 
by Boal can co-exist in a single city, at any given point in time. Different areas 
such as housing, education, employment, social inclusion, show different levels 
of integration and division in Mostar. A larger degree of assimilation is being 
seen, for example, in the workplace (especially in public institutions), but 
segregation at the residential and social level persists. Rural and urban 
communities within the same municipal area demonstrate different 
characteristics. The shift from one stage to another is also gradual rather than 
sharply delineated, and can go back and forth based on the prevailing political 
environment and various other factors, rather than move in one direction, in a 
linear fashion. 
As far as Mostar is concerned, its population virtually transformed during and 
immediately after the war. During the field research, a number of respondents 
mentioned that between 70 - 80% of the pre-war population of Mostar fled the 
city during the conflict, and most of them have never returned. The influx of 
migrants from the predominantly rural areas of Western and Eastern 
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Herzegovina, as well as central Bosnia, considerably changed the complexion of 
Mostarian society. 
"80% people are not from Mostar, they are from Eastern Herzegovina, 
Western Herzegovina, etc. They never lived in Mostar as a city, as 
one. They only see this, this version, only this upgrade of the 
software, they don't know anything else. Its perfectly normal for kids 
in west Mostar - the so-called Croat part of town - to not know that 
there is a covered swimming pool here [in the east}, and they can 
swim in it in the winter too. They don't know because their parents, 
their teachers, no one told them, just because its on the east side, or 
the Bosniac side. "(Omanovic, interview) 
While the figure offered by different respondents varies and cannot be 
considered reliable data, the point being made is that if a large chunk of the 
population of the city is made up of displaced persons from small towns or rural 
areas which are largely mono-ethnic, is it realistic to expect the city to return to 
its pre-war plural way of life soon after the war? According to Bjelakovic and 
Strazzari (1999): 
"On the one hand the strong presence of victims of ethnic cleansing 
perperuates intolerance among ethnic groups and radicalizes social 
relations by advocating revenge and insisting on the impossibility of 
multiethnic coexistence. On the other hand, the unchallenged power 
of the ethno-nationalist rural elites that had actively pursued Mostar's 
urbicide has left citizens who were expelled reluctant to rerum. II (p. 
92) 
This limited interest (or even ability) of post-war populations to revert to the 
pre-war plural city maintained, and indeed further entrenched, the polarisation 
in Mostar. The ethnic cleansing worked both ways - the urban population fled 
previously mixed zones to the safety of ethnically homogeneous areas (or 
abroad), and the incoming refugee population created ethnically homogeneous 
enclaves within the urban core, often under the direction· of nationalist 
politicians. The significance of this transformation was never really taken into 
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account by the international community. In this context, the core objective of 
the international community to reunify Mostar seems at best rushed, and at 
worst, completely disconnected with post-war realities of complete polarisation 
(if Mostar is viewed as one city), or cleansing (if seen as two-cities-in-one). 
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6.0 Introduction 
Continuing the discussion on EUAM in greater detail, this chapter reviews the 
Administration's objectives, assumptions, strategy and impact. It also explores 
how urban planning was proactively used by the six City-Municipalities to assert 
control and entrench divisions, and by other external actors to reconstruct key 
symbolic structures such as the Stari Most (old bridge) and the Stari Grad (old 
city). The conclusion summarises the major reasons why EUAM failed in its 
limited efforts to introduce urban planning in the reconstruction process. 
6.1 EUAM's assumptions, strategic choices and their implications 
As described in the previous chapter, the EUAM derived its mandate from the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in Geneva in April 1994, which was 
aimed at ending the conflict between the Bosniacs and Croats, and piecing the 
Federation together. The Administration's stated objectives were to provide a 
unified administration for the city, initiate the process of reconstruction, and 
normalise life in the city. 
It appears from literature, data gathered as well as field interviews that the 
international community broadly, and EUAM in particular, made some major 
assumptions about the pre-war context which influenced the strategies it 
deployed towards achieving these goals. The assumptions (such as the 
importance attached to reunification by Mostar's post-war residents, or the lack 
of capacity among local communities to undertake planning and reconstruction) 
could perhaps be the result of the lack of time and commitment to build an 
adequate understanding of the situation, and the choices (such as further sub-
dividing the city into six City-Municipalities) due to the political exigency of the 
time and the high levels of mistrust and insecurity. Regardless of the causes, 
these assumptions and choices have had serious long-term implications for the 
development of the city, its reunification and reconciliation between its 
communities, as discussed below. An analysis of these can also provide 
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significant lessons to other transitional administrations engaged in post-war 
reconstruction. 
6.1.1 Multi-ethnidty. multi-cuJroralism in pre- and post-war Mostar 
As discussed in considerable detail in the previous chapter, most people 
interviewed for this research stated that before the war they had never thought 
about national or religious identities, they went to mixed schools, studied a single 
curriculum, used the same hospitals and health care facilities, worked in similar 
locations, socialised with all groups, intermarried (to some degree). and lived in 
mixed neighbourhoods all across the city. This was their definition of 
integration. This also seems to have been accepted without question by the 
international community. 
The analysis presented at the end of the same chapter, however, also 
demonstrates that Mostar was historically at best a plural city, with the urban 
core showing some signs of assimilation during the Yugoslav era. Yet, it was 
always vulnerable to being segmented or polarised due to the fact that the rural 
areas within and around the city were ethnically homogeneous, and nationalist 
forces had started making inroads into these areas (and indeed, all across 
Yugoslavia) towards the late 1980s. Early in the conflict, it was claimed by Croats 
as the capital of Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna. despite its large Muslim 
population. Spatially too, it was not difficult to draw a line through the 
municipal area, and to a lesser degree, the urban core. 
During the war, Mostar's population changed significantly, due to the influx of 
refugees and displaced persons from the surrounding regions, and the exodus of 
large numbers of original residents of the city either to ethnically homogeneous 
areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina, or abroad. The ability of the new 
immigrants from ethnically homogeneous rural communities to restore the pre-
war multiculturalism and pluralism Mostar cannot be gauged, but their interest 
in multiethnic coexistence, in a dense and interactive urban environment, so 
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soon after a violent conflict, can be reasonably assumed to be low, and their 
levels of intolerance and mistrust, along with their vulnerability to manipulation 
by the national elites, high. In a two-year study of Mostar and Vukovar which 
started on September 2000 and focused on social reconstruction, Corkalo et al. 
found that the differences between "us" and "them" were solidified to such a 
great degree during and after the war that '~ .. it is extraordinarily difficult to 
reverse this process" (Corkalo, Adjukovic et al. 2004: 146). They also highlight 
that many of the 'old Mostarians' or pre-war inhabitants of the city find that they 
are unable to relate to or accept the new residents and their way of life, 
particularly as many of the immigrants corne from mono-ethnic, rural areas. 
All the factors discussed above made the reunification of Mostar extremely 
difficult. Ignoring these, and perhaps despite a tacit understanding that this was 
unlikely to be realised within the mandated duration of the EUAM, the 
international community made Mostar's reunification a key goal of the 
Administration, and an indicator of the Federation's viability. Unsurprisingly, it 
only partially realised its objectives, successfully restoring a degree of normal life 
within the city, but failing to achieve complete political, social, economic and 
physical reunification. 
6.1.2 Pre-war institutional structures 
"Pre-war Mostar had a well-developed planning system, whereas the 
foreign actors chose to ignore that and impose their own solutions. " 
(Sead Pintul, former director of urbanism, Mostar, as quoted in 
Mostar 2004 Symposium. Summary Report: Lessons Learned in 
Mostar 2004) 
Another assumption of the international community, the EUAM in particular, 
seems to have been that no institutions existed, or were functional, during the 
war in Yugoslavia, and that any existing (socialist) structures were outdated, 
bureaucratic and corrupt, and therefore merited dismantling. In fact, there were 
very strong institutional structures in former Yugoslavia - nowhere is this more 
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evident than in the area of development planning. The socialist system was 
extremely strong in this regard, and the whole of former Yugoslavia was covered 
by economic and spatial plans and planning institutions for different levels 
(national, republic, cantonal, local). As discussed in Chapter 4 on Bosnia, urban 
development and planning in Yugoslavia reflected the socialist principles of 
egalitarianism and planned urbanisation. State institutions (such as the local or 
cantonal planning institutes) were powerful actors in planning, not only in terms 
of laying down policy, but also as the chief developers of land and housing. 
In Bosnia, the planning tradition in fact pre-dates Yugoslavia. beginning as it did 
during the Ottoman era. The Ottomans laid the foundations of urbanisation in 
Bosnia. Cities took on a distinct Turkish character, including in particular the 
development of self-contained residential neighbourhoods with central open 
spaces or courtyards, a clear demarcation of residential and business districts. and 
of public and private spaces (Puljic 1992; Bublin 1999; Malcolm 2002). The 
Austro-Hungarians, following the Ottomans. brought industrialisation, and 
further urbanisation followed in its wake. They built an extensive transportation 
network criss-crossing the region, installed infrastructure, and extended urban 
centres across Bosnia and Herzegovina with the construction of European-style 
housing, military structures, factories, administrative and public buildings 
(Taylor 1981; Williamson 1991; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 1999; Pa§ic 2004). 
It is clear, therefore, that planned urban development was not new to Yugoslav 
or Bosnian cities. That it needed reform is a different matter. Field research 
reveals that the capacities for planning existed at various levels even during and 
after the war. However, these were brushed aside by the EUAM in its 
reconstruction programmes. The failure to take the old plans, planning systems 
and capacities into account, and the consequent attempts to start up parallel 
structures and introduce new forms of planning, didn't meet with much success, 
and reconstruction remained a piecemeal exercise with no long-term perspective. 
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6.1.3 Division for reunification 
EUAM initiated the discussion on the division of two post-war municipalities 
(east and west Mostar) into six smaller districts, on the eve of Dayton, assuming 
that this would help break down the still-persisting hard barriers between the 
two sides. According to Reichel (2000), the Croat representatives had been 
adamant about the division of the city right from the beginning of the political 
dialogue on the future status of Mostar, insisting on two districts in a 'unified 
city'. It should be noted here that the Bosniacs supported the reunification of the 
city at this stage (OHR-South 2006)'19. The May 1995 strategy document prepared 
by the Administrator mentions the possibility of dividing the city or 
municipality into smaller boroughs, warning however that strong central 
authority on key issues must accompany any decentralisation measures (EUAM 
1995). In fact, as early as October 1994, an internal document of the EUAM had 
put forth a proposal to develop Mostar as a two-tier municipality. It was 
suggested that an equal number of community councils (ethnic-based) be 
established on each side, which would control matters of local concern, and a 
City Council on the central level be set up for only addressing 'whole-town 
matters' (Yarwood 1999; EUAM Year unknown-a). Each community council 
would send an equal number of its elected members to the City Council, which 
meant that the ethnic balance would always be equal. Importantly, this 
document suggested that the 'City President' would be an additional post, 
preferably an international figure, which implied a permanent or at least long-
term international mandate. Clearly, this proposal was never accepted. 
The principles for splitting the city into six city-municipalities, operating under 
the umbrella of an overarching city administration, were outlined and agreed in 
the Dayton Annex pertaining to the Federation and Mostar, signed on the 10th of 
November 1995. As the key political protagonists could not reach agreement on 
'19 This stance was later reversed (in 2003, when the negotiations were on to formulate the new 
Statute) as the Bosniacs became unsure oftheir demographic majority in the city. 
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the borders of the six City-Municipalities, it was agreed that the Statute for 
Mostar would address this issue as well as other details of electoral and 
administrative arrangements. The Interim Statute of Mostar, adopted in February 
1996, was based on these principles. 
However, the six 'City-Municipalities' became powerful and independent agents, 
effectively overruling (or at least neutralising) the City of Mostar80. As the city-
municipalities usurped the powers of the City of Mostar, the international 
community seemed helpless to enforce the Statute's key provisions. Some believe 
that to be the cause of the lasting division of Mostar: 
"The Interim Statute had a few integrative elements. The first was 
urban planning, second, financing, and third, infrastructure. Within 
the Statute it was said that those three elements belong to the city of 
Mostar - the city of Mostar is responsible for them. So the moment 
those three [elements} couldn't live [survive}, the next step naturally 
was that there was no integration. "(Corie, interview) 
6.1.4 Economic revival based largely on tourism 
The EUAM's weak efforts to revive the economy of the city were based on the 
assumption that tourism was and would continue to be the mainstay of Mostar's 
economy. In fact. as discussed in the previous chapter. Mostar was a significant 
industriaVmilitary centre before the war. with nearly 40 per cent of its 
workforce employed in industry and less than 5 per cent in tourism (Yarwood 
1999). Due to various factors. including the failed privatisation process across 
Bosnia. inadequate oversight and accountability. and the lack of a coherent 
economic development strategy. the industrial units in Mostar were never 
revived (FranCie. interview). 
The EUAM did make some efforts to revive the local economy and create jobs. 
but with limited success. Financial support was provided for local enterprises. 
80 The municipality and citizens of Mostar were also burdened by an excessively complicated (as 
well as dysfunctional and internationally-manipulated) electoral system, based on proportional 
representation, of electing members to the 'City-Municipal Councils' and the 'City Council.' 
(Interim Statute of the City of Mostar 1996; Chandler 1999; Bose 2002) 
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including small and medium-sized businesses, providing basic services. A 'cafe 
culture' rapidly emerged to serve the growing international community. The 
total amount allocated to supporting these businesses was about DM 8 million. 
EUAM also initiated an Investment Support Programme for large public 
companies, including textile, concrete, construction equipment etc (Reichel 
2000). However, not many of these enterprises could sustain themselves over 
time. The city continues to face significant unemployment today - some statistics 
state that there were 15,574 registered unemployed persons in Mostar at the end 
of 2007 (FZS 2008: 21), but this only includes those that register with the official 
employment agency". The city's economy currently relies excessively on 
tourism-related activities - 220,000 tourist arrivals were recorded in 2004 (World 
Bank 2005b: 6), and this number has risen to 800,000 in 2008, according to some 
anecdotal accounts (Francie, interview). The piecemeal reconstruction of housing 
and infrastructure and limited investment support initiatives, without any 
coherent economic development strategy, appears to have been one of the major 
strategic errors on part of the EUAM. Later interventions by the international 
community, for instance by USAID, also attempted to support small businesses, 
but the pre-war large-scale employment in the industrial and military sectors 
could never be matched. 
6.2 Urban planning: the road not taken 
6.2.1 Reconstruction planning without urban planning 
"This was a missed opportunity. that we didn i give enough emphasis 
on planning. Decisions were not based on a strategy. but on 
compromises. EU was very focused on here and now, and they had 
some good professionals. But still, I feel all this money spent could 
have had better results. " (Raspudic, interview) 
81 The estimated population of the municipality of Mostar in mid-2oo7 according to the same 
statistical source was 111.198 persons (FZS 2008: 9). This however cannot be considered perfectly 
accurate because there has not been any population census in the country since the war. 
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The maiJ?- elements of the reconstruction process initiated by the EVAM in 
Mostar have been comprehensively described by John Yarwood (1999). who was 
the Director of Reconstruction within the Administration. In September 1994. 
he proposed a strategy as well as a departmental framework for approval. 
suggesting that the Reconstruction Department be sub-divided into five groups. 
viz. building repair (and demolition). infrastructure repair. urban planning. 
construction sector recovery. and project finance and administration. Of these. 
the building demolition. repair and reconstruction emerged as the most 
prominent and visible activity undertaken by the EVAM. 
An important role was assigned to external consultants by the Reconstruction 
Department. THW (Technisches Hilfswerk. or Technical Relief Agency). the 
German emergency support organisation. partnered with EVAM in surveying 
and assessing the extent and degree of damage. and undertook the major 
responsibility for the supply of building materials for repair and reconstruction of 
individual houses and flats. A specialist Danish consulting organisation prepared 
the initial demolition plan and programme. A Spanish NGO was engaged to 
develop a computerised project accounting and management system. GHK 
International prepared an Infrastructure Strategy and Investment Programme. 
submitted in November 1994. as well as a specific study on the water sector. 
which was completed in April 1995. Crown Agents were involved in preparing a 
background study into the construction industry in Mostar, which also included 
suggested projects and a list of available contractors in east as well as west 
Mostar. This was also completed in April 1995. EVAM's internal documents as 
well as Yarwood's publication clearly indicate that the activities of the 
Department were meticulously planned and organised, and attempted to make 
the best use of consultancy expertise available across Europe. Fundamental 
repairs to infrastructure, including water supply, sewerage systems, electricity, 
heating, roads and bridges, were carried out swiftly and effectively. Health and 
primary education facilities were also restored on both sides. 
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However. the excessive reliance on European consultants and companies neither 
helped in rebuilding the local economy. nor supported the capacity-building or 
skill-development of local professionals towards European standards and 
procedures. It also encouraged the perception (and. consequently. resentment) 
among the local community that the international actors were merely 'washing 
the money' in Mostar (Pintul. Puljic, Omanovic interview). 
At the same time, in this process of demolition, repair and reconstruction. there 
seems to have been no place for any strategic thinking or planning for the future 
of Mostar. Yarwood clearly states that the recovery of the planning system was 
I~ •• a vital objective for the EUAM and particularly that it was a vehicle to build 
unification"(yarwood 1999: 28). Yet. he and his other colleagues also recall that 
strategic planning of any sort was seen as a waste of time and resources. and 
urban planning was the pushed to the bottom of the priority list because of the 
urgency to spend money (Yarwood, Puljic. Raspudic, interviews). 
6.2.2 Urban planning efforts - too little, too late 
"In their first year, the EU Administration was only interested in 
repair and reconstruction. In the second year, they started the 
economic revival through small businesses. In the third year, they 
thought about planning and set up a joint team from both sides. By 
then it was too late. "(Puljic, interview) 
In fact, it was at the end of 1994, that the proposal was first mooted to establish a 
local team to work on an All-Mostar Structure Plan. comprising professionals 
from both sides and the EUAM. A workshop was organised in Hotel Ero (see 
Figure 13). but the emphasis of the 'planning programme' proposed herein was 
once again on the survey of damaged buildings, an action programme for 
building repair. demolition. etc, and an investment strategy for the same. The 
outline of a Structure Plan was also proposed in this workshop, which was 
envisaged to include topics such as circulation. land use, key facilities, local plans 
etc. The budget for urban planning and data management together was a mere 
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DM 0.6 million, which amounts to approximately 0.2% of the EUAM's total 
budget (EUAM Year unknown-b). Meanwhile, action preceded planning, often 
with disastrous consequences. 
Figure 15: Mostar planning workshop. The handwritten banner on top 
mentions the dates - 29.11- 01.12.1994 (Source: John Yarwood) 
As Figure 15 illustrates, an attempt was clearly made to initiate a planning 
process in December 1994, not long after the EUAM was established. However, 
the Reconstruction Department of EUAM encountered anum ber of hurdles in 
this task. First of all, within the EUAM, there was a driving emphasis on action. 
According to Yarwood, the fact that Mostar was at the time in the eye of the 
media and the European politicians created a lot of pressure on the Administrator 
and his team to deliver clear, brick-and-mortar outputs. 
"[We} were wholly focused on action. There was a politically-driven 
and to some degree} immediate-driven desire to gain political success 
via the media. And therefore the real event was not to say through the 
media 'We 've just approved an absolutely brilliant plan.' That just 
doesn 't impress anybody. . .. So Mr. Koschmk was extremely clear from 
the beginning - 'Mat I want is action. ' He was an extremely practical 
man. It was a case of 'action, not words: and that whole atmosphere I 
think diffused very quickly through the organisation. " (Yarwood, 
interview) 
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The second hurdle was the establishment and functioning of a joint team of 
planners from both sides to prepare the plan. In spite of being promised GIS 
infrastructure (hardware and software), training, and the assurance that they 
could each build their own databases without being forced to share any data or 
information, the political leaders stalled the process. 
«We had proposed that you don't share the information if you don't 
want, but just buy the hardware and software and build your own 
databases on each side. EUAM will pay for everything as well as the 
training. Don't exchange information,' but at least put everything into 
a database. So that in future, when Mostar is one unit {city}, it will be 
easy to combine databases. But they didn't agree. So last year {2007} 
we had to start afresh. "(Raspudic, interview) 
It is unclear when the team was finally established, but before the riots of 
February 199682, which brought the planning activities to a sudden halt 
(Yarwood 1999), it managed to complete a basic assessment of the situation 
which formed the precursor to the plan. A building damage data-base was 
prepared and base mapping was undertaken, which could have served as a basis 
for the planning process. A few local plans, such as one for the Musala area, were 
also commissioned by the EUAM in 1995. There is no sign that this has ever been 
implemented, and in fact it has been impossible to trace this plan in Mostar. No 
resources were allocated by the EUAM for the preparation of any other 
10caVregulation plans for other parts of the city, including the Stari Grad (old 
city) and the central zone. It should be mentioned here that eventually, not one 
but two plans were drawn up for the old city. The first of these was proposed by 
an Italian architect for UNESCO, and aimed at safeguarding and revitalising the 
old city and its architectural heritage (Herscher 1998). This proposal, prepared as 
early as 1997, was never formally adopted by the Mostar - Stari Grad city-
82 The riots were caused by the proposals made in the draft interim Statute which suggested that a 
large area on both sides of the river, including the old town, railway and bus station, major 
infrastructure installations etc, be incorporated in the neutral 'Central Zone.' This was 
unacceptable to the Croats, who attacked the EUAM office and the Administrator. Hans 
Koschnik. For more details. see section 5.3 and footnote 67. 
229 
Chapter 6: Urban planning under the EU4M 
municipality. The second plan was supported by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture. 
This plan emphasised not only reconstruction but also renovation, i.e. correction 
of the planning problems faced by the old city in the past. It was adopted as the 
master plan for the Stari Grad in 2001 (Demirovic, interview). 
Admittedly, it would have been easier to prepare plans for a part of the city 
which was only 'claimed' by one community. Also, both plans were prepared by 
professionals who were largely from outside Mostar. A planning process which 
engaged both communities, and made use of the existing professional capacity 
and institutions within Mostar, was clearly on nobody's list of priorities. 
The work of the joint planning team from east and west Mostar seems to have 
continued haltingly, however, under the guidance of the Office of the Special 
Envoy in Mostar (OSEM). In November 1996, a report titled 'Urban and 
Structural Plan of Mostar: Survey of Data and Analytical Studies' was issued. This 
included some basic background information on the themes of cultural and 
historical heritage, demography and economy, natural environment, water 
supply, sewerage system and energy, and circulation. This was, however, 
extremely basic and disjointed, as each chapter was written by a different author 
or 'expert.' No city-level plan or strategy could thus be prepared in the EUAM or 
OSEM's tenure, and for long afterwards. 
6.23 Independent efforts in planning and reconstruction: "Mostar 2004" 
While the post-war reconstruction of Mostar was being undertaken by EUAM 
and a growing number of other international actors, there were also other efforts 
which were aimed at developing new ideas and alternatives for the rebuilding of 
the city. The most prominent of these was the "Mostar 2004" initiative, launched 
by Mostar architect Amir Pa~ic who fled to Istanbul during the conflict (Bing 
2001). Pa~ic was the Assistant Director of the Institute for preservation of the old 
city (Stari-Grad) before the war, and it was under his watch that Mostar had 
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received the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1986 for the conservation and 
revitalisation of the old city83. 
As early as 1993, Pasic delivered a series of lectures in various U.S. universities 
on the reconstruction of the historic core of Mostar. He was ambitious enough to 
set a date - 2004 (ten years hence) - as the target for completing the 
reconstruction of the city (Pasie, interview) . Perhaps because of his pre-war role, 
he was concerned predominantly with the restoration , reconstruction and 
revival of the Stari Grad, and its most em blematic feature, the Stari Most. 
Figure 16: A poster of the Mostar 2004 campaign, still visible on 
the side of a renovated building off the Bulevar. (Source: author. 
September 2008) 
83 Amir Pasic was the Assistant Director of the agency Stari-Grad, which at the time was a semi-
autonomous organization supported by the Ministry for the Protection of Monuments and 
Nature of the Republic of Herzegovina. According to the Aga Khan award websi te: "Beginning 
in 1977, Stari-Grad spent three years documenting [he hislOric centre. Subsequencly it has 
undertaken the restoration of the river embankments, a 16th century Ottoman tower and 
bndge, a 17th-century clock tower, two mosques, a madrasa, private houses, a tannery and 
shops that date back to the 18th-and-19th centuries. The jury noted that the rehabilitation of 
this wide variety of building types 'has been handled in an exemplary manner{. .. } nothing is 
overdone or tounstic. "' (Source: http://www.akdn.org!akaa_award3_awards.asp) 
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Herscher (1998), Bing (2001) and others have described how the Mostar 2004 
workshops were initiated and conducted in the early years. The first two 
workshops, in 1994 and 1995, were held in Istanbul, and were mainly attended 
by American and other foreign students, with little involvement of Bosnians. 
These were aimed at building an understanding of the social, political and 
architectural context within which Mostar was situated, and eventually led to an 
enlargement of the area of focus for subsequent workshops (from only the old 
city, the expanded scope included key Orthodox and Catholic sites on both sides 
of the river, and buildings which were not only in the Ottoman style but also 
Austro-Hungarian and modem structures) (Bing 2001). Later workshops and 
design studios, some of which were held in Mostar and involved a few local 
architects and planners, proposed design solutions for the reconstruction and 
recovery of various parts of the city, for example, the development of the south 
military site; the redevelopment of the bus and railway station area, which has 
historically been quite underdeveloped; and different concepts for reconstruction 
of the 'Front Line', particularly on the west side (where large areas could be 
densified) (Plunz, Baratloo et aI. 1998). 
A discussion on the purpose and impact of the "Mostar 2004" workshops is 
neither the aim nor the focus of this work. It is important, however, to explore 
the dynamics between this effort and those driven by other international actors 
such as the EUAM, the World Bank, Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils, 
and various other multilateral and bilateral donors. The lack of any 
communication between Pasic, clearly a key player, and the EUAM, is 
particularly telling. 
As a result of the "Mostar 2004" workshop series and the interventions of 
UNESCO, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, the World Bank and other actors, US$ 
12.5 million were raised for the reconstruction of the Old Bridge, and a new 
master plan was adopted for the Stari Grad, in 2001. The bridge was inaugurated 
- as Pasic had foreseen, and indeed, planned - in July 2004. However, the bridge, 
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as noted earlier, is but a much-touted and much-exploited symbol of 
reunification, which in fact does not connect the two divided parts of the city, 
nor the communities which live within them. In fact, in a fairly frank assessment 
of the reconstruction approach adopted in Mostar, in which they were key 
actors, Calame and Pasic (2006) argue that, in hindsight, the reconstruction of 
the bridge and revitalisation of the historic district were perhaps undertaken too 
early. Because these initiatives were not accompanied by similar rehabilitation 
efforts in other parts of the city, the resultant development in Mostar is lopsided 
and unsustainable, and the bridge itself, .~ .. cold comfort to the residents of 
Mostar"(Calame and Pasic 2006: 2). 
The EUAM was at the time undoubtedly preoccupied with restoring normal life 
in a city that was destroyed and divided by the conflict, and in this process had 
to maintain a delicate balance between the major ethnic communities in Mostar. 
It is surprising, therefore, that the Reconstruction Department did not press upon 
Pasic and his collaborators, which included a large number international schools 
of architecture and planning, as well as some students, planners and faculty from 
within Bosnia and Herzegovina, to include a wider geographical area as well as 
thematic scope in their planning and design efforts. The Administration in fact 
seems to have asserted little control over the planning initiatives being 
undertaken independently, while the city was still under its watch and it had the 
authority and opportunity to do so. This was indeed a missed opportunity - the 
processes running in parallel could have in fact been brought together to create 
some synergy, and planning could have been a tool for a more effective and 
sustainable reintegration of the divided city, not just for the "facsimile 
reconstruction"ofits most emblematic elements (Calame and Pasic 2006: 1). 
6.3 Planning for division: Strategies and tactics of local actors 
"Politicians don 't want planning because it puts restn'ctions on them, 
they like situations where they can negotiate, make deals. That is why 
we still have no plan. "(Raspudic, interview) 
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6.3.1 Existing plans and the role of post-war local institutions 
The last urban plan of Mostar, prepared by the pre-war spatial planning institute 
(Zavod za Prostomo Uredjenje Mostar) was approved in 1980. A later document 
was the spatial plan of Mostar, prepared in 1986, with a fifteen-year perspective 
(it was valid until 2000). Pre-war Mostar had about 57 settlements, urban and 
rural, and regulation plans existing before the war covered about half of the 
municipal area. 
When the city administration and all its supporting institutions such as the 
cadastral institute and the spatial planning institute, split into two parts, the 
records were mostly held in the western part of Mostar. As discussed earlier, the 
Croats refused to part with them for almost a year (Bofic, interview). Two 
planning institutes were established on each side, which provided advice on 
revision of plans to the respective city-municipalities (Urbing to the three city-
municipalities in the west,' and Urbanisticki Zavod to the three in the east). The 
two post-war municipalities and their successor city-municipalities consistently 
exploited the absence of an implementable planning framework or any 
regulatory system in the aftermath of the conflict. Many changes were made to 
the regulation plans of Mostar covering the two sides. Most were land use 
changes were made ostensibly to allow for the construction of housing for 
refugees and displaced persons (Markic, interview), or for the construction of 
new facilities such as hospitals (Bubalo, interview). Some green areas within the 
urban core were also notified as construction land, in this process, for example, 
near Hotel Bevanda in west Mostar. Some respondents have suggested, on the 
condition of anonymity, that this particular change was made in order to 
construct villas for the new, powerful politicians of west Mostar. 
It is important to mention here that although the pre-war planning procedures 
tried to ensure public participation in planning at various levels, there were also 
ways and means to bypass this consultation process. One of these was the 
adoption of modifications to regulation plans, which, if approved by the Spatial 
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Planning Institute, did not require public consultation or review. Another tool 
was the "expert opinions" - the Institute or department of urbanism could ask for 
an expert opinion on a particular project (usually post-facto), and as long as the 
expert(s) gave their assent, they didn't need to take the issue to the wider 
community (Cengic, Jamakovic. Sankovic SimCic. Elezovic. interviews). This 
practice continues even today. In Mostar. most changes to the regulation plans in 
the post-war period were made without any discussion or consultation 
whatsoever. 
"The Agency Stari Grad takes care of protection of these [heritage] 
structures, but also gives expert advice. We don't give permission but 
expert opinion. Moever wants to build, they have to ask permission 
from the Federal Ministry in Sarajevo. If someone wants to make 
small changes, they apply to the City of Mostar to ask for permission 
[ ... ] If the object is in the protected zones, they will ask the Agency 
for advice. This Agency will give expert advice to the Institute of 
Urbanism, and they give the permission. If it is an important object, 
they will contact the Federal ministry, and they will give advice." 
(Elezovic, interview) 
Some bigger initiatives were also undertaken by the city-municipalities, such as 
the preparation of a master plan for the old city, initiated by the 'Mostar - Stari 
Grad' city-municipality in 2001. This was based on the agreement signed 
between the City of Mostar, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and the World 
Monuments Fund. While the agreement was signed at the appropriate level (by 
the City of Mostar), the decision to adopt and implement the plan was passed in 
the council of the city-municipality 'Mostar - Stari Grad' on 10th of May 2001 
(Decision about making and implementing the Master Plan of Old Town in 
Mostar 2001). This decision, which quoted the legislation on spatial planning 
prevailing before the war, is evidently in violation of the Interim Statute, which 
had assigned the city planning function to the City of Mostar only. 
In addition to the land use changes and preparation of a few new plans, the city 
municipalities, advised by their respective institutes on the east and west, also 
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permitted the construction of some extremely controversial buildings. According 
to Wimmen (2004), very early in the reconstruction process, the Croats in 
particular started ': .. claiming and nationalizing public space along the former 
front line, and turning it into an image of the nation they intended to build. To 
this end, they started, from the mid-90s onwards, a transparent strategy of 
claiming national space, by either appropriating existing buildings, or erecting 
new ones" (Wimmen 2004: 5). The Franciscan bell tower and the cross on the 
Hum, are examples of the abuse of urban planning and regulatory power for 
consolidating national interests (see Figures 17 and 18). Even so-cailed non-
ethnic projects such as the redevelopment of Hotel Rub are mired in 
controversy, and the differing opinions reflect a distinct nationalist tone, which 
makes it yet another divisive element between the Croats and the Bosniacs. A 
Croat expert involved in the team reviewing the Rufa project stated that: 
"/ had a negative opinion about the project because / think, as a 
professional, it doesn't fit in that area. But they said, she's saying that 
because she's a Croat. That has nothing to do with my professional 
opinion. The report sent to UNESCOIICOMOS presented one point of 
view - that the hotel should be built ... but my opinion was dIfferent. II 
(Sankovic Simcic, interview) 
One of the Bosniac respondents, however, offered this opinion: 
"The Croats have created Medjugorje as the new tourist hub, whereas 
in the past Hotel Ruza used to be where all tours to Medjugorje 
started Now, a large-capacity hotel such as the one being built would 
divert the tourist base from Medjugorje, so they are not allowing it to 
be built. "(Omanovic, interview) 
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Figure 17: The Franciscan bell tower dominates the Mostar skyline from every 
viewpoint. The partially constructed Hotel Rlrla complex can be seen in the 
foreground. (Source: author. December 2006) 
Figure 18: View of the Bulevar, looking south. The Franciscan bell tower and the 
cross on the Hum are powerful Croatian symbols. The open space seen in the 
foreground is the proposed site for an Islamic centre and the subject of an ongoing 
debate on whether it should be allowed. (Source: author, September 2008) 
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6.3.2 Resetdement of refugees and displaced persons 
The problem of housing the refugees and displaced persons was not unique to 
Mostar or its surrounding Canton. Across BiH, the municipal authorities used the 
one " .. . fTeely avalJable resource - parcels of socially-owned land, much of i[ 
agricultural land - in order to address [his burning problem [of housing [he 
displaced)" (ESr 2004: 42). This strategy was also applied in Mostar. There was, 
however, one crucial difference. The resettlement of Croat refugees and rDPs in 
and around Mostar was a well-planned, well-funded initiative by the Croatian 
government, via the Herceg-Bosna authorities, in order to boost their ethnic 
strength in the region (ESr 2004). The creation of new settlements around the 






Figure 19: IDP resettlement in the south of Mostar municipality. not far from the 
urban core (Source: author, September 2008) 
The pre-war Serb residents of Mostar have returned mainly to the rural areas of 
the municipality. Approximately 7000 Serbs have returned to the city, most of 
them to Ortijes, a Croat-controlled area to the south of the municipality. 
238 
Ch apter 6: Urban pJanning under the EUAM 
According to Vujadin Berberovic, a Serb returnee and representative of the Serb 
community: 
"More people got back into the villages than the town centre. It is 
more difficult to survive in the city as there are no jobs. It is much 
easier to find economic activity in the rural area. " (Berberovic, 
interview) 
This is also reinforced by a UNHCR official , Maja Hadzizukovic, as well as 
others, in their interviews. Some fresh attempts are being made, however, to 
promote Serb returns within the urban core. Republika Srpska is one of the 
donors, along with the Federation, the Canton and the city, supporting the 
rebuilding of apartment blocks in and around Santica street and the Bulevar, 
most of which housed a mix of Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs before the war 
(Boskovic, interview) . Authorities hope that the reconstruction of these 
apartments will encourage the Serbs to return to Mostar - however , whether 
they actually return or simply repossess and sell their properties, remains to be 
seen. 
Figure 20: Election poster of the main Serb party (SNSD), just 
prior to the local elections in October 2008. 'MOjB KUCB' means 
'My Home'. It shows a shift in the Republika Srpska (RS) position 
whereby Serbs are being encouraged by RS authorities to return 
to places like Mostar. (Source: author. September 2008) 
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Bosniacs, on the other hand, have been unwilling to move (return or move 
afresh) to Mostar, in large measure due to the lack of economic opportunities, 
but mainly because of the fear of Croat dominance. The demographic changes 
brought about by resettlement of Croat IDPs and non-return of Bosniacs, the 
neglect of the Mostar Bosniacs by Sarajevo, and the very real possibility of 
t~ •• becoming second-class citizens in a fully-centralised city dominated by their 
Croat neighbours" (ICG 2009: 8), were all significant reasons behind the Bosniac 
parties' active opposition to the reunification statute in 2004. 
The Croats, of course, no longer have any incentives to move back to Mostar, 
especially to the eastern side (Catic, Demirovic, Duliman, interviews). According 
Elvir Duliman, the head of a local NGO: 
"There is no legal obstacle any more for people to go back anywhere, 
but they are st111 not ready to do so. Security, employment and the 
economic situation are the main deterrents. Those who moved abroad 
don't see a future here, so they don't want to come back. " (Duliman, 
interview) 
6.3.3 The political struggle to control planning 
The recently-concluded four-year long tussle between the major political actors 
in Mostar to control the planning function within the unified municipal 
administration illustrates how much importance is accorded to this issue by the 
local politicians. Most of this information is derived from internal documents of 
OHR and UN-HABITAT, as well as field interviews. 
Section 5.3 in the previous chapter has already highlighted the problems faced in 
the administrative reunification of the municipality after the imposition of the 
Mostar reunification statute by the OHR. The control of the Spatial Planning! 
Development Institute and definition of its competencies was among the major 
sticking points in implementing the reunification process. In the Yugoslav era, 
the Spatial Planning Institute was charged with producing the broad 
development strategy for the city, as well as spatial, urban plans, and regulation 
240 
Chapter 6: Urban planning under the EUAM 
plans, when asked to do so by the municipal department of urbanism. The 
reunified administration as proposed by the Winterstein Commission foresaw 
only an Urban Planning Department, without the previously existing urban 
. 
planning institutions (Urbing and Urbanisticld Zavod in the west and east, 
respectively). However, during the power sharing talks in 2004 between the 
main political parties (SDA and HDZ), it was agreed that the head of the Urban 
Planning Department would be a Croat. This prompted the Bosniacs to propose 
the formation of a new urban planning institution, with a Bosniac director, and 
instil within it, the authority to approve development plans. 
As it was foreseen to control the development and allocation of land, the control 
of the Spatial Development Institute in divided Mostar became an increasingly 
contentious issue. The two sides agreed that the Director of the Department of 
Urbanism with the municipality would be a Croat, who had already been 
appointed, and the Director of the Spatial Planning Institute would be a Bosniac. 
The SDA proposed the former mayor of Mostar North municipality as their 
candidate. In the Council session scheduled for adopting the decision on the 
Spatial Planning Institute, the SDA proposed an amendment that would give the 
Institute Director complete authority to approve or reject development 
applications in those areas of the City that are not covered by a regulatory plan 
(estimated at 50% of the total municipal area). This move would have given the 
SDA disproportionate control over the future of development in the city and was 
thus strongly opposed by the Croat bloc in the Council, resulting in a political 
impasse that lasted until December 2006 (OHR-South 2006; Curran 2007). The 
establishment of the Institute was finally imposed in the form of a Decision of 
the OHR, along the lines of the original pre-blockade proposal, allocating 
technical responsibilities of planning to the Institute, but also ensuring that the 
regulatory function stayed with the Department of Urbanism of the city 
administration (OHR 2006). 
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6.4 Why urban planning failed under the EUAM? 
The preceding discussion gives us some insights into the approach to 
reconstruction and urban planning adopted by the EUAM. The key reasons for 
the failure of the Administration to produce a plan or institute a new (or 
modified) planning system are summarised below. 
• Little consideration for the old planning system. existing plans. and 
planners: The EUAM initiated the process to prepare an 'All Mostar 
Structure Plan' in early 1995. However, there was an existing spatial plan 
and urban for Mostar, which had been prepared not long before the 
conflict began (at the end of the 1980s). These plans, although 
conventional, provided a useful background and basis from which the 
preparation of a new plan could have been initiated. Undoubtedly, the 
situation had changed dramatically due to the war, and new emergency 
priorities had to be addressed. Yet, an understanding of the old plans and 
planning systems could have cut a lot of the lead-up time for the planning 
team. 
('Some of the internationals also came with the idea of starting from 
zero point: [as if] nothing had been here before. This approach 
produced distance between the international team and the local 
team. " (Cengic, interview) 
• A new type of planning: The Structure Plan, a very British innovation 
proposed by John Yarwood, was a new animal for the planners of Mostar, 
who were experienced and well-versed in the Yugoslav system of spatial 
plans, urban development plans (master plans), and regulation (local) 
plans. Admittedly, it may have been a more effective approach towards 
planning in the post-war environment. However, the preparation of a 
new type of plan, when the legal framework were unclear, seemed like a 
waste of time to many professionals. It appears from a number of 
interviews that despite the efforts put in to develop the Structure Plan, 
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the planners didn't quite understand the concept. The Italian chief of the 
urban planning section also seemed convinced that it was a detailed 
exercise which involved collecting vast amounts of data and information, 
rather than a broad development 'guide' which the Structure Plan is 
meant to be (Yarwood, interview). Indeed, the partially completed 
structure plan, of which I have a copy, appears remarkably like a 
masterplan - comprehensive and long-winded84• Clearly, most of the local 
planners just did what they knew best, but also felt unable to use the pre-
war planning documents because they felt they had to follow the 'new' 
approach. Others simply t~ •• played along in order to please the 
internationals. " (Puljic, interview) 
• Lack of an institutional approach: The EUAM tried to do everything 
themselves, with the involvement of their limited local staff, or by hiring 
European consulting firms. The local architects or planners hired by the 
EUAM in different departments worked under European directors who 
were significantly less informed, and sometimes less qualified, than 
themselves. As with other institutions, they also failed to acknowledge 
the existence and capacity of the pre-war planning institute (split into 
two by the time they arrived), and build on the existing institutional 
structures. This approach led to weakening of any existing planning 
capacities, and indeed, a 'de-skilling' of local planning professionals in 
Mostar. The knowledge and experience of local professionals was put to 
little use by the EUAM, or for that matter, by the OHR (Bofic, Pintul, 
interview). 
84 This is also the case with a strategic plan for Sarajevo, prepared in 1994 by a specialist 
(international) office established at the time. In the words of Skotte, N ••• they came to Sarajevo, 
they not only brought money and know-how, but also strategic planning as a mode of planning. 
The strategic planning approach (pn'oritising, action-oriented etc) was applied mainly to 
infrastructure. But when the strategic plan for Sarajevo was made, it was hopeless. It was not 
strategic at all, there was no strategy or priorities or choices in it. It was B mode of planning 
imposed by internationals without being grounded in the way people think or do things here. II 
(Skotte. interview) 
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"They rEUAMJ didn't choose the right way of planning, they didn't build 
up the local institutions. Then it could have also been separated from 
politics. They just didn't want to do it the right way. If they had put effort 
and money into rebuilding the Institute and used pre-war planning 
capacity, and maybe just brought in some expens, it would have been a 
better way to do things. " (Pintul, interview) 
• Misplaced priorities of the urban planning section: The urban planning 
section within the EUAM's Reconstruction Department also focused its 
early attentions mainly on developing building databases, mapping and 
collecting detailed background information. and less on strategic thinking 
and building a collective vision for the city. The existing spatial and urban 
plans could have been used to initiate some strategic thinking for future 
development of Mostar. and the regulation plans could have been useful 
in order to check illegal construction and appropriation of land. as well as 
launch some quick impact projects. The large number of consultants 
being deployed by the Department could have taken care of the detailed 
inventory and building database. In the end. however. there was no 
integrated effort to address concerns of economic rehabilitation, 
employment. housing and planning. 
• Laissez-faire rebuildini: In order to ensure planned reconstruction and 
development in the city. a strict moratorium on random reconstruction, 
change of land use or ownership should have been imposed across the 
city. It was assumed that this would be done by the City of Mostar which 
came into existence after the adoption of the Interim Statute in early 
1996. By then. however. it was too late, as the City-Municipalities 
proceeded apace to approve opportunistic land use changes and building 
works. According to Zarko Markie. the Director of Urbanism: 
"Each city-municipaHty made regulation plans and changes to existing 
plans. They made hundreds of regulation plans over the years. Most of 
these were light deviations. But today. eighteen years after the war, the 
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question of whether this was supposed to happen is not really useful. It is 
reality now, it exists on the ground II (Marldt, interview) 
• Prevailing political environment: It is generally felt that the EU 
Administration was short-sighted, focused too much on visible results, 
didn't engage adequately with local professionals, failed to establish the 
rule of law, especially vis-a-vis reconstruction, and was unable to rebuild 
local institutions. At the same time, a number of respondents also felt that 
the Administration had an impossible task (Cengit, Bofit, interviews), 
given the political situation, the level of mistrust and the complete lack of 
goodwill between the key protagonists, at the time. 
"Because the old spatial plan lasted unt111998, these guys [the 
politicians} didn't have any interest to touch it. It was a political 
problem. Because if you're a Bosniac mayor and you do something 
which is unacceptable [to the Croats}, a bomb will be thrown under 
your car. So they silently left it to the municipalities. II (Bofit, 
interview) 
"You need consensus for planning, but it is impossible [at the time). 
So I don't blame them (EUAM). You are given a country which is 
in a war, there are two of three major parties, it's a bloody conflict-
and you're asked to work in it... Of course, planning can support 
division, and reunification as well. But when there is no consensus 
on having tlnot divided" society, then what [can planning do}?" 
(Cengit, interview) 
6.5 Conclusion 
In the post-EUAM years. reaching agreement on a single urban planning 
institution and a common urban plan for the entire city was seen at different 
stages by various international organisations and individuals as an important 
confidence building measure amongst the communities and a mechanism for 
strengthening local governance (OHR-South 2004). In 1997, the Secretary 
General of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, Geneva, Dr. Suha Ozkan 
asserted that tiThe preparation for the Master Plan for Greater Mostar is a must. " 
(quoted in Mostar 2004 Workshop: Report 1997 1997: 66) Updating pre-war 
245 
Chapter 6: Urban planning under the EUAM 
maps and plans, discouraging an excessive reliance on tourism in the long-run, 
and the diversification of the economic base of the city, were all issues 
highlighted in the same workshop in 1997. In 2005, upon the request of the 
municipality, UN-HABITAT placed an urban planning adviser within the city 
administration, for a period of two years, and attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to 
raise resources from donors for the preparation of a new urban plan for Mostar 
(Curran 2007). Around the same time, the World Bank approved a project on 
urban infrastructure for Mostar, which included a loan of KM 1 million for the 
preparation of an 'urban management development plan' (World Bank 2006b). 
Yet, fifteen years after the war, little progress has been made in achieving these 
objectives. 
In contrast to the EUAM, OHR and other international agencies, the evidence of 
other (predominantly local) actors' active interest in urban planning and 
reconstruction is strewn across the City. On a positive note, the Stari Most has 
been rebuilt, the Stari Grad revitalised, a plan for the old city formally adopted 
and currently under implementation. On the other hand, the changes made by 
the erstwhile city-municipalities to regulation plans and the structures loaded 
with ethnic symbolism constructed subsequently are also visible for all to see. 
The strong politician-businessman nexus has led to a large number of illegal land 
use changes, land grabs and unauthorised constructions85, converting public space 
to private, public enterprises to ethnically-controlled private ones. The ethnic-
based tussle for the control of the planning authority continues. 
This begs the question whether the EUAM's positive contributions were in fact 
marginal to the reconstruction of Mostar in the long-term, given that their work 
seems to have been undertaken not so much within an imbalanced planning 
context as with total disregard to the planning context and long term goals. More 
85 At the time of writing (April 2009), the Director of Urbanism of Grad Mostar had been charged 
with illegally approving land use changes and allowing at least three private supermarkets to be 
established on public land. An investigation is now being launched. 
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than its investment in reconstruction, it is the absence of any vision, strategy or 
regulation on the part of EUAM, which seems to have contributed in a 
significant manner to the way Mostar is today. 
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7.0 Introduction 
"The example of Mostar shows that having a lot of money to throw 
around doesn't buy you everything. Because certainly the EU 
Administration spent huge, disproportionate sums of money in 
Mostar, to very h"ttle effect. " (Wheeler, interview) 
The last two chapters discussed the pre-and post-war situation in Mostar, how 
the reconstruction of the city was initiated and implemented, and the degree to 
which urban planning was utilised by the EUAM (and other actors) in this 
process. Based on this discussion, along with the review of literature and 
theoretical framing in Section I, the success or failure of early post-war 
reconstruction efforts in Mostar can be seen as a product of three aspects. The 
first of these can be described as endogenous, as they relate to EUAM itself, its 
strengths and weaknesses. An assessment of these vis-a-vis what are seen in 
literature as key factors for the success of any Transitional Administration, can 
lead us to important lessons and perhaps some additional considerations to keep 
in mind while installing future T As. This is undertaken in the first section of this 
chapter. 
There were also a number of other, exogenous, aspects which influenced the 
reconstruction process, as well as the possibility of reunification of Mostar. The 
in-conflict and post-conflict political, social and economic environment across 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (and within Mostar), high levels of mistrust and 
insecurity. vested interests of various political players. and how they played out 
in Mostar. forms the second aspect. This is discussed in the second part of this 
chapter. 
The third aspect relates to urban planning. It has been seen in literature that 
urban planning has both potentials and limitations in the post-war 
reconstruction process. While on the one hand it can help provide a long-term 
perspective and kickstart economic recovery (for example, seen in post- Second 
World War Europe). as well support inclusive development (seen in some 
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developing countries where the urban planning system is being reformed), it can 
also be used to demonstrate power, to dominate and to divide (e.g. in Jerusalem 
and the West Bank; Fao in Iraq; Beirut in Lebanon, etc). How this played out in 
Bosnia and in Mostar, forms the third aspect of this analysis. The fourth and final 






Figure 21: The three strands of analysis 
7.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the EDAM, and some lessons for 
Transitional Administrations 
7.1.1 Key detennining factors for any Transitional Administration s success 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there is a growing body of literature focusing on 
Transitional Administrations, the conditions in which they are established, their 
widely variable mandates, structures, capacities and resources. The key success 
factors for any Transitional Administration were summarised in the same chapter 
as: (a) a clear and time-bound mandate with a specific end-state to aim for; (b) an 
appropriate level of military, financial and human resources, (c) appropriate 
250 
Chapter 7: EUAM's legacy 
decentralisation of decision-making and implementation powers between the 
international masters, the TA and the local actors; and, (d) the willingness and 
ability of the T A to work with a wide range of domestic interlocutors 
(Chesterman 2001; Schoups 2001; Chopra 2002; Baskin 2003; Rathmell2005). 
An attempt can be made to assess the EUAM vis-a-vis these broadly accepted 
determinants of success. First of all, the Administration had an extremely broad 
and ambitious mandate, and the expected goal - creating the conditions for a 
unified city - was as vague as it was unrealistic, given the EUAM's time frame. 
The EUAM identified 'reconstruction of the city and reunification of its police 
force' as the twin-pronged strategy to achieve this clearly impossible goal. 
Second, in terms of resources, while the EUAM was provided with a sizeable 
budget, it was not backed up by "military muscle" (Williams, interview), and nor 
by political support at the highest level in the European Council. Furthermore, 
its staff members were drawn from different European countries and had little 
experience in administering fragile, highly contested territories just emerging 
from devastating ethnic conflict. 
liThe main problem is that these internationals, they think they know 
everything. Even if he [Hans Koschnik} is a (former) Mayor of not a 
town but a village of 10,000 people in Germany. he [thinks he} knows 
everything from the first day and doesn't need any advice. " (Pa~ic, 
interview) 
Third, the EUAM received little guidance from its European masters, and 
equally, had little control over, or accountability to, the local actors responsible 
for day-to-day governance of the city. It was thus not hard for them to imagine 
they were working in a vacuum, and invent strategies as they went along. 
Finally, the willingness and ability of EUAM to work with local actors, including 
politicians, professionals, elected representatives, civil society organisations and 
citizens at large, was severely compromised by the lack of enforcement powers, 
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its limited temporal mandate (two years), and its poor understanding of the pre-
war Yugoslav context, institutions and governance arrangements. 
liThe EU Administration was not an administration, it was a money 
dispensing machine. They had no power, no muscle, no political or 
military backing basically. So both sides just ignored them [ ... J they 
made all the right noises but waited out EUAM's phase. " (Williams, 
interview) 
A more detailed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of EUAM follows 
below. 
7.1.2 Strengths olthe EUAM 
The signing of the Washington Agreement in 1994 and the placing of Mostar 
under an external administration provided an extremely important opportunity 
for the reconstruction and recovery of this war-divided city. A key strength of 
the EUAM was its early start - it was established in 1994 when the war had not 
yet ended, and had a head start over reconstruction efforts undertaken in other 
parts of the country. 
An even more important aspect was the Administration's sizeable reconstruction 
budget, mentioned frequently in this research. Bosnia received some of the 
largest per capita aid in recent reconstruction history. According to Barakat and 
Zyck, the annual per capita non-military assistance provided to Bosnia within 
the first two years after the conflict was US$679, over five times more than that 
provided to Germany under the Marshall Plan, and ten times greater than that 
provided to Afghanistan (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1070). The European 
Commission's eagerness to test its newly formulated Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, as discussed already in Chapter 5, also came with a significant 
commitment of resources, both human and financial, to the Mostar 'project'. In 
the end, the EUAM spent the equivalent of about 144 million ECU during its 
term. Other donors, including multilateral and bilateral agencies, as well as 
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international NGOs - especially those providing humanitarian assistance -
quickly followed86• 
Unfortunately, this large sum of money 'dispensed' by EUAM was not adequately 
leveraged to establish any basis for the long-term development of the city, or to 
undo its ethnic partition. Projects were implemented quickly and efficiently, but 
were often based on compromises made with different nationalist groups. The 
need for building a thorough understanding of the context and taking a long-
term view was severely undermined by the urgency to spend the allocated 
resources. 
"The EUAM spent a lot of money in Mostar, I helieve the equivalent 
of 150 million Euro, hut with very little leverage. It was a very 
difficult period, hut still, the EUAM's resources could have heen used 
more effectively and successfully. The impact should have heen much 
greater ... I think this is a prohlem with short-term administrations -
they want results quickly, hut working with all the groups needs 
time. And you cannot split them further just to get results in the 
short-term, you cannot make distinctions from the heginning - a 
neutral approach to the prohlem is critical FinaJJy, I also think that 
they had their own preconceived ideas and were not responsive to the 
locals. " (FranCic, interview) 
7.1.3 Weakne~es olme EUAM 
The EU Administration was clearly constrained by the provisions of the Geneva 
MoU, as well as the approach of the European Council and each country which 
• 
contributed staff to the mission. For Europe, Mostar was a first experiment in 
international administration, a 'learning by doing' experience for which there 
were no standard operating procedures. 
86 It appears, however, that there is no consolidated information on how much international aid 
Mostar has received till date. Most donors operate independently and deal directly with their key 
interlocutors - the municipality, local and international NGOs, community groups, UN agencies 
etc. Even the aid received by the municipal administration cannot be verified, as the two 
municipalities (existing until early 1997), and later, the six city-municipalities (merged only in 
2004), have either never maintained or simply not shared their records on donor support 
(Kamerit, interview). 
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To begin with, clearly, the main international players - Europe and the United 
States - were hasty in declaring Mostar to be the lodestone for the Federation, 
central to its success, integral to the co-existence of Croats and Bosniacs. The 
international community failed to anticipate the levels of animosity and 
significantly overestimated the ability and interest of victims, perpetrators, and 
all those affected by the conflict, to come together again. 
Furthermore, the decision to fix the term of the EUAM in advance, to a very 
short period of two years, was a critical factor which worked against the 
reunification of the city. Those who opposed reunification either simply refused 
to cooperate, or made the right noises in public but failed to keep their promises. 
The Administration had no real political leverage, and even its economic 
leverage (the huge amounts of reconstruction aid being poured into Mostar) was 
only limited to one side (the Bosniacs), as the Croatian side really did not need 
that much assistance and therefore could not be coerced to cooperate on 
reunification of the city. The inability of the EUAM - and indeed the wider 
international community - to exert any control on the Croatian government was 
a major factor inhibiting the systematic reconstruction and reunification of the 
city. 
The Administration also had very little guidance from the Council, and its 
diverse team drawn from all contributing countries often pulled the EUAM in 
different directions. The directors of the different departments were not 
appointed on the basis of their capability or experience, and often reverted to 
their own capitals when decisions needed to be made (Special Report concerning 
the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, 
Mostar (EUAM) 1996; Reichel 2000). Furthermore, the over-arching emphasis on 
the Administration's 'European-ness' meant that the opportunity to employ 
experienced professionals from other parts of the world, and indeed from within 
Bosnia itself, was lost. 
254 
Chapter 7: EUAlvf's Jegacy 
There were also a number of internal weaknesses of the Administration. No clear 
strategy was defined early enough to determine how the objectives of the 
mission would be achieved. There were no standard operating procedures. A 
report by the Court of Auditors points out that different departments within the 
EUAM often followed different procedures, ended up paying differential rates to 
the same contractors, and often simply did not know what their colleagues were 
doing. There was a ': .. lack of appropn'ate financial and management accounting 
tools, capable of recording properly the EUAM's financial operations and 
generating accounts along with meaningful management information" (Special 
Report concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union 
Administration, Mostar (EUAM) 1996: 10). An 'emergency' approach and a rush 
to spend the allocated funds dominated EUAM's work throughout its mandate. 
The emphasis on demolition, repair, winterisation and reconstruction of 
individual structures was not carried out with a long-term strategic view. The 
reliance on foreign consulting firms for most of these activities, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, meant that an opportunity was missed to utilise and 
enhance local capacities, and thus lay the foundations for rebuilding the 
economy. In sum, EUAM often compromised on its long-term goal of 
reunification of the city in order to achieve the short-term objectives of 
rebuilding as much as they could, and through that, spending their allocated 
budget, within a two-year window. This was not done unknowingly, however, as 
strategy document of May 1995 makes clear: 
" ... under the constraint to spend the allocated funds in Mostar during 
our remaining presence, we cannot wait until the shape of a future -
unified - administration of Mostar is sufficiently defined We need 
some gw'delines for our actions now and independent of the future 
constitution of Mostar municipality." (EUAM 1995: 7. emphasis 
added) 
Finally. very little coordination was seen between the EUAM and other actors 
who were beginning to establish their activities in Mostar after the Dayton 
255 
Chapter 7: EUAM's Jegacy 
agreement - for instance, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the World Bank, as 
well as UNESCO, ICOMOS and other international organisations interested in 
the reconstruction of the Stari Most and Starl Grad. There was an overlap of at 
least a year between the closure of EUAM and the arrival of the other 
organisations (an EUAM documen~ dated July 1995 mentions the allocation of 
DM 1.6 million to a housing repair project of the DRC). Yet, there seems to have 
been no handover strategy, or discussion on the way forward between the 
Administration and the incoming actors. 
Another factor which hampered the EUAM's effectiveness was the extremely 
limited understanding of pre-war institutional structures, rules, regulations and 
procedures, especially vis-a-vis construction, land use allocation, cadastre, and 
spatial planning. Indeed, the Yugoslav-era systems were cumbersome and 
inefficient, but understanding them was crucial in order to make the best of the 
existing professional capacity in these areas. The EUAM, and the international 
community as a whole, rejected the Yugoslav systems outright, and made little 
effort to engage with the large number of qualified local professionals or with 
citizens, which in Mostar created a resentment against the foreign experts and 
their foreign ideas that lasts till this day. Today, the planning system is virtually a 
replica of the system which existed in the former Yugoslavia, with a complex 
system and multiple layers of plans, long and cumbersome procedures, a 
multitude of institutions, and yet no strategic thinking or true participation. An 
opportunity to reform the system by taking local professionals into confidence 
was clearly missed in the early days after the conflict. 
Finally, the poor enforcement capacity of the EUAM led to the non-
implementation of the 'integrative provisions' of the Interim Statute, namely, the 
City of Mostar's control on urban planning, infrastructure and finance. These in 
turn led to a failure to prevent illegal appropriation of land, land use changes and 
budget allocation at will by the city-municipalities, and private capture of state 
property, all of which contributed to the deepening of the city's partition. 
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The above discussion illustrates that the EUAM had several weaknesses, some of 
which were quite critical in determining its short-term outputs and long-term 
impact. At the same time, the blame for the failure to reunify Mostar cannot be 
laid solely at the door of the EUAM. The international community's approach 
and strategies were responsible to a significant degree for perpetuating the 
divisions in the city, and many of these lay outside the EUAM's control. 
7.1.4 Additional success factors for TAs engaged in reconstruction, recovery 
and reunification efforts 
The EUAM was a unique experiment in the fact that it was an attempt by a 
regional organisation (the European Union) to assume the administration of a 
small territory within a sovereign state (the city of Mostar), but without 
executive authority (which was retained by the local governments of east and 
west Mostar), and with weak enforcement powers (further undermined by the 
inability of the European leaders to back up the EU Administrator and his 
decisions). The latter two aspects in fact reduced the Administration effectively 
to a reconstruction agency rather than the umbrella governance institution for 
the city. The EUAM's major contribution to the dty of Mostar is seen as the 
restoration of essential services and rehabilitation of infrastructure and some 
housing. The long-term impact of the Administration is measured by many in 
terms of what it failed to achieve (economic recovery of the city, equalisation of 
living conditions in the two parts of the city, control of illegal construction, etc.), 
rather than the immediately-visible outcomes of its work, such as the 
reconstructed roads and bridges, schools and hospitals. 
The experience of EUAM can, however, add some additional success factors to 
those listed in section 1.1 of this chapter. These are listed below. 
• A thorough understanding of the context, existing legal and policy 
framework, local institutions, capacities and path-dependencies. 
Undoubtedly, such comprehension does not corne easily in the short-
term, but it is critical in order to devise solutions to the particular 
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situation, which might have a greater chance of local buy-in and success, 
as opposed to the standard formula of establishing a liberal peace. 
• A deardefinidon o/what the TA is meant, and not meant, to be. TAs at 
the local level should not mistake their prime responsibility as that of 
providing humanitarian relief or reconstruction assistance. If the TA's 
mandate is to lay the ground for sustainable and inclusive long-term 
development, reconciliation and reunification, then its strategies must be 
tailored accordingly. 
• An operational capacity and time-frame commensurate with goals. 
Leaving too early can be as dangerous as staying on too long. An optimum 
time-period and clear resource allocation is essential for any TA. Staffmg 
arrangements within the TA must include a diverse group of professionals 
with knowledge and understanding of the context and the complex task 
at hand. 
• A dear long-term perspective, including an exit or handover strategy that 
considers international as well as local actors and their capacities. Donor 
coordination and partnership-building must be included within the 
mandate of the TA, and be accepted by key international and local 
interlocutors. On its part, the T A should plan for its eventual closure by 
developing a medium- to long-term vision and strategy in consultation 
with key partners, as well as a clear handover strategy which delineates 
the responsibilities of other actors at the end of its mandate. 
7.2 BosniaIMostar: Opportunities and Threats 
7.21 Opportunities in early post-war years 
Although the city and country had been severely battered during the war, there 
were also some positive local conditions which had the potential to take EUAM's 
reconstruction and reunification agenda forward. Many of the citizens of Mostar 
who had been brought up during the Tito era were committed to the Yugoslav 
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ideals, and the Yugoslav period was in fact the only time in its history that 
Mostar achieved a state that can be considered close to assimilation87, Some of 
these people chose to stay back or return to Mostar after the war, and champions 
could have been found among these groups to support the one-Mostar idea. 
In addition, there were also a large number of qualified urban development 
professionals in the city - architects, planners, conservationists etc - who could 
have provided knowledge, support and momentum to the reconstruction and 
reunification process. Funher, the city had a pre-existing development strategy 
and spatial and urban plans - however flawed, these could have been used to 
initiate the discussion on reconstruction, and build ownership of the process 
among local professionals. 
The growing interest of other international organisations in securing global 
recognition for a rebuilt Mostar as a symbol of multi-ethnic co-existence, and the 
increasing number of volunteers - architects, researchers, artists and others -
interested in Mostar, was also an important opportunity that could have been 
used to build the momentum and a campaign for a united Mostar. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the "Mostar 2004" campaign, launched in 1993, held 
workshops every year in different locations with architecture students, 
researchers, academics and other interested actors, on the reconstruction of 
Mostar (Kron 2000). This campaign, however, remained separate from the work 
the international community was doing on the ground. A small but growing 
number of local professionals willing to collaborate across ethnic lines could have 
also been brought together to define a joint vision and strategy for the future of 
the city, but this was initiated only half-heartedly, and thus met with limited 
success. 
87 See analysis presented in Chapter 5 
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7.22 Threats to reconstruction and reunification 
As discussed in earlier chapters on Bosnia and Mostar, historically as well as in 
the immediate pre-war years, there were faultlines within Mostarian society and 
physical segmentation within the city, which came to the surface during the war. 
The pre-Yugoslav pluralism had been 'papered over' during the Yugoslav era by 
slogans of 'brotherhood and unity'. Questions of national identity were 
suppressed and swept under the carpet by Tito's personality and policies. After 
his death, nationalist inclinations began to resurface. The war brought them to a 
head. 
"National and social segregation could be seen, both in the life and in 
the picture of the town [of Mostarj. However, in SFRY, socialist and 
multi-national state of equal nations and nationalities: it was 
forbidden to talk about it." (Urban and Structural Plan of Mostar: 
Survey of Data and Analytical Studies (Final Report) 1996: 5) 
The conflict in Mostar was one of the most extreme and bloody episodes in the 
three-year war in Bosnia, and ripped the city apart. The influence of Croatian 
leaders on the Herzegovinian leaders, the determination to set up the ethnically 
homogeneous entity of Herceg-Bosna with Mostar as its capital, and the lack of 
any goodwill whatsoever on the part of the Croats, were all underestimated by 
those who sought to reunify MostarM. The transformation of the community, 
with the departure of urban Mostarians and the influx of large number of 
displaced persons from ethnically homogeneous rural areas, were also important 
factors which hampered the reconstruction of Mostar, and stalled the progress 
towards its reunification. 
Repercussions of the more general failures of the international community in 
Bosnia, including the political and territorial separation imposed by the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, the misguided emphasis on early elections, the failed 
privatisation process (at least in the first round), and the initial emphasis on 
88 These aspects have been discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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majority returns (and neglect of minority returns. especially before 1997). all of 
which led to territorial consolidation ethnic groups and divisions instead of a 
return to multi-ethnicity. were also felt in Mostar (Donais 2002; Pugh 2002; Bose 
2005; Heimerl 2005; Pugh 2005). The main issues relating to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement have already been explored in previous chapters. The second was the 
emphasis on elections. In Mostar. as well as across Bosnia. the first post-war 
elections merely served to strengthen the positions of hardline nationalists who 
were overwhelmingly voted into power (Klemencic and Schofield 1996; Bose 
2002; Bose 2003). This has also been discussed at length in the previous chapter. 
It is important here to explain the remaining two aspects in a little more detail. 
The failure of privatisation. already discussed in Chapter 4 on Bosnia. can be 
attributed to the (perhaps naIve) assumption that standardised privatisation 
programmes applicable to transition countries could be applied to Bosnia as well. 
and that privatisation (in this manner) would lead to a '~ .. [de-politicisation of] 
economic life and [. . .] provide the basis for economic recovery and growth" 
(Donais 2002: 2). eventually leading to a peaceful co-existence and a return to the 
pre-war mixed society. It failed. however. on all these counts. turning into '~ .. a 
corrupt, ethnicized and protracted struggle for power, which has done little to 
stimulate economic growth or promote inter-ethnic reconciliation" (Donais 
2002: 2). This was also visible in Mostar, where the privatisation of the single 
revived production unit - the aluminium factory - through what has been 
described as t~ •• an example of crony capitalism" (Pugh 2005: 451). has actually 
deepened the ethnic divide over the years. 
"We don't have any factories in this [eastern] part of town, and there, 
on the other side, there are no jobs for our people. So how can we be 
'together'?,,(Omanovic2, interview) 
Last, but not the least. the returns policy of the international community also 
affected the situation in Mostar. Heimerl (2005) highlights that the fact that until 
1996. the international community concentrated on the safer and more do-able 
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task of majority returns, that is, the return of refugees and displaced persons to 
areas which were controlled by their own ethnic group. In 1996, more than 
250,000 returns were recorded across the country. Initial decisions relating to 
housing reconstruction, new housing construction and allocation of housing 
were left largely to local authorities, who " ... continued demographic 
engineering, focusing on creating incentives for their own IDPs to setde 
permanently where it benefited their respective ethnic agendas. Entity, canton 
and most often, municipal authorities achieved this through the distribution of 
building plots, construction materials, business premises and commercial real 
estate to displaced persons" (Heimerl 2005: 379). The result, clearly not 
anticipated by the international community, was significant ethnic consolidation 
in the early post-war years. This, coupled with the unexpected election results in 
1997 and the increasing political power of nationalists, as discussed above, led to 
a revised returns agenda from 1997 onwards, focusing this time on minority 
returns. This, too, was unsustainable in the long run, as it failed to ", .. take into 
account the changed social, political and economic circumstances in Bosma" 
(Chandler 2005: 317)89, 
Mostar had approximately 40,000 displaced persons in 1994 (Yarwood 1999: 4). 
In 2000, this number had fallen to about 20,000, whereas in 2007, there were 
only 1274 persons in Mostar recognised as IDPs (Vetters 2007: 206), However, 
these figures are misleading as they do not reveal the extent of population 
turnover and transformation during and since the conflict. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, considerable resettlement of Croat refugees and displaced 
89 A recent report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IOMC) observes that many 
IDPs still face a range of obstacles to return including issues relating to livelihoods and economic 
opportUnities. a feeling of insecurity in areas where they would be in a minority of they returned. 
access to education. etc., as well as a "limited desire to return." In view of these issues. it 
concludes that ". .. the overwhelming focus on reconstruction is increasingly recognised as an 
incomplete approach to return, which requires a broader range of sustainability measures, as well 
as to securing solutions for those who cannot or do not want to return. More than 12 years after 
the war. it has become evident that the ethnic repartition resulting from the war cannot be 
completely undone. "(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008: 16) 
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persons was undertaken with covert support of the Croatian government 
(although exact numbers are unavailable). That, coupled with the unwillingness 
of Bosniacs and Serbs to return to Mostar in large numbers, has permanently 
altered the demographic structure, and consequently, the power equations, in the 
city. 
7.23 Lessons for other reconstruction efforts 
An assessment of the context within which EUAM was operating brings out 
certain key moments or positive developments - windows of opportunity - that 
could have been used to support the reunification goal, but were unfortunately 
missed. It also identifies some critical threats - negative developments that 
occurred around this time - which had a significant impact on the work of 
EUAM. It might be useful for T As to be cognizant of some of these elements, so 
they can be better prepared to manage the risks to their objectives. 
• Using local resources is not optional Tapping local resources, particularly 
knowledge, skills and positive attitudes, can be a significant factor 
contributing to a T A's success. Much has been said and written about 
involving the local community and beneficiaries, but local professionals 
in Mostar, particularly architects and planners, were clearly marginalised 
by the EUAM in the initial reconstruction effort. 
• Transformation of the dty and sodety is a reality. The failure to recognise 
that the urban community has transformed during the war by the 
departure of those with high mobility and opportunities, and influx of 
large numbers of displaced persons, can lead to unrealistic objectives and 
misplaced priorities. This can significantly undermine the efforts of the 
TA, as it did in Mostar. 
• Political elites will necessarily push for their own agendas. Establishing 
the rule of law is as important as establishing security in the aftermath of 
conflict, especially at the local level where political and financial elites 
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can closely linked and become all-powerful. In Mostar, the war-time 
Mayors of both east and west Mostar were also rich investors in their own 
right. While on the west, Mijo Brajkovic eventually became the owner of 
AluminijMostar, a large number of properties and commercial enterprises 
on the east side were owned by Safet Orucevic. The EUAM for the most 
part ignored their activities, which led to the capture of important assets 
by these actors, undermined the rule of law and institutionalised corrupt 
practices. 
• The big picture is important. In Mostar, the reunification project of the 
international community was backed by the Croats only after a change in 
leadership in Croatia in 2003 (Williams, interview), when the latter sent 
out a clear message that the 'Herceg-Bosna' project was all but abandoned. 
The influence of Croatia and its forceful efforts to create the third entity 
were underestimated by those who sought to reunify Mostar in the early 
days of the conflict. If better understood. more realistic strategies could 
have been adopted towards the 'normalisation' of life in Mostar, in the 
initial days, instead of pushing for 'reunification' which in fact led to the 
stalling of development. 
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Endogenous factors (internal to EUAWlC) Exogenous factors (external to EUAWlC) 
Strengths Opportunities 
• Early start - establishment of the Administration in 1994 • Bosniac interest in retaining Mostar as a unified city 
• High levels of human and financial resources • Pre-war generation showed signs of assimilation, especially within the 
• Presence of international troops urban core 
• Large number of professionals such as architects. planners etc for a small 
city (high existing capacity) 
• Willingness of professionals on both sides (who remained or returned) to 
cooperate. despite political intransigence 
• Existence of a spatial plan, urban plan and related documentation 
• Interest of international agencies such as UNESOO. WMF. ICOMOS etc to 
rebuild the Stari Grad and revive Mostar's world heritage status 
• Increasing interest of international 'freelancers' (architects. researchers. 
volunteers) in Mostar 
Weaknesses Threats 
• Goals and objectives too ambitious. especially for a two-year mandate A. Social, ~olitical and economil,;; environment in BiH and Mostar 
,. Lack of a clear and achievable set of outcomes for EUAM • Society divided under the mrface (historically). frozen by Yugoslav policies 
• Focus on details of reconstruction (demolition, winterisation, repair. • Spatial development of the city in distinct phases and patterns 
reconstruction) without broader vision or long-term strategy 
• Spatial concentration of population according to nationality in rural areas 
• Pressure to spend all allocated funds within the two-year time-frame of municipality as well as surrounding region 
• Limited coordination with other actors (e.g. international NGOs. World Bank. • Hard division of the city into ethnically cleansed areas of east and west 
etc) Mostar. and Croat insistence on keeping the town divided 
• I ;rnited understanding of pre-war institutional structures for spatial planning. • Main social and economic assets located on the western side of the Neretva 
cadastral systems. construction, etc. (and thus under Croat control during and after the war) 
• Limited participation of local actors Jprofessionals or citizens) in • Exodus of Mostari intellectuals. professionals. prominent citizens - not 
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reconstruction efforts 
• Failure to implement the unifying provisions of the Interim. Statute 
• Failure to prevent illegal appropriation of land. land use changes, 
construction, and private capture of state property 
• No handover strategy 
enough local champions to promote reunification 
• Influx of large numbers displaced persons from surrounding areas 
(predominantly rural settlements or small towns) 
B. Broader Ie strategies and decisions for Bosnia. and their impacts 
• Hasty decision to establish Mostar as the lodestone for the Federation 
• Predetermined and fixed temporal mandate (two years) of EUAM 
• Limited guidance and unclear chain of command from the Commission to 
EUAM Division of the EUAM team (staft) along EU country lines (a head of 
department post for each country). 
• Pre-Dayton agreement to split the city into six city-municipalities, realised 
(and cast in stone) through the Interim Statute 
• Inability of Ie to control external (Croatian) influence on West Mostar 
• Failed privatisation efforts across Bosnia 
• Undue reliance on early elections (and proportional representation systems) 
to promote democratisation, throughout Bosnia also in Mostar 
• Neglect of minority returns in early post-war years, which led to 
wi~read ethnic consolidation 
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7.3 Role of urban planning in reconstruction: Potentials and 
limitations 
7.3.1 Revisiting the 'pillars' of post-war reconstruction. with reference to urban 
planning 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a number of authors have in recent years addressed 
the issue of post-war reconstruction, how it can be made more effective and 
provide a foundation for sustainable, long-term recovery. Physical reconstruction 
is seen as an essential complement to economic reconstruction, and the two need 
to ultimately rebuild the socio-economic fabric of a society divided by conflict 
(Brown 2005; Junne and Verkoren 2005b; Zetter 2005). 
Of Barakat's seven 'pillars' that form the basis for sustainable recovery and 
reconstruction (2005b), also discussed in Chapter 3, at least three can be 
potentially achieved at the local (town or city) level, to a significant degree, 
through the processes of urban planning. These are: 
• A clear and collective vision for post-war recovery, at least for the medium-
term, which is developed through participatory processes. The process of plan 
preparation can help to provide concrete agenda that brings together a range 
of stakeholders to discuss issues of common concern, such as basic services or 
the economy, and develop a widely accepted vision for the future. This was 
seen, for example, in the aftermath of the Second World War in Britain. 
There was a surge of interest during and immediately after the war, among 
planners, policy-makers, citizens and the media, in developing the vision of a 
new and sustainable future and proposing radical changes to correct the pre-
war problems of urban environments.9O A manual for redevelopment of 
central urban areas was ready as early as October 1941, and planning was 
90 A more comprehensive discussion on this has been included in Chapter 3. 
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viewed as an important exercise to correct pre-war urban problems, as well as 
boost citizens' morale (Larkham 2005). 
• Equity in the distribution of the benefits of reconstruction and peace, and in 
terms of the relative importance accorded to the needs of different groups, 
sectors and geographical areas. Clearly, this requires an assessment of the 
priorities of different groups; the existing levels, quality and access to services 
and opportunities; a set of development goals; and clear objective for different 
sectors. All of these can be put together in a succinct manner in a spatial or 
urban plan. In the absence of a strategic vision or plan, reconstruction in the 
aftermath of disasters, both natural and man-made, can be inequitable and/or 
contentious. This is illustrated, for instance, in the reconstruction of New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Hartman and Squires 2006; Kates, 
Colten et al. 2006)91, and the rebuilding of Beirut Central District (BCD) in 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Stewart 1996; Charlesworth 2003; Hartman and 
Squires 2006). These are only two of many examples of inequitable 
development in the aftermath of disasters. The reconstruction of BCD by a 
privately owned company (Solidere) was aimed at providing an economic 
boost to the city and country in the aftermath of war, but it failed to 
anticipate the social implications of the approach being adopted, reinforced 
the power of political and financial elites, and has over time deepened the 
social divisions in the cityn. A collective vision and strategic plan, prepared 
with broad-based consultation, could perhaps have helped to avoid this 
situation. 
• Reconstruction and development, including physical, economic as well as 
social aspects. Urban planning is seen today as an activity that stretches 
91 Kates. Colten et al. (2006) note that half of New Orleans residents lived in rental housing before 
the hurricane. and at the time of writing. most public hOUSing remained unreconstructed. It was 
decided that four major housing developments would not be rebuilt. Hartman and Squires (2006) 
also point out that pre-disaster inequities, exacerbated by disaster, can be replicated and even 
deepened through unthinking reconstruction efforts. 
92 A more comprehensive discussion on Beirut is included in Chapter 3. 
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beyond simply land use planning or regulation, to encompass a range of 
activities across sectors which can together build sustainable, viable and 
inclusive cities and towns. It is also being recognized by many international 
agencies that urban planning has a role to play in addressing immediate post-
disaster needs, but with an eye on the future (UN-HABITAT 2004b). 
An additional element that can be addressed through planning is that of Security, 
but only if the conceptualisation of security proposed by Barakat is expanded to 
include issues of human security, i.e .• not just "freedom from fear". but also 
"freedom from want" (UNDP 1994: 24). Barakat defines security in a narrow 
way, as the end of violent conflict, which can be achieved by the ceasefire, by 
effective policing and in the long-term, by creating conditions for peaceful 
resolution of conflicts among groups (Barakat 2005b: 254). However, if we 
consider the other elements proposed by UNDP. including economic, health and 
environmental security, urban planning can playa role in achieving all of these, 
through provision of opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and income-
generation. rational and just allocation of resources for health and education, and 
protection of the environment 93. 
Linked to this discussion are two other aspects of sustainable physical 
reconstruction. proposed by Zetter (2005). which can also be realised more 
effectively with the inclusion of urban planning: 
• Linking relief and rehabilitation to recovery and development. The 
application of approaches such as action planning, or strategic planning. can 
help to prioritise planning interventions at different stages of the post-war 
recovery process. Once again. some good practices can be drawn from 
planning approaches adopted in the aftermath of natural disasters. for 
example in the state of Gujarat. India. after the earthquake in January 2001 
(ADRC 2005). 
93 The seven elements of human security as defined by UNDP are economic, food.' health. 
environmental. personal. community and political security (UNDP 1994: 24). 
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• Rebuilding institutional capacity. Planning is very often a local government 
function, and can provide an entry point for restoring institutional capacities, 
though provision of training for staff, equipment, software etc. In addition, 
planning legislation can be an important (and a not-so-controversial) tool to 
reform the development decision-making process to make it more inclusive 
and transparent, especially at the local level. This was done, for example by 
UN-HABITAT in Kosovo through a series of projects and programmes 
focusing on local governance, urban and spatial planning94• 
7.3.2 Potentials and limitations of urban pJanning in post-war Bosnia and 
Mostar 
During the field research, a question on the role of urban planning in post-war 
reconstruction was put to various respondents, including planners, urbanists, 
civil society members and political actors. An analysis of the responses as well as 
other information obtained from the field leads to the following key potentials 
and limitations of urban planning i~ Mostar in the immediate aftermath of the 
war. 
potentials 
• Coordination of reconstruction efforts. As discussed in earlier chapters, most 
international agencies simply cherry-picked reconstruction projects in 
Mostar, depending on the profile they wanted and the budget they were 
willing to allocate. These included the old city and the old bridge. public 
squares. educational institutions, apartments, infrastructure rehabilitation etc. 
None of this was coordinated or aligned to any strategic plan which identified 
the short-, medium- and long-term priorities of the city. For example, the 
Gymnasium. which was seen by many as an even more significant symbol of 
reunification than the Old Bridge, a t~ • • [living institution which} could 
demonstrate the potential for positive exchange between former rivals" 
94 See footnote 39 in Chapter 3 for details. 
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(Calame and Pasic 2006: 8), only received funding for repair and 
reconstruction from 2004 onwards (Omanovic, interview). A city council 
official observed that " .. . Most donor projects are offered to us - its like, take 
it or leave it. Sometimes they are based on informal discussions [with donors}, 
but there is no formal strategy or priorities" (Kameric, interview). A strategic 
plan for the city could offer a road map for emergency, medium- and long-
term development. 
• Economic revival. Fifteen years after the war ended in Mostar, the city is yet 
to have a viable economy with a diverse range of economic activities as had 
existed before the war. Like in post-war Germany and Britain, regional and 
urban development planning could have been the tool to drive national and 
local economic revival. In Mostar, most formal employment is currently 
provided either (a) by the state, within institutions of federal, cantonal or 
local governance, or in educational and health institutions; or, (b) by the sole 
surviving industrial unit Aluminij, described as "one of the biggest aluminium 
smelters in the region" (Bosnia Aluminium Smelter Cuts Output, Pay 2008), 
which is situated in west Mostar and employs only Croats; (c) through self-
employment in tourism-related activities, such as pansions, cafes, internet 
cafes, or other service-sector activities, mainly in east Mostar; (d) shops and 
small commercial establishments; and (e) agriculture, mainly in the rural 
settlements within the municipality. However. there continues to be high 
unemployment. especially among the youth. and the weak economic base of 
the city is a commonly-expressed concern. Furthermore, if, as the analysis in 
Chapter 4 suggests. economic development had been a key element in the 
glue holding the Mostar society together before the war, it could potentially 
have been used as a tool to bring the communities together again. 
Unfortunately, planning was neither used as a reference point or tool for 
reading the pre-war urban context, nor as a trigger for post-war urban 
recovery. 
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• Supporting property restitution and facilitating return: As discussed earlier, 
urban planning, building and housing policies were used by nationalist 
politicians in Mostar, and indeed all over BiH, to consolidate war-time ethnic 
cleansing and prevent the return of refugees and displaced persons, 
especially 'minority returns' (Heimerl 2005; Tuathail and Q'Loughlin 2009). 
A planning process, initiated in the early post-war years, could have speeded 
up the replenishment of destroyed or damaged housing stock, supported 
initiatives focusing on property restitution, prevented ad hoc resettlement of 
displaced persons based on ethnic considerations, and facilitated return. 
• Preventing land grab, land use changes and illegal construction. The post-war 
phase in Mostar initially saw two municipalities, then six city-municipalities 
and one central administration, before the administration was finally 
reorganised and unified after 2004. As discussed before, the two 
municipalities and the six city-municipalities took over the planning function 
and made changes to existing regulatory plans without any consultation, 
ostensibly to respond to post-war needs (particularly those of the displaced 
persons), but apparently also to accommodate the demands of the new 
political elite. Public green spaces were turned into building land, and a 
number of controversial buildings were sanctioned, including shopping 
centres, religious buildings, hotels and apartments. An emphasis on some 
form of urban planning and regulation in the early years, with an emphasis 
on transparency and the rule of law, could have halted corrupt and illegal 
practices before they took root. 
• Environmental sustainabJ1ity. Many respondents mention the dysfunctional 
landfill site, and the pollution of the river Neretva, as key environmental 
problems facing the city. Both the sewerage and the solid waste management 
systems are currently being upgraded and reformed with the support of the 
World Bank. Institutional reform and the merger of divided utilities is once 
again a contentious issue in this process. The discussion on a management 
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plan for a combined water utility was initiated under the EUAM, but did not 
make much headway. As a result, decisions on planning, reconstruction or 
expansion of other municipal services were postponed. While recycling of 
construction material was a booming business under the EUAM, it was not 
pursued subsequently as an environmentally-friendly way of rebuilding the 
city. All these factors have led to a steady deterioration in the urban 
environmental conditions in the city over the past fifteen years, a condition 
that could have been prevented by the adoption of a strategic plan for 
services, infrastructure, and environmental management, along with context-
specific, environmentally-friendly, building construction guidelines and 
codes. 
• Reform of pre-existing planning systems, institutions and capacities. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, the former Yugoslavia had a strong 
planning tradition and culture. Admittedly, it was top-down, overly 
bureaucratic, and driven by economic concerns. Spatial planning was seen as 
a tool to achieve the goals and strategies set out by economic plans. 
Undoubtedly, the system needed reform, but the post-war environment 
provided an opportunity to initiate such reform. There were also a large 
number of professionals - architects and planners - working in the city of 
Mostar, either in the municipality, or the spatial development institute, or 
other public sector bodies such as those dealing with the old city, the 
economy or housing. They could have provided a useful human resource pool 
to initiate urban planning, and could have been capacitated in the process to 
think differently about planning in the context of the transition from war to 
peace, a centralised to a strongly decentralised system of governance, and 
from a socialist to a market-driven economic system. This opportunity was 
missed, and today the planning system in Bosnia is but a replica of the pre-
war system, albeit with further reduced accountability and participation (see 
Table 6). 
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TypeJlevel of plan Objective Responsibility for Responsibility for Status (as of September 2008) 
preparation implementation 
Spatial plan for the To define the spatial (regional) Federal Ministry of Spatial Federal Ministry of Spatial Not prepared after the war 
Federation strategy for the entire Federation Planning Planning 
Spatial plan for the To define the regional strategy for all Cantonal Ministry of • Cantonal Ministry Not prepared after the war 
Canton municipalities the Canton Spatial planning • Municipalities 
Spatial plan for the To provide the development Institute for Spatial Department of Urbanism, • Last pre-war spatial plan 
Municipality objectives and strategy for entire Planning for Mostar City of Mostar prepared in 1986 
municipality. including urban and • New spatial plan process 
rural settlements initiated through a decision 
of the Munici~ali!y - 2008 
Urban plan (Master plan) To provide detailed guidelines for Institute for Spatial Department of Urbanism. • Last pre-war urban plan 
development of the urban area. P1anni ng for Mostar City of Mostar prepared in 1980 
includes zoning, F ARB and other • Not prepared after the war 
building specifications 
Regulation plans Detailed land use plans and • Institute for Spatial Department of Urbanism, • About 50% of the 
(Local plans) construction guidelines for Planning for Mostar City of Mostar municipal area is covered 
neighbourhoods. other zones. • Other specialised bypre-warre~on 
protected areas, rural settlements bodies such as the plans. 
within the municipal area. used for Agency Stari Grad • No details on how many 
making land use changes and have been revised or made 
granting building permits after the war. 
-
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• Recording and sharing of urban data. Many professional planners from 
Mostar point out that politicians of the city have deliberately chosen to put 
planning on the backbumer. because they prefer to have a discretionary 
system (or rather. no system at all). whereby they can negotiate and 'make 
deals' with investors and developers, or make false claims about 
demographics and socio-economic development (Omanovic. Puljic, Raspudic. 
interview). The process of preparation of a spatial or urban plan could have 
helped in collecting, recording and making public. accurate information 
about the demographic profile. housing, land use and socio-economic 
development across the city. and perhaps building accountability and trust at 
a different level. 
• Increased communication across the ethnic divide. As discussed in Chapter 
Six, the EUAM did initiate urban planning in Mostar by establishing a multi-
ethnic team of professionals for this task. Although the initiative was short-
lived. it provided an opportunity for the planners to engage with their 
colleagues from 'the other' side in a professional. even friendly manner. This 
was also seen in later editions of the Mostar 2004 workshops which were held 
in Mostar. Similar efforts to organise public debates around urban 
development issues, and engage a wider group of citizens in developing a 
shared vision of a new Mostar, could have provided a platform for dialogue, 
consultation and negotiation on issues of common concern, such as the 
economy or the environment. The urban planning process, even if it did not 
produce a perfect plan. could have provided important stepping stones in the 
path to peace in Mostar. 
IJrnitations 
• Urban planning as a suflicient condition for reunification and peacebuiJding. 
Clearly. the views and strategies of the opposing groups on reunification of 
Mostar were derived from the wider political environment. and the positions 
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of political parties and leaders at higher (cantonal, federal, national) levels. 
Local level political elites were focused on consolidating their ethnic base, 
and unwilling to give up their grip on power. In this process, urban planning, 
even if introduced, could have only played a small role in the bigger picture 
of reunification. Having said that, planning could certainly have provided the 
opportunity to understand the pre- and post-war context better, laid the 
foundations for a more equitable development on the two sides, and provided 
a platform for citizens and their representatives to engage in a constructive 
dialogue over day-to-day needs and priorities. 
"Experience has not shown that planning has a major role to play in 
[building] peace. We have to be slighdy humble about the role of 
planning. It is necessary, [but] planning in contested environments is 
not going to be visionary, you can use it to put in basic services and 
infrastructure where agreements can be reached. "(Skotte, interview) 
7.4 Urban planning as "the missing link" in the (incomplete) 
recovery of Mostar 
The preceding analysis illustrates how initial post-war reconstruction efforts in 
Mostar, led by the EUAM, were influenced by internal strengths and weaknesses 
of the EUAM and the wider international community, as well as external 
opportunities and threats posed by the post-war context in Mostar and Bosnia. It 
also attempts to highlight the areas in which urban planning could have played a 
useful role in achieving the objectives of reconstruction, recovery and 
reunification, as well as its limitations. This discussion draws on both the 
literature (reviewed in Chapters 2-4), and the field research findings (discussed 
in Chapters 5-6). 
As expected, the perceptions of the role of the EUAM vary greatly between 
different stakeholders - the local residents, local professionals who worked with 
EUAM, those who did not, local politicians from different sides, and the 
international professionals, including those who were in some way associated 
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with the EUAM, and those who were not. The singular contribution of the 
EUAM is recognised as the repair and reconstruction of some public housing, 
basic infrastructure including schools and hospitals, roads bridges, and the 
restoration of electricity, water and sewerage facilities, which undoubtedly led to 
a degree of normalisation of urban life, and laid the foundations for the future. 
However, most respondents, local and international, agree that the long-term 
impact of EUAM's work is certainly not commensurate with the amount of 
money that was spent by the Administration in a relatively short period of two 
years. 
The rational allocation of domestic as well as international resources, a halt on 
illegal constructions, the development of a coherent vision or development 
strategy for Mostar in consultation with a wide range of actors and stakeholders, 
as well as reform and capacity-building of local institutions, could all have been 
achieved through the timely application of various instruments of urban 
planning by the EUAM and its successor, the OHR-South office. The long-term 
structural consequences of short-term actions undertaken by international actors 
have resulted in further deterioration of the urban fabric and environment in the 
post-war decades - labelled as itUrbicid 2" by Borislav Puljic (interview). Yet, 
the installation of a planning system and process is prevented by the increasingly 
powerful elites, entrenchment of corruption, and a deepening mistrust between 
the major ethnic groups. Despite the nearly complete reunification of the city 
administration, all these negative impacts are proving extremely difficult to 
reverse, and a sustainable future for a unified Mostar, based on a process of long-
term policy-making, seems a distant dream. As one respondent puts it, Mostar is 
not divided city any more. Since the War, it has evolved into what can be more 
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8.0 Introduction 
This thesis comes at a time when there is an increasing interest in the role of 
transitional administrations in post-war settings, on the one hand, and a revival 
and renewal of urban planning, on the other. The overarching objective of this 
research effort therefore extends beyond simply an assessment of the 
performance, successes or failures, of the EU Administration of Mostar. Rather, it 
is an exploration of the extent to which urban planning could have been a useful 
tool for the Administration in achieving its goals of reconstruction and 
reunification of the city, the form it should have taken, and the stage at which it 
could have been introduced. 
The aim of this research project was to test the hypothesis that urban planning 
can be an instrument both for understanding the pre-war context, as well as 
developing post-war reconstruction strategies for the short-, medium- and long-
term, and that its neglect by international actors can in fact have significant 
negative implications for a city recovering from conflict. It aspired to contribute 
to literature, policy and practice, as well as the reunification of Mostar. This 
chapter explores whether, and the degree to which, these aspirations have been 
met, and puts forth some propositions for future efforts in the post-war 
reconstruction of cities. 
8.1 Developing the argument 
The subject of this thesis in fact lies at the intersection of a number of disciplines 
-among others, urban planning, history, ethnic conflict, post-war reconstruction, 
and international governance and state-building. A review of the relevant 
literature on all these themes was in itself a challenging task, the integration of 
these different 'knowledges' virtually inconceivable at the outset. After 
establishing the research objectives, research question and hypothesis, and 
discussing the methodology, I began the literature review by exploring the 
mutuality of cities and war in history, the nature of recent conflicts and their 
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impact of cities, and the cyclical rise, fall and revival of urban planning. This is 
the theme of Chapter Two, which discusses the significance of cities, ancient and 
modem, as key strategic targets in wars, and the phenomenon of 'urbicide', 
which has gained prominence in recent years in literature and in real life. The 
modem urban planning profession found its niche and significance in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, when it was seen as a tool to reconstruct 
cities, revive national economies and deliver equitable development. As 
urbanisation gained momentum, however, urban planning seemed unable to 
keep up with the new demands of sustainability, inclusion, poverty reduction, 
and other approaches such as urban management and urban governance took 
centre-stage. In recent years, it has once again emerged as an important 
instrument to address these and other contemporary concerns (such as post-
disaster recovery, and climate change), but as this chapter concludes, it is still not 
a favoured tool in post-war reconstruction, where 'short-termist', ad-hoc 
approaches remain popular. 
Chapter Three of this thesis looks more closely at the different approaches 
adopted towards post-war reconstruction in the period following the Second 
World War, and the role of planning in each of these. A range of examples is 
used to illustrate the positive as well as the not-so-positive roles and impacts of 
urban planning in post-war situations. The still-emerging literature on post-war 
reconstruction and transitional administrations is also discussed in detail here. It 
appears that while urban planning played a key role in the reconstruction of 
Europe, in particular, in aftermath of the Second Worlel War, it has been 
discarded in the wake of more recent conflicts, mainly because of the emphasis 
on building a liberal peace, which advocates a reduced role of the state, and of 
which structural adjustment and market reforms are central instruments. Other 
factors include unwillingness on the part of the occupying powers and 
transitional administrations to take a long-term view, as well as a lack of 
understanding of the importance of planning in building economically self-
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reliant, sustainable and peaceful societies. The failure of international actors to 
recognise the importance of planning and its instruments, when the same 
instruments are used and abused by local political interests as a mechanism to 
establish control or advance particular economic or ethnic interests, can best be 
described as 'malign neglect'. 
Chapter Four, the last one in the literature review trilogy, discusses the pre- and 
post-war urban planning approaches and trends in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
After careful thought, I decided not to position the war in Bosnia as the centre of 
this historical chapter, but as a backdrop to the discussion on urbanisation, 
planning, urban destruction and reconstruction. It emerges from the analysis that 
historically, since the Ottoman era, the different ethnic communities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina led largely separate lives, even though both Ottomans and 
Austro-Hungarians were tolerant of all faiths and allowed key symbolic 
structures to co-exist. Cities, in particular, came to acquire a distinct character 
which I have described as 'plural yet segmented'. The early years of the Yugoslav 
era witnessed the suppression of national identities, and consequent rejection 
and destruction of any symbols of such identities. However, the process of rapid 
urbanisation which took place as a result of industrial development seemed to 
destabilise both rural and urban societies. Finally, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the various types and levels of divisions in Yugoslavia (inter-regional, 
intra-regional, inter-city. intra-city. and of course, inter-ethnic) could not be 
suppressed any longer. When war broke out. cities were not only attacked from 
outside. they also imploded from within. 
This chapter also asserts that the peace settlements agreed at Washington and 
Dayton. as well as the post-war reconstruction efforts led by the international 
community, disregarded the existence of the many historical cleavages in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. They also failed to acknowledge that pre-war Yugoslavia had 
been a highly institutionalised polity. that the state was a powerful actor which 
could not simply be wished away or transformed overnight. and that political 
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and economic liberalisation in war-ravaged Bosnia could not be achieved 
through radical or prescriptive formulas. The consociational system established 
in Bosnia, and the frequent elections at local, cantonal, entity and state levels, 
consistently strengthened the hands of nationalist parties. Privatisation of state-
run enterprises merely served to enrich the powerful nationalist elites on all 
sides without restoring employment or economic productivity. Most 
reconstruction activities were implemented through external actors and new 
institutional arrangements established in parallel to existing local, cantonal or 
entity-level structures, which undermined and weakened the local institutions 
further. The lack of a clear vision or plan for reconstruction and recovery meant 
that billions of dollars were spent without commensurate results. The discussion 
in this chapter brings us to the conclusion that the lack of understanding of the 
relationship between industrial development, urbanisation, ethnicity and 
conflict, governance structures, institutions and processes, including those 
relating to planning, led to a deeply flawed strategy for post-war reconstruction, 
recovery and reconciliation. 
The discussion on Mostar in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, based on field 
research, takes the above proposition further. Chapter Five examines the socio-
economic and spatial development of Mostar through the Ottoman, Austro-
Hungarian and Yugoslav years, its destruction during the war, post-war 
reconstruction efforts, and its situation today. I use Boa1's framework to conclude 
that the view of Mostar as a fully 'assimilated' community before the war was but 
a myth, and that the pre-war cosmopolitanism of Mostar was only confined to a 
small urban core. I also demonstrate that the city and the population of Mostar 
were radically transformed by the war, and the restoration of status quo ante was 
therefore an unrealistic ambition. In doing this, I also demonstrate that Boal's 
framework is quite simplistic, whereas in reality, polarisation and plurality often 
co-exist, at different levels, in different spatial and social realms, within any 
multi-ethnic city. 
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Although the reunification of Mostar was an avowed goal of the international 
community, the reconstruction process and the legal-political approach adopted 
in the early post-war phase under the EUAM only served to divide the city 
further. Fifteen years after the signing of the Washington Agreement, two 
statutes, many OHR decisions and several million dollars later, Mostar continues 
to be divided and its two halves look more and more like two cities rather than 
one. The economy, education, social and cultural life remain largely separate. 
The city administration is yet to be fully integrated, and the political institutions 
are often paralysed by obstructionist tactics from one side or the other. Looking 
back to 1994, the objective of the international community to reunify Mostar 
. seems at best rushed, and at worst, completely disconnected with post-war 
realities. 
Chapter Six of the thesis brings the role of the EU Administration of Mostar, its 
mandate, approach, strategies and achievements, under closer scrutiny. Relying 
predominantly on data collected in the field, I also discuss the urban planning 
efforts of the EUAM, those of the six City-Municipalities which Mostar was 
divided into, as well as the initiatives of other external actors involved in the 
reconstruction of the city. The EUAM paid little attention to urban planning, 
urban planners or existing plans and planning institutions in its reconstruction 
work, citing lack of time and the imperative of spending their allocated budget 
within a short span of two years. In fact, both the EUAM and the OHR viewed 
planning as a technical, rather than political, activity, and thus not terribly 
important or urgent. The City-Municipalities, on the other hand, used the 
absence of international focus on planning as an opportunity to modify and use 
planning instruments such as regulatory plans and building permits to advance 
particular economic andlor ethnic agendas. The control of the recently 
established Spatial Planning Institute was a particularly contentious issue and is 
discussed in detail here. I conclude this chapter by summarising the major 
reasons why EUAM failed in its efforts to introduce urban planning in the 
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reconstruction process. By neglecting planning. the international community, in 
particular the EUAM and OHR. allowed facts on the ground to be created, the 
negative consequences of which are proving to be irreversible. 
Chapter Seven brings the theoretical strands and the field research together. 
Three main threads are discussed here. First of all, I explore the endogenous 
aspects of EUAM - its strengths and weaknesses - and relate these to the 
discussion on Transitional Administrations in Chapter Three. This points us 
towards some important lessons and some considerations to keep in mind while 
installing future T As. Next, I discuss the exogenous aspects which influenced the 
reconstruction efforts undertaken by the EUAM, including, for instance, the 
political. social and economic environment across Bosnia and Herzegovina (and 
within Mostar) during and immediately after the conflict. Finally, I review how 
urban planning was undertaken in Mostar, and how this relates to the potentials 
and limitations of planning in post-war reconstruction processes in general. In 
the end. an attempt is made to bring it all together and conclude that the 
international community's goals of economic recovery, institutional reform, and 
reunification of Mostar (however unrealistic) could have been better served by 
the application of urban planning - both as a lens for understanding the pre-war 
urban context. and as an instrument of public policy, to guide urban social 
change. 
8.2 Responding to the research question and hypothesis 
The main research question that this study sought to answer, is re-stated below 
for ease of reference. 
How is urban pJanning viewed in the process of reconstruction of war-
torn dties. and to what extent is it used as an instrument by the 
international community, particularJy transitional administrations, for 
sodo-economic recovery and development, community empowerment. 
and ethnic reconciliation? 
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I attempted to respond to this question both through the literature review. which 
considered a large number of cases and experiences of post-war reconstruction 
by different actors. and the field research. which focused on the city of Mostar. 
Urban planning is not a popular area of research among those who address issues 
of post-war reconstruction. or transitional administrations. Nor is post-conflict 
reconstruction a popular theme among urbanists and urban planners. Finding 
precise information relating to post-war planning efforts. especially in the case of 
more recent conflicts. was therefore. a challenging task. I relied to a great extent 
on the considerable body of literature on the reconstruction of Europe after the 
Second World War. which also covers the themes of urban planning and 
development. As stated earlier in this thesis. urban planning was an important 
tool to initiate and support national recovery after the War in Britain. Germany. 
Poland. the Netherlands. and many other countries. In the aftermath of more 
recent conflicts. especially where international actors rather than national 
governments have taken a leading role. planning has been relegated to the 
margins of reconstruction and post-war recovery efforts. 
On the other key element of the question posed above - Transitional 
Administrations - I discovered that the body of literature addressing different 
aspects of TAs is expanding every day. Recent publications by Stahn (2008) and 
Chesterman (2004). in particular. helped me build an updated understanding of 
the evolution ofTAs. their legal basis. mandates. activities and achievements. On 
the other hand. I also discovered that the role of T As in physical and economic 
reconstruction after conflicts is not very well-documented. Furthermore. I found 
that the EUAM is one of the least-researched transitional administrations. 
perhaps because there are no local archives of the EUAM held in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. and the EU archives in Brussels are not yet open to the public. The 
latter proved inaccessible till the very end of my research - to find information 
on the EUAM I relied mainly on interviews with those who had worked for the 
Administration. and their limited personal archives. 
285 
Chapter 8: In conclusion 
In Mostar and Sarajevo, I found many urbanists and professional architect-
planners interested in the subject and willing to talk about the challenges of 
planning in a post-war, transition country environment. The following 
hypothesis was central to my research, and I presented it in different ways, in 
whole or in part, to my respondents. 
Urban planning has been neglected by the intemationa1 communi~ 
particularly transitional administrations, as a tool for the analysis of, and 
as an instrument for the promotion of, urban social change, despite its use 
and abuse by local political actors as a mechanism to establish control or 
advance particular ethnic interests. This may have had a negative impact 
on both the long-term development of the dry as well as ethnic 
reconciliation efforts. 
Answers to the question on the role of urban planning in post-war 
reconstruction varied considerably, based on the perception and understanding 
of urban planning among different respondents. International actors initially 
viewed planning as a long-term, technical activity to detennine land use - when 
perceived in this way, it naturally figured at the bottom of their priority list. It 
was only very recently (2005 onwards) that they began to acknowledge the 
political significance of urban planning and take steps to reform the planning 
system. Local planners, on the other hand, have seen planning being used as a 
political instrument by politicians and policy-makers in the city and canton. 
However, while they highlighted the significance of planning, at the same time 
they attempted to downplay their own role, describing themselves as 'mere' 
technical experts. Most local professionals seemed trapped in the Yugoslav-era 
vision of urban/spatial planning as an important but mainly technical tool to 
implement the vision of politicians or top-down economic plans, rather than an 
instrument to define a collective vision for a city. build public participation and 
accountability in governance. and develop a sustainable. viable and inclusive 
urban future. Other respondents including NGO representatives and citizens 
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pointed towards the unplanned reconstruction, the illegal land allocation and 
land use changes, and the lack of economic activity in the city, as failures of 
urban planning. Some clearly blamed the international community for allowing 
such a situation to come to pass. 
8.3 Methodological reflections 
Conducting research in a post-war environment is not easy, even when the 
conflict has been over for many years. In this case, fifteen years have elapsed 
since the Washington Agreement was signed, which ended the war between the 
Bosniacs and Croats. I began my research on the basis of the assumption that this 
was a good time-frame to assess the impact of early post-war interventions, and 
this was reiterated by a number of my respondents as well. However, in some 
cases it turned out to be a little too late for respondents to recall the details of the 
reconstruction process and planning efforts in the EUAM era. Some personal 
archives had already been lost, destroyed by key respondents who had no further 
use for them. On the other hand it was too early to access the archives of the EU, 
which are only released to the public thirty years after any event. This, I believe, 
would be a problem for many researchers seeking to assess the long-term impact 
of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
I also had to extend the period of time I was examining, in order to fully 
understand the context and the various political developments that took place in 
Mostar and which have affected it development. The focus of this research was 
mainly the EUAM phase. However, to understand the impact of the EUAM's 
work and more broadly, the international community's efforts in Mostar, I 
needed to examine not just the immediate pre-, in- and post-war phases, but 
delve deeper into history, and also explore later developments which took place, 
under the OHR, for instance. This process, I believe, has considerably enriched 
my analysis. One of the conclusions of this thesis, in fact, is that the historical 
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context has to be properly understood before solutions can be proposed (or 
imposed, as the case may be) by external actors, in post-war situations. 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, other issues such as access to data and 
respondents, language, sensitivity and bias, were in my view addressed 
effectively in the field. Although this is not a quantitative study, I succeeded in 
interviewing thirty-seven respondents, including elites as well as citizens, 
international agency representatives as well as those representing Bosnian 
institutions. The snowball sampling method helped to gain access to a number of 
respondents who I might not have otherwise identified or reached. 
It was difficult, however, to identify returnee citizens and families, especially 
Croats who had returned to the central zone. UNHCR or even local NGOs 
dealing with IDP, refugee or returnee issues do not have accurate information on 
how many displaced persons who have re-claimed their pre-war properties have 
actually returned to occupy them. Thus, for the returnee interviews, I didn't 
have a finite universe from which a sample could be selected (e.g. beneficiaries of 
a particular project, a reliable list of returnees, or even basic census information), 
and snowball sampling was of limited use in this process. Despite the difficulties, 
however, I succeeded in interviewing three Bosniac, two Serb and one Croat 
family, who provided important perspectives on the past, present and future of 
Mostar. 
A commonly-heard criticism of qualitative research is that it is based on 
impressions or does not make use of any hard data. On the contrary, the real 
strength of the present study lies in its empirical base, including accurate 
historical data as well as recent statistical information, pre-war planning 
documents and maps (some of which were extremely difficult to track down), 
photographic evidence (both historic and current), and thirty-seven field 
interviews. 
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8.4 Learning from Mostar: A few propositions for future post-war 
reconstruction efforts 
The EU Administration of Mostar was an experiment in transitional 
administration at a time when such arrangements were far from common. 
Within its short mandate of two years, the EUAM undoubtedly achieved 
significant results in terms of repair and reconstruction of housing, rehabilitation 
of services and infrastructure, roads and bridges, all of which were urgent and 
essential for the normalisation of life in the war-ravaged city. 
In setting itself the ambitious goal of reunifying Mostar, the EU Administration 
sought continuity with the pre-war status of the city. However, it failed in its 
attempts as this goal was sacrificed in the interest of establishing a functional 
administration in the short-term. On the other hand, in the case of 
reconstruction and planning, the EUAM attempted to break with the past and 
establish its own priorities, as well as a new system of planning. Once again, it 
was not very successful in those efforts. While the latter could be viewed as a 
strategic mistake, due to a lack of understanding of the Yugoslav context, the 
former was perhaps a political compromise - an ambitious mandate watered 
down by ground realities. Both have had a long-term negative impact on the 
city. It could well be that a reversal of the strategy, i.e. perhaps allowing east and 
west Mostar to recover from the wounds of war before attempting to force a 
reunification, but supporting a revival and gradual reform of the old institutional 
set-up for planning, may have been more successful. This also partially supports 
the conclusion of Bieber (2005) that territorial fragmentation and formal, 
complex governance arrangements have hindered the reunification and post-war 
development of Mostar, and that a more pragmatic approach may have been 
more successful. 
A few conclusions emerge from the case of Mostar which could be relevant for 
other cities and territories emerging from conflict, in particular where 
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international transitional administrations playa major role. These are discussed 
below. 
8.4.1 Building an understanding of the context is vital 
This research demonstrates that humanitarian and reconstruction interventions 
undertaken by international actors during and after the war are often based on 
limited understanding of the context. In Mostar, the evolution of the city, its 
social and spatial structure, economic base and pre-war cleavages, provide 
important clues to understand the manifestations of the conflict, the reasons 
behind its intensity, and the factors which caused the city to be divided along 
certain (physical) lines. In the rush to negotiate a peace deal between the 
Bosniacs and Croats, the international community failed to build up a complete 
understanding of the context, and rather misguidedly, placed the reunification of 
Mostar at the core of the peace agreement. Subsequent efforts by the EUAM and 
other actors to reconstruct the city were also based on a shallow understanding 
of the pre-war situation, the transformation of the city during the war, and the 
power and control exerted by the political actors who took centre-stage during 
the war. 
The key failures of the EUAM which emerge from field interviews include: (a) 
the Administration's inability to build broad-based consensus on reconstruction 
issues and bring on board qualified local professionals; (b) its failure to stop the 
reconstruction of key ethnic buildings that became overpowering symbols of the 
city; (c) its powerlessness to establish the rule of law and stop the land grab and 
land use changes by powerful political figures on both sides of the divide; and, 
(d) its failure to kick-start the economy. Most of these could have been avoided if 
there had been a better understanding of the context, the 'lay of the land' as it 
were. Both during as well as after the EUAM's tenure, there was little 
transparency or accountability, particularly in the allocation of undeveloped 
municipal land. Discretionary land use changes and extra-legal allocation of land 
and building permits, mainly with the objectives of bolstering ethnic numbers in 
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particular areas or supporting investors based their ethnicity, was commonplace. 
All these developments not only further polarised the ethnic groups and 
hindered trust-building and reconciliation, but also undermined the existing 
development plans and made urban and economic development highly 
politicised. This in turn has made the reunification of the city much more 
difficult. 
8.4.2 Cities are radically transformed during conflicts, and status quo ante 
cannot be easily restored, Jet alone imposed 
Documented experiences from other divided cities, as well as the field research 
in Mostar shows that reunification of cities divided by conflict is not something 
which can be imposed by external actors. Most of my local respondents in 
Mostar felt that although the city may have been partially reconstructed thanks 
to EUAM and administratively reunified (to an extent) due to the OHR's efforts, 
spatial reunification of the city and re-integration and its communities are 
unrealistic objectives set by the international community with little reference to 
ground realities. The city's population has been radically transformed by the war. 
A large number of pre-war urban residents have left permanently, and have been 
replaced by displaced persons from the surrounding region who have now 
permanently settled in Mostar. A large number of Mostar's citizens have sold or 
exchanged their pre-war properties and decided to move permanently to areas 
where they are in a majority, or to settle abroad (though exact numbers are 
unknown). As discussed in Chapter Five, even today, there are two major 
hospitals on the east and the westj two primary schools, one high school 
(Gymnasium) but with three separate curricula (Bosniac, Croat and the 
International Baccalaureat) taught on three floors; different shopping centres; 
two (ethnic-based) football clubs, etc. Most people also state that although some 
young people from both sides sometimes cross over to visit clubs and bars on 'the 
other side', a large majority chooses to socialise in their own part of town. When 
asked if they feel safe crossing over to the other part of the city, the response is in 
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the affirmative, but most respondents confess to feeling a certain level of 
discomfort in doing so. 
"Now its rather okay, but occasionally you will hear that somebody 
got beaten up ... there, or there [on either side], because in this way 
politicians are keeping the ethnic tension. I go over there, I shop, but 
I try to come back before dark. "(Behram, interview) 
Unsurprisingly, the representatives of international agencies (local and 
international) put forth a far more positive view on the question of reunification, 
citing the progress made in terms of freedom of movement, removal of physical 
barriers which prevented people from crossing over, the common license plates 
for all cars and the reasonable level of return (at least on paper). The 
reconstruction of the old bridge, the Mostar Gymnasium (high school), which 
now has one administration and one principal, though three curricula continue 
to be taught on three floors, and the city park, which was inaugurated last year, 
are all cited as examples of progress. The administrative reunification of the city 
is ongoing, and the Spatial Planning Institute has finally been established. Yet, it 
is a near-consensus view that the city can never achieve its pre-war status, and 
that: 
"All we can hope for is the absence of conflict, and that the two sides 
can live together side-by-side, even if it is on two different banks of 
the river. "(FranCic, interview) 
8.4.3 Transitional administrations need to talee a long-term view 
Despite the fact that most transitional administrations have a short-term or 
limited mandate, the experience of EUAM demonstrates that they still need to 
adopt a longer-term perspective in their activities95 • The absence of a long-term 
view is reflected, for instance, in the division of the city into six city-
95 This also holds true more broadly for the international community, which was unprepared for 
a lengthy intervention in Bosnia. International actors - individual countries, as well as 
multilateral bodies including the EU, UN, World Bank and others - assumed that a liberal 
democracy would be fairly easy to install (predominantly through elections" deregulation and 
privatisation measures). and would allow them to make an early exit from the country. This, as 
history has proved. was not to be. 
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municipalities, which further entrenched the divisions across the city and made 
reintegration much more difficult in the long run. It is also seen in the reluctance 
to prepare any kind of reconstruction or development plan for the city, or build 
up capacities of existing institutions and professionals, which could have 
significantly altered the way the city looks today. Clearly, the EUAM had no 
long-term vision or development strategy for the city - it neither formulated one, 
nor did it attempt to utilise what already existed in the form of development 
plans at various levels. While trying to ensure that it did no harm to the city or 
citizens of Mostar, it also failed to do much good in the long term. Unfortunately, 
the international community wasted their window of opportunity to plan a 
better future for the whole of Mostar, whereas the local actors used all planning 
tools at their disposal to further their own agendas. 
In taking a long-term view, or at least one that extends beyond their own 
mandate, it is also imperative that the records or archives of the transitional 
administration are properly maintained and eventually handed over to local 
actors, so that subsequent efforts towards reconstruction are incremental and 
build upon what was achieved in the transitional phase. This was not done in 
Mostar, and clearly reflected in the field research. Any responses to questions 
about the EUAM's archives pointed only towards Brussels, and were made with 
more than a hint of bitterness. 
8.4.4 Urban planning has a role - in divisionl reunification, sustainable 
development and peacebuilding 
The role of urban planning in reconstruction of post-war cities, as a tool to 
support the development or peacebuilding goals of reconstruction, is neither 
well-defined nor clearly understood by the organisations undertaking these 
efforts in the aftermath of war. Field research findings from Mostar support the 
claims made in literature that in the immediate aftermath of conflict, local actors 
often use urban planning tools to 'continue war by other means'. Local planners 
in Mostar state that planning has become far more politicised in Mostar since the 
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six city-municipalities abused their powers and used planning tools to reinforce 
the results of ethnic cleansing. appropriate or mark territory. and establish 
symbolic and actual control over contested areas. These are reflected. for 
example. in the construction of prominent religious symbols such as the bell 
tower of the Catholic church. or the cross over the Hum. or in the support 
provided to the activities of developers of a particular nationality. as in the case 
of Hotel Ruza. 
There are diverse views regarding the stage at which planning could have been 
introduced in the process of reconstruction or the role it could have played in 
peacebuilding. It was dearly not possible to initiate a full-fledged long-term 
planning process in the immediate aftermath of the war. given that the level of 
mistrust between the different groups was extremely high in 1994, and there was 
evidently no political commitment to sharing even basic data and information, 
let alone towards planning or reunifying the city. However, many respondents 
point out that at the very least, the Administration could have enforced a 
moratorium in the early post-war years on changes to land use and building 
plans, and on random rebuilding and reconstruction by the city-municipalities, 
thus gaining control over those agendas and fIrmly establishing the rule of law. 
At the same time, re-establishment of the planning institute at the city level, and 
supporting it to review the old spatial plan and prepare an updated version. could 
have been an incremental and acceptable way of initiating planning. 
There is also a broad agreement among the respondents that the EUAM had the 
opportunity and resources to prepare some kind of a reconstruction agenda or 
plan which would extend beyond their mandate, and which could have been 
used for planned or coordinated interventions towards physical and economic 
reconstruction. The Administration could also have made better use of existing 
(pre-war) planning documents and professionals to gather information about past 
development approaches and trends, land use and socio-economic development 
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prospects, which could have also served as a point of departure for planning the 
reconstruction of Mostar. 
Finally, the urban planning process, however tentative, could have been used to 
initiate a dialogue between professionals as well as citizens on all sides of the 
ethnic divide, on issues of common concern, such as access to urban services or 
economic recovery and employment. This might have helped in gradually 
reducing the 'salience of ethnicity' as Simonsen (2005)96 has described it, laid the 
foundations for the development of a new collective vision for Mostar, and 
facilitated the building of effective governance structures at the local level. 
8.5 Meeting the research objectives 
As mentioned earlier, conducting research on a topic such as the one chosen for 
this study poses enormous challenges in terms of building an understanding of 
the various disciplines which the central theme touches upon. The same aspect, 
however, also gives the study its distinct focus and niche. 
The broad goal of this research project was to make a contribution to the 
following three areas: 
• the literature on the reconstruction of conflict-affected cities and societies, 
particularly focusing on the use (or not) of urban planning; 
• the approaches and interventions of the international community, especially 
transitional administrations, towards reconstruction in other post-war cities; 
and 
• the ongoing process of reunification of Mostar. 
8.5.1 Contribution to literature 
As summarised in the section 8.1 above, in this thesis I have reviewed the 
literature on cities and war, urban planning, post-war reconstruction, and 
transitional administrations, and formulated and tested my hypothesis in the city 
96 See Section 2.2 
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of Mostar. The conclusions arising from this thesis, I believe, advance the 
ongoing work on post-war reconstruction, and considerably enhance our 
knowledge of transitional administrations, their role in physical reconstruction, 
and the types of public policy tools they choose (or not) to deploy. They also 
point towards the importance of taking a long-term view, and introducing urban 
planning in the early stages of post-war reconstruction of cities. 
In terms of its contribution to post-war reconstruction literature, first of all, this 
study questions the international focus on the piecemeal reconstruction of 
symbolic structures, which became the pre-eminent feature of the post-war 
rebuilding of Mostar. The findings from field research, especially interviews, 
support the view of Calame and Pasic (2006), who have questioned the 
internationally-driven reconstruction approaches that prioritise the rebuilding of 
symbolic structures over housing, infrastructure, education and health services 
and other necessities of urban life. Taking that discussion further, this research 
highlights the importance of urban planning as an instrument to 're-envision' the 
city in such a manner that enables its citizens to look forward rather than back, 
to identify and prioritise the actual (rather than perceived) post-war needs of the 
different segments of the community, and to view and plan for the development 
the city as a whole, rather than as a sum of its parts. 
Second, this study also builds on and adds to the work of Barakat (200Sb), by 
elaborating how urban planning can be a useful instrument in at least three of 
the seven 'pillars' of post-war reconstruction that he proposes, and expanding the 
concept of security, also one of the aforementioned pillars. This thesis 
demonstrates that human security, or 'freedom from want', including economic, 
health and environmental security, is equally if not more important than 
'freedom from fear', and that the former can be achieved by using planning as 
one of the tools of post-war reconstruction. 
The utilisation of planning can also make Zetter's proposals (2005) of linking 
relief to rehabilitation, recovery and development more effective, and can be a 
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useful entry point to start rebuilding local institutional and professional 
capacities. In fact, at the local level, urban planning can be a central tool in what 
Barakat and Zyck describe as '~ .. an architecture of integrated, directed recovery 
[involving] centralised planmng, the establishment of an overarching recovery 
framework and the direction of donors, international orgamsations, NGOs, civil 
society and others to integrate their activities and contributions within this 
framework"(Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1081). 
At the same time, findings from Mostar indicate that incremental change, for 
instance, in the existing plans, planning system, institutions and capacities, might 
have been a more useful and effective approach towards rebuilding the divided 
city and community, than the attempts which were made either to radically 
reform the planning system (by introducing the new concept of Structure 
Planning), or on the other hand, to simply abandon a long-term perspective 
altogether. Thus, this research reinforces the observation made by Ian Davis over 
twenty years ago that the potential for bringing about radical change in urban 
plans and city development after conflicts is rather over-estimated in most 
situations, and that one has to be realistic rather than utopian in establishing the 
goals of post-conflict reconstruction (Davis 1987). 
Finally, where this research differs from previous and ongoing work is clearly 
seen vis-a-vis the work on divided cities, in particular that of Scott Bollens (1998; 
2000; 2006), and Esther Charlesworth (2003). As discussed in Chapter 5, recent 
writings by these two authors place urbanists (Bollens 2006) and architects 
(Charlesworth 2003), respectively, at the centre of their proposals to soften 
ethnic boundaries in divided cities. The present study demonstrates that this 
significantly over-estimates the roles of these actors and does not adequately 
address the political environment within which they operate. This thesis, 
therefore, shifts the focus to international administrations who deploy (or don't) 
instruments of architecture/urbanism and urban planning, exploring why this is 
the case, assessing the impact of (non-) utilisation of urban planning as an 
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instrument for post-war reconstruction, and suggesting what TAs can do 
differently based on the lessons from the incomplete recovery and continued 
division of the city of Mostar. 
8.5.2 Contribution to policy and practice 
In terms of having an impact on policy and future work of the international 
community in general and T As in particular, the findings from this research 
draw the attention of the international community to a number of aspects. The 
most important among these is the need to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the context, in order to be able to design appropriate, customised solutions for 
post-war reconstruction and recovery. Urban planning can serve as a lens to 
develop an in-depth understanding of the evolution of the city, society and 
economy, its historical divisions, governance arrangements and power structures, 
as well as identify potential areas (spatial and sectoral) for reconstruction, 
recovery and development. Such an understanding can help avoid costly 
mistakes, such as the attempts to tum a state-run industrial economy into a 
market-driven service economy overnight, which were (and in many cases, 
continue to be) aligned with global agendas rather than local realities. An 
understanding of the pre-war institutional structures can also help in 
determining an incremental strategy to reform these institutions without losing 
support of local elites, professionals and citizens. 
Second, the assessment of EUAM also brings to the fore the importance of setting 
achievable goals and establishing realistic time-frames for TAs. The EUAM was 
tasked with the reconstruction and reunification of Mostar, but its mandated 
time frame was only two years. This had two major implications. First, the 
Administration was in a rush to spend its allocated budgets and demonstrate 
concrete reconstruction outputs. This also meant that it could not withhold 
reconstruction resources from either side for too long, and had to release the 
monies even if the political elites failed to comply with its conditions. Second, 
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those who opposed the reunification agenda simply waited it out until the 
EUAM's pre-determined mandate came to an end. 
A third policy element pertaining to TAs which emerges from this research on 
Mostar is the imperative of employing effective strategies and commensurate 
resources to achieve the TAs goals. The EUAM did not have a clear relationship 
with its local counterparts, neither any division of labour, nor powers of 
enforcement. It did not have the appropriate professional capacity to undertake 
the objectives or activities it had been saddled with. At critical moments, the 
Administration's decisions were not backed up by its European masters. It did 
not take a long-term view (not even a medium-term view, or simply look beyond 
its own mandate), build partnerships with local institutions and professionals, or 
engage adequately with agencies that came after it. Finally, the EUAM also did 
not use the opportunity of reconstruction to initiate the discussion on a new 
vision for post-war Mostar. Clearly, though the international community willed 
the outcomes, they did not will the means to achieve those outcomes. 
Finally, this study suggests that urban planning can be used to not only 
coordinate physical reconstruction efforts among various international actors, 
but also negotiate a new vision of the city among its various stakeholders, 
establish the rule of law and transparent governance, and start rebuilding and 
reforming institutional and professional capacities. This is clearly a 'what if 
scenario and cannot be conclusively proved by the thesis. However, it does 
emerge from the field investigation that planning was (and still is) seen by local 
political actors in Mostar as an important instrument to control land and other 
assets, redistribute populations and resources, and establish control over their 
respective territories - in sum, as a tool to keep the city divided. The 
international community either failed to grasp this implication until very late in 
the day, or turned a blind eye to it, and in the early reconstruction phases viewed 
planning simply as a time-consuming technical tool to create some grand vision 
for the future (thus, a non-priority area of intervention or support). By failing to 
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take control of planning, the EUAM, OS EM and OHR in fact allowed local 
politicians to drive the planning agenda for their benefit and pursue a divisive 
and divided development, thus permitting nationalist agendas to not only persist 
but become more deeply entrenched. 
The conclusions of this research clearly bring out the importance of re-
politicising planning, that is, bringing it back from its fringe role as a 'technical 
tool', and re-establishing it as a central, political instrument of public policy, 
especially at the local level, in post-war situations. This, I believe, has the 
potential to be the most important contribution of this thesis to future 
international interventions, in post-war as well as other post-disaster contexts. 
8.5.3 Contribution to the reunification and revival of Mostar 
This study suggests that urban planning, if carried out in a strategic, action-
oriented and participatory manner, has the potential to initiate dialogue, 
promote equitable access to opportunities for minorities and majorities to rebuild 
their lives and homes, and foster inclusion. These, in turn, can provide the 
foundations for a sustainable urban future, and an enduring peace. In Mostar, 
even a partial or incremental revival of existing planning instruments, 
institutions and capacities in early post-war reconstruction efforts would have, in 
my view, gone a long way towards building a viable future for the city and its 
communities. As highlighted by various respondents, a combination of short-
term priorities with a long-term vision, responsive to community concerns, 
could have supported socio-economic development, empowered local actors, and 
served as a catalyst to the process of ethnic reconciliation and peacebuilding. 
However, it was a call that the international community had to make, and one it 
did not. 
The process of reunifying Mostar is still far from complete. As the conclusions 
point out, the city looks more and more like two-cities-in-one, rather than a 
unified whole, owned as such by all of its citizens. The last fifteen years have 
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seen a hardening of positions and deepening of ethnic-based differences. Still, it 
is hoped that this study can contribute to finding a happy modus vivendi for the 
city and citizens of Mostar in the not-too-distant future, when urban planning 
takes its rightful place as a tool for negotiation and accommodation and building 
a common future, rather than an instrument for corruption, control and 
domination. 
8.6 Directions for future research 
Reconstruction of war-tom cities is not a new area of research, considering the 
fact there has been the spate of articles, books and research studies on the 
rebuilding of European cities, in particular, but also those in Japan, after the 
Second World War. However, there is very limited information on the 
reconstruction of cities after more recent conflicts, for instance, the wars in the 
Balkans, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq. This thesis makes a small contribution 
to the discussion on the extent to which urban policy and planning work as a 
tool of governance, and how power relations are reflected in city building 
processes in complex political environments after conflicts. Mostar is one of 
many cities destroyed and divided by war. Other cities, both in the Balkans and 
other parts of the world, may not have received similar attention from donors, 
policymakers, and indeed, researchers. It is hoped that other researchers would 
be able build on the present work and expand it in both scale and scope. Some 
empirical studies on the types of planning approaches being employed by various 
international actors in contemporary post-conflict situations, for example in 
Somalia, their effectiveness and replicability, would also be a useful addition to 
the growing body of literature in this area. 
Second, this research asserts that the role of planning in the post-war 
reconstruction of Mostar was heavily influenced by the prevailing global 
thinking and the emphasis on building a 'liberal peace: Fifteen years on, as the 
constraints of the liberal peace model are becoming more evident and 
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international actors are growing more circumspect about exporting liberal 
models of economic and political development, it would be interesting to explore 
the changing role (if at all) of planning in post-war situations . 
. Third, the reconstruction of cities affected by widespread and recurrent terrorist 
attacks, such as have been witnessed in recent months in various cities across 
Pakistan (only one of many examples), can provide interesting insights on how 
functioning city administrations deal with, and recover from, intermittent 
attacks (rather than prolonged conflicts). This is yet another area which could be 
explored by authors and researchers working in the area of post-war recovery. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, urban literature is also yet to focus its 
attention on cities and towns which have faced the brunt of conflicts and 
humanitarian crises in their surrounding regions, and become home to large 
numbers of temporary and permanent immigrants, refugees as well as IDPs. Such 
cities can be found, for example, in Sudan (particularly Khartoum, which is home 
to millions of IDPs fleeing conflicts in different parts of the country); in Jordan 
and Syria (which continue to host large numbers of Iraqi refugees); and in a 
number of small towns in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (where 
displaced persons from the Swat valley have temporarily settled in recent 
months). How are the crises of insecurity, of returns and displacement, of inter-
communal divisions, of housing and infrastructure, addressed in these situations 
of 'forced urbanisation'? How can they be addressed through urban policymaking 
and planning? These are all pertinent questions in today's global context which 
will arise repeatedly, and which urban and post-war reconstruction literarure 
must begin to explore. 
8.7 Post-script: Mostar - The poster-child that wasn't 
When this research project was conceived, reunification of 'divided cities', 
through the use of urban planning, seemed to be the central idea to be explored. 
As the exploration progressed, however, I realised that cities all over the world, 
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in developed and developing countries, are divided, for a variety of reasons. Most 
are divided along income or class lines, either due to the dominance of the 
market, or ineffectiveness on part of the state. Many are divided along racial 
and/or ethnic lines, and often these divisions go a long way back in time. These 
themes are explored in detail in Chapter Two. In sum, divided cities are not only 
a product of war. They may be undesirable, but they cannot simply be wished 
away, transformed, or (re)unified overnight. 
This thesis in fact narrates two intertwined stories - the first is that of Mostar, 
and the second, that of EUAM. In the first, it concludes that the multi -ethnic 
ideal view of Mostar which is extensively promoted and widely accepted was but 
a myth, and thus, the ere-establishment' of this ideal, at least in the short term, 
was highly unlikely. 
In the second story. this thesis suggests that the very goal of the EUAM - that of 
re-establishing Mostar as the ideal multi-ethnic, unified city representative of a 
peaceful co-existence in the Muslim-Croat Federation - was flawed. The rhetoric 
was far too ambitious, and in a sense, the EUAM was set up to fail, or at least 
only succeed partially. Its vision was clearly not shared by all local actors, and 
was based on a hasty and shallow understanding of the context. Undoubtedly. a 
few results were achieved, and urban life slowly limped back to normal thanks to 
the Administration's efforts to reconstruct infrastructure and housing, restore 
public services. and establish security. However, by not taking a longer-term, 
strategic view, the international community has also missed the opportunity to 
(re)envision and (re)build Mostar as a city whIch at least offered decent and 
affordable housing, infrastructure or services, a good quality living environment. 
employment opportunities, or any future prospects to its citizens. In my view, 
this is the final lesson from Mostar. For a war-tom city, rather than aiming to 
restore status quo ante, building an "inclusive city" (UN-HABITAT 2002b: 5), 
where the different communities have the right to access services and 
opportunities, and co-exist without the threat of violence, might be a more 
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realistic, more progressive, and infinitely more positive goal. In this process, 
urban planning may not be a sufficient condition, but it is certainly a necessary 
one in order to create a new political geography for the war-tom city. 
Transitional Administrations and other international agencies involved in 






Appendix 1: Interview Schedule (semi-standardised) 
The key dimensions explored through 'elite' interviews are listed below. These 
emerged from the hypotheses and literature review chapters. The exact 
interview questions and order of questioning was different for each respondent. 
• How did urban planning and local governance broadly function in Mostar 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the war? Who controlled local 
development and investment decisions? 
• What was the extent of political influence and public participation in 
planning, under the socialist system? 
• What was the geographic distribution of population in Mostar before 1992? 
Were the major communities fully integrated in terms of their living areas, 
workspaces, public services etc? 
• What was the thinking behind reunification of Mostar, and the strategy and 
tools adopted by the EUAM towards achieving this goal? 
• What were the reasons behind establishment of the six city-municipalities 
and central zone? 
• Did the local communities want a unified city? Do they still want a unified 
city? 
• If the OHR was determined to impose a unified administration on the city of 
Mostar, what instruments or tools (other than the 2004 statute) were used to 
ensure that the city was reunified de facto, not just de jure? 
• What role did other international actors such as bilateral and multilateral 
donors and lending agencies play in the reconstruction of Mostar (setting of 
priorities, funding, implementation etc.?) How did their activities influence 
the reunification agenda? 
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• Did the local stakeholders have any role in determining priorities and 
projects? To what extent were activities undertaken by transitional 
administration and the other international actors responsive to the 'rear 
priorities of the local communities? How was this ensured? 
• How did EUAM relate to the former municipal departments? Was there any 
attempt to use existing information/development plans etc? 
• Were projects selected based on reconciliation and reunification goals? To 
what extent? Who were the key decision-makers? Any specific examples 
(reconstruction projects or planning decisions) which have had a long-term 
impact on reunification (positive or negative)? 
• What was the extent of local political influence on (or control of) urban 
planning under the EUAM and OHR? 
• How did the EUAM and OHR, and other agencies responsible for 
reconstruction, approach urban planning? 
• Was urban planning viewed by the Administration as a long-term agenda, 
and deliberately deferred to domestic authorities or local government 
institutions? 
• Did the EU Administration and OHR understand the significance of urban 
planning or developing a strategic vision or plan for reconstruction, economic 
recovery or reunification? 
• Why did initial efforts towards urban planning under the EUAM fail? 
• Was there a lack on international donor commitment (political support or 
financial resources) to support planning efforts? Why? 
• Do you think the reconstruction process could have been used more 
effectively towards reunification? How? What would you change? 
• What is the legacy of EUAM? 
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• What role could an urban plan play in reunifying the city? Would people 
from both communities buy into a unified vision or development strategy? 
What would be the preconditions for it to succeed? 
A semi-standardised questionnaire for household interviews was also developed. 
Questions related to how Mostar was as a city before the war, how it changed 
during the war, and what it is like now. Living conditions, level of integration, 
priorities of the community etc. were all explored. The respondents were 
predominantly returnees and were contacted through various local and 
international NGOs. However, I didn't succeed in interviewing as many families 
as I had planned. I believe that this was mainly due to the lack of a strategy on 
how to select a sample or contact people, from a fairly diffused universe. I went 
about it in a fairly ad hoc manner, and couldn't get very far. 
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Appendix 2: List of respondents 
Name Designation/organisation I Interview date 
IntematiQllal agen~ n:pre~entatiR~ (past and plJ:5ent) 
1. John Yarwood Former Director of Reconstruction, EUAM 06/03/08 
(now based in the U.K.) 
2. Anatoly D. Viktorov Head of Regional office (South), OHR, 02/09/08 
Mostar 
3. Amela Bozic Political officer, OHR, Mostar, ex-EUAM 03/09/08 
4. Vesna FranCic W orId Bank, Sarajevo 11109/08 
5. Mark Wheeler Political Adviser, OHR, Sarajevo 11109/08 
6. Kendall Palmer OSCE, Mostar 24/09/08 
7. Maja Hadzizukovic UNHCR, Sarajevo 26/09/08 
8. Richard Williams Former Head, Mostar Implementation 13/05/09 
Unit (now based in the U.K.) 
Urhm plannen. urbani~ta 
9. Said Jamakovic Director, Cantonal Planning Institute, 10/09/08 
Sarajevo 
10. Vjekoslava Sankovic Urbanist, University of Sarajevo 11109/08 
SimCic 
11. Sead Pintul Former head of urban planning, east 03/09/08 
Mostar 
12. Salko-Salem Bubalo Director, Spatial Development Institute. 04/09/08 
Mostar 
13. Senada Demirovic Architect-planner. Department of 09/09/08 
Urbanism, Grad Mostar 




15. Lejla Catie Head of urban planning section, Grad 18/09/08 
Mostar 
16. Zoran Bosnjak Urban planning section, Grad Mostar 18/09/08 
17. Franjo Boskovie Urban reconstruction section, Grad 19/09/08 
Mostar 
18. Borislav Puljie Architect-planner, ex-EUAM 22/09/08 
19. Milada Elezovie Agencija "Stari Grad", Mostar 23/09/08 
20. Marica Raspudie Urban inspections department, Grad 24/09/08 
Mostar, ex-EUAM 
21. Nihad Cengic Urbanist, University of Sarajevo 26/09/08 
22. Hans Skotte Associate Professor, Department of Urban 26/09/08 
Design and Planning, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology 
(NINU), Trondheim (Interviewed 
Sarajevo) 
23. Amir Pasie Architect/urbanist, Mostar 29/09/08 
Qther lQ~1Il government offidlb. MQHDl 
24. Sanela Kameric International affairs officer, Grad Mostar 16/09/08 
25. Adnin Hasie Member of City Council, Mostar 18/09/08 
26. Murat Corie President of City Council, Mostar 22/09/08 
Indel!endent prQfe&&iQnW&. NGO repre&entlltive&. MQ&mt 
27. Aida Omanovie RESCA TE (NGO), Mostar 02/09/08 
28. Elvir Duliman Nansen Dialogue Centre (NGO), Mostar 15/09/08 




30. Mirsad Behrarn Journalist, Radio Television Mostar 08/09/08 
(RTM) 
31. Anita Zovko Journalist, Federal Television Mostar 27/09/08 
Mastar ,itizenslReturnees 
32. Family Huskovic Bosniac returnees, Santica street 09/09/08 
33. Family Habibje Bosniac returnees, Podhum 09/09/08 
34. Majda Omanovic Bosniac returnee, west Mostar 19/09/08 
35. Klaudija Babic Croat returnee, Rodoc 24/09/08 
36. Vujadin Berberovic Serb returnee, Ortijd 05/09/08 
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